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vAbstract
In 1999 Europe, through the European Commission and the European
Space Agency, began detailed definition of a second generation Global
Navigation Satellite System (GNSS). This GNSS development
programme, known as “Galileo”, was intended to both complement and
compete against the existing US Global Positioning System (GPS).
Unlike GPS, Galileo is intended to be privately financed, following the
initial development investment from the EC and ESA, which implies that
Galileo should provide some revenue-earning services. From its earliest
inception, the basis of these services has been assumed to be through
the provision of Signal Integrity through an Integrity Flag broadcast
through the Galileo system– a service which GPS cannot provide without
some external system augmentation. This thesis undertakes a critical
evaluation of the value of this integrity system in Galileo.
This thesis has two parts. The first demonstrates that the conditions
required to attract adequate private finance to the Galileo programme
are incompatible with the system architecture derived from the early
Galileo system studies and taken forward into the system early
deployment phase, which includes an Integrity system within Galileo.
The second part of this thesis aims to demonstrate that receivers which
can combine the signals from GPS and Galileo may offer a free Integrity
service which meet the needs of the majority of users, possibly up to the
standards required for aviation precision approach. A novel Receiver
Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) technique is described, using
an Errors in Variables/Total Least Squares approach to the detection of
inconsistencies in an over-determined set of GNSS signal
measurements. The mathematical basis for this technique is presented,
along with results which compare the simulated performance of receivers
using this algorithm against the expected performance of Galileo’s
internal integrity determination system.
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11. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose and Scope
This thesis has been produced as a result of the author’s involvement in
a number of aspects of the European “Galileo” satellite navigation
programme, since the early definition phase of the system. The Galileo
programme is, at the time of writing, arguably the most significant space
engineering programme currently being undertaken within Europe. Apart
from the technical challenges associated with developing a highly
accurate global navigation and timing system, the development of the
Galileo programme also has a number of political, economic and
managerial hurdles to overcome before the system can be deployed.
When the Council of European Transport Ministers declared an intention
to proceed with the initial definition of a civil-owned and operated satellite
navigation system in June 1999 it seemed that Galileo would provide an
example of European industrial co-operation breaking a virtual US
monopoly, in a similar way to Airbus and Ariane in the airliner and space
launcher fields, respectively. Although the European Commission and
European Space Agency had put in enormous effort into pushing the
programme forward, a number of key technical, political and financial
issues remained unresolved.
Foremost amongst these was the issue of funding. From its inception,
Galileo has been presented as a project to be funded as some form of
Public/Private Partnership (PPP), in which commerce and industry would
subscribe to the programme in return for revenues to be earned from
commercial exploitation of the Galileo signals. This thesis will
demonstrate that the existence of the American Global Positioning
System (GPS), with its free-to-air signals, and plans for significant
performance upgrades over the next decade or so, make the case for a
PPP for Galileo, as currently defined, unsustainable. Specifically, this
thesis will demonstrate that the Integrity Determination System, a key
element and design driver in the Galileo architecture, adds significant
cost to the system which can never be recouped through sale of any
integrity-dependent services.
As a research project under the Engineering and Physical Sciences
Research Council’s (EPSRC) “Total Technology PhD” programme, this
thesis has two components:
• A “management” element, which presents the results of an analysis
of the business case used to justify the inclusion of a discrete
Integrity Determination System in the Galileo architecture. This
includes the results arising from two surveys with which the author
was involved into the aspirations held by the European (or,
2specifically, UK) satellite navigation industry for Galileo, and a
separate review of a business case for Galileo developed by
PriceWaterhouseCoopers;
• A “technical” element, which presents the results of an analysis of the
predicted performance of a combined future GPS/Galileo
constellation when used to undertake receiver autonomous integrity
monitoring.
The technical element, which is by far the larger component, considers
the use of techniques known as Receiver Autonomous Integrity
Monitoring (RAIM) as a low cost alternative to the inclusion of a
dedicated integrity function within Galileo. Specifically, a novel RAIM
algorithm, based on a mathematical technique known as “Errors in
Variables” or Total Least Squares through Singular Value Decomposition
is developed. This technique is shown, under certain conditions,  to offer
integrity performance significantly better than traditional Least Squares
Residuals RAIM techniques, and a patent has been applied for, to
protect the commercial applicability of this process.
The implication of these results, especially when considered along with
the results of the management element, is that the Galileo baseline
architecture is over-designed; the Integrity Determination System is an
unnecessary expense, the costs of which are unlikely to be recouped
from commercial operations, and therefore should be removed from the
baseline Galileo system architecture.
1.2 Background
Since the US-owned and operated Global Positioning System first
started transmitting signals that could be used by civilians for accurate
position, velocity and timing (PVT) applications in the mid-1980s, a huge
satellite navigation (satnav) industry has developed. Although the
industrial segment dedicated to hardware (i.e. GPS chipsets and their
associated receivers) is largely American, European industry plays a
leading role in the development of applications and services which use
GPS signals.
GPS does not have a monopoly on satellite navigation (the Russian
GLONASS system is still operational, China launched its first military
navigation satellite in late 2000 and a number of small commercial
satnav systems have been launched in the last twenty years), but its
signal is recognised as the de facto standard. Originally conceived and
deployed as a US military system, GPS is still funded mainly by the
Pentagon, although latterly the US Department of Transportation has
also contributed to the system, in recognition of its importance as an
asset to civil commerce and industry. More significantly, GPS remains
under US military control and will remain so for the foreseeable future,
although statutes have been passed committing the United States to the
3continued free provision of a civil GPS signal, within the constraints of its
primary, military mission.
The importance of GPS to commerce and industry is not confined to the
United States; European users in industries as diverse as oil
prospecting, agriculture and road haulage have become increasingly
reliant on signals from the GPS constellation of satellites. Not wishing to
remain reliant on the United States for access to what is increasingly
regarded as a critical resource, the European Union (EU) has embarked
on a satellite navigation programme of its own. This programme began in
1996 with the go-ahead for development of EGNOS, the European
Geostationary Navigation Overlay System. As its name suggests,
EGNOS is not a global satnav system in itself; it is an extension to the
GPS and GLONASS systems, comprising a network of ground stations
which monitor the accuracy of the satnav signals being transmitted over
Europe. Dedicated EGNOS payloads are piggy-backed on various
Geostationary communication satellites to enable signal correction and
integrity warning signals to be broadcast to GPS and GLONASS users.
EGNOS is Europe’s contribution to the Global Navigation Satellite
System Phase 1 (GNSS-1). As well as GPS, GLONASS and EGNOS,
the GNSS-1 architecture is currently planned to comprise the Wide Area
Augmentation System (WAAS), and the Multi-Transport Satellite
Augmentation System (MSAS) which, when fully operational, will provide
EGNOS-type overlay services to North America and Japan/Far East
respectively.
The system performance specifications for EGNOS and the other
overlay systems (generically referred to as space-based augmentation
systems or SBAS) are, in general, driven by the requirements of civil
aviation. More specifically, the defining specifications for SBAS are those
that would allow the systems at Full Operational Capability (FOC) to be
certified for use for Category 1 (Cat I) precision approaches, in
accordance with the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO)
standards. Thus, in the US WAAS is funded primarily by the Federal
Aviation Authority (FAA), and in Europe EGNOS is partially funded by
organisations such as NATS (UK National Air Traffic Services) – and
hence, indirectly, by the airlines themselves, as the prospective
beneficiaries of the service.
Being reliant on Geostationary satellites for the transmission of
correction and integrity signals (and hence suffering from “blocking” of
the signal in built-up areas), WAAS and EGNOS cannot be regarded as
truly ‘multi-modal’ – they may eventually be suitable for Cat I approaches
to airports but they offer little benefit to rail and road users in urban
areas, for example. The European approach to GNSS Phase 2 is to
develop and deploy its own global constellation of navigation satellites,
under a programme given the title Galileo.
4In 1998 the European Space Agency (ESA) commissioned the
Comparative System Study (CSS) to consider various possible
architectures for a European-owned GNSS-2 constellation. In parallel,
the European Commission, working under the auspices of the
Directorate General of Transport and Energy (DG TREN) of the
European Union, began a series of studies to determine the case for a
European satnav system independent from GPS, and to consider issues
such as how such a system should be funded.
By June 1999 the Council of European Transport Ministers made a
declaration on its intention to proceed with the initial definition of the
Galileo system. ESA was to take the lead for definition of the space and
associated ground segments, under its GalileoSat programme, while the
EU itself would manage a series of associated studies to run in parallel
with ESA’s system engineering activities. These EU studies included:
• GALA – Galileo overall architecture study
• GEMINUS – Galileo system and service definition study
• GALSAS – The Structural Analysis Study of the European Satellite
Navigation Applications Segment.
In order to provide a justification for the development of the Galileo
system over and above the desire for European independence from GPS
for satellite navigation services, a set of high-level requirements which
would distinguish Galileo from GPS were agreed between ESA and the
EU, and presented as a “High Level Definition” (HLD) document. From
these requirements a set of system specifications were developed and
formally issued as ESA’s “System Requirements Document” (SRD)
which, through a number of revisions over GalileoSat Phase B and
subsequent studies, form the basis of the system specification for
Galileo. The high-level requirements behind the SRD highlighted the
perceived shortcomings of GPS, and hence were intended to provide the
justification for the development of Galileo. These shortcomings may be
considered to be:
• GPS does not transmit an integrity signal. Although a “satellite health
flag” in the navigation message broadcast by each satellite provides
a limited form of integrity, the nominal update rate for this flag is too
infrequent to allow it to be used for safety critical applications (such
as aviation);
• The Coarse Acquisition (C/A) signal which GPS provides for civilian
use may be degraded or even turned off at the discretion of the
United States military command;
• The C/A signal transmitted by the current generation of GPS
satellites is broadcast on a single frequency, whereas in order to
make accurate corrections to compensate for ionospheric signal
delays coherent transmission on two frequencies is required;
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international aviation authorities are unable to certify GPS as a
primary navigation aid, even though it provides navigation accuracy
some orders of magnitude better than any available terrestrial
systems;
• The GPS constellation has been sized to provide acceptable
accuracy and availability in military operational environments.
Typically these have largely unobstructed views from horizon to
horizon. As a result the availability of GPS (i.e. the fraction of time
when at least 4 satellites are visible) is restricted in urban
environments;
• The GPS service is provided at risk to the user, with no guarantee of
accuracy or availability, and with no liability for the performance of the
system.
The baseline system architecture for Galileo arising from the ESA
Comparative System Study and fed into the GalileoSat SRD was
developed to create a system which addresses these shortcomings.
A key element of the GalileoSat baseline definition is that the system
should meet its specifications stand-alone, i.e. it must be able to operate
entirely independently of GPS. However, because GPS is recognised as
being the de facto standard for satellite navigation and, with the
enhancements planned for GPS in the next two decades and the
projected market for accurate positioning services, Galileo also has a
driving requirement that its signal must be compatible and interoperable
with that of GPS. That is to say Galileo should not present undue
interference to the GPS signals, and it should be relatively easy to
manufacture receivers that can combine signals from the two
constellations such that within the derived navigation equation it is
transparent whether any or all of the satellites being used are Galileo or
GPS satellites.
A separate element of the Galileo programme that is crucial to this thesis
is the political requirement that a significant proportion of private funding
should be used to develop, deploy and operate the system. Since GPS
has led to the development of a vast civil industry (mainly in the US),
both in the manufacture of equipment and in the development of
applications and services, it is reasonable to assume that the
deployment of Galileo would stimulate similar industrial benefits in
Europe. Private industry stands to gain significant rewards from the
development and deployment of this system, and current dogma dictates
that the system should be at least partly funded from private investment,
through some form of Public-Private Partnership (PPP).
GalileoSat Phase B was followed by ESA’s Galileo Phase B2 (Design
and Development Phase), and Phase C0 (Detailed Development)
activities. In turn, European Union funds were committed to the Galilei
6studies – successors to GEMINUS and GALA, and intended to develop
further the full system and service definition, along with a better
understanding of the business case for Galileo.
1.3 Thesis Objectives and Problem Statement
The apparently unrelated requirements on the Galileo programme
mentioned above (specifically, the desire for stand-alone performance at
least as good as GPS; the inclusion of a near real time integrity signal;
interoperability with GPS; and funding from a Public-Private Partnership)
can be combined to formulate the problem statement for this thesis as
follows:
The conditions required to attract adequate private finance to the
Galileo programme are incompatible with the system architecture
derived from the results of the ESA Comparative System Study,
GalileoSat and GALA system definition activities. Receivers which
can combine the free-to-air signals from future GPS and the Galileo
Open Access Service will offer performance (in terms of position,
velocity and timing accuracy, availability, integrity and continuity of
service) which meet the needs of the vast majority of users.
Specifically, Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM)
techniques applied to a combined Galileo/GPS constellation will
offer adequate system integrity for the majority of users. In order to
attract private investment into the Galileo programme the system
specifications need to be re-evaluated to meet the requirements of
the mass market, and the system architecture needs to be
simplified accordingly.
The ultimate objective of this thesis is to test this problem statement and,
one hopes, to demonstrate that the Galileo programme is more likely to
be successful financially and technically by moving some of the
requirements for meeting integrity performance specifications away from
the system infrastructure, and into the user receivers. The enabling
objectives to test this hypothesis include:
• Demonstration that the business case for inclusion of an Integrity
Determination System within the Galileo infrastructure is unsound, as
currently specified.
• Demonstration that by combining the free-to-air signals from GPS
with the free-to-air signals from Galileo, currently implemented
standard RAIM algorithms can provide overall performance that
exceeds the current specifications for the Galileo Commercial Access
Service ;
• Development and evaluation of a novel RAIM technique, which offers
accuracy and integrity performance that is comparable to the
7requirements for civil aviation Category I (Cat I) precision
approaches, and hence exceeds the current specifications for the
Galileo Safety of Life Service;
• Demonstration that this novel RAIM technique can be shown, by
simulation, to meet the specified requirements for false alarm and
missed detection probabilities for aviation precision approach
applications.
As will be shown, the Galileo programme faces a number of technical,
managerial and financial challenges. The research performed for the
production of this thesis was undertaken under a number of activities
intended to revisit some of the systems engineering decisions leading to
the Galileo system and mission requirements specifications. It is hoped
that the results herein may lead to a design simplification, and hence
cost reduction, for Galileo.
1.4 Approach
This thesis has two distinct but closely related components:
• The Integrity Justification Study: A financial analysis, based on an
appraisal of underlying assumptions made in an EC-sponsored study
into the business case for Galileo. These results are put into context
with an analysis of two surveys into the views of key members of the
UK satellite navigation industry. From these surveys, subjective
statements from representatives of various industrial, commercial and
administrative organisations, regarding the justification for Galileo as
a whole, and its various proposed services are distilled into an
argument regarding the justification for the IDS;
• The RAIM Study: The development and analysis of a novel RAIM
algorithm that can be applied to a combined Galileo/GPS
constellation to meet the needs of aviation users, which
demonstrates that the Integrity Dissemination System currently
included in the design of the Galileo ground segment is an
unnecessary cost that would not be attractive to private investors and
hence ought to be removed, or at least substantially de-scoped in its
required stand-alone performance.
In general terms, the non-technical element of this thesis attempts to
undertake an investment analysis from the perspective of a potential
private investor considering funding the Galileo programme.
Although in the recent development of Galileo a number of studies have
been performed which purport to be cost-benefit analyses (CBA) of one
form or another, these invariably have been performed from the point of
view of the EC or other Governmental agencies, and have attempted to
provide a justification for Galileo based upon the macro-economic
8benefits the system is expected to provide as a return on the public
investment. Instead, the Integrity Justification Study presents a critical
assessment of the projected market for satellite navigation applications
in Europe, and derives conclusions about likely revenue streams for
Galileo commercial services.
The technical component of this thesis, the “RAIM Study”, considers how
Galileo is likely to perform in an environment in which GPS is offering
dual-frequency free-to-air signals. Taking the often observed
phenomenon that if there is a way to get a useful service for free,
somebody will find a way to get it, this thesis concentrates on the use of
RAIM techniques to provide an alternative to Galileo’s controlled-access
integrity signal. This study compares the likely performance of an
advanced RAIM algorithm developed by the author with the specified
performance for Galileo’s commercial and safety-of-life services.
The conclusions of these two studies together strongly support the
problem statement presented in the previous section. It is therefore
recommended that potential investors in the system and other agencies
involved in funding and specifying the Galileo system should call for a
removal of signal integrity dissemination from within the Galileo
specifications.
1.5 An Introduction to RAIM
Given the central role that the concept of Receiver Autonomous Integrity
Monitoring has to this thesis, it is worth presenting a brief introduction to
RAIM at this point, although it is discussed more fully within the RAIM
Study.
As mentioned previously, the provision of signal integrity from within the
Galileo system itself is seen as a key differentiator between Galileo and
GPS. In this context “Integrity” is defined as:
“…the trust which can be placed in the correctness of the information
supplied by the total system. Integrity includes the ability of a system to
provide timely and valid warnings to the user when the system must not
be used for the intended operation”.
Section 5.4.2 provides a fuller explanation of the meaning of this
definition. In simple terms, Integrity is the property that someone using
the system for a safety-critical purpose, such as landing an aircraft in
poor weather, needs to have confidence that if something goes wrong
and their estimate of position (i.e. altitude) is incorrect, they will be given
correct and timely warning.
It is possible to provide integrity through some kind of external
augmentation system (for example, the WAAS and EGNOS systems
9referred to previously) or, as is currently defined for Galileo, by building it
into the system specifications from the outset. The problem is that any
such system is inevitably expensive, with its need for multiple
redundancy in all critical systems including wide area communications
networks, software developed to the most exhaustive level of test and
validation and, most critically, with extremely demanding specifications
on time to alarm (TTA). The Integrity Justification Study within this thesis
demonstrates this point.
An alternative method of providing signal integrity information is through
Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring techniques. These algorithms
rely on users being able to access more satellites than the minimum
number required for a navigation solution, in order to estimate the
integrity of the signal from these redundant measurements. Currently,
with a GPS constellation of 24 satellites providing only a single
frequency in its Standard Positioning Service (SPS), RAIM cannot meet
Category I requirements for aviation precision approach, although RAIM-
enabled receivers can be used as a navigation aid for less demanding
phases of flight. However, by using both Galileo and upgraded GPS
systems together the quality of the integrity information available from
RAIM algorithms will increase dramatically, due to both the increased
size of the useable constellation and the improved accuracy of the
signals compared with current GPS.
The idea that the relatively simple methods that underpin most RAIM
algorithms could be used as an alternative to the complex, monolithic
integrity determination systems mentioned above is quite divisive within
the GNSS world. On the one hand, there is an argument that the best
place to evaluate the quality of a user’s position solution is at the
receiver itself, enabling both local effects and system-level faults to be
detected, which implies the use of some form of RAIM. On the other
hand, the argument is made that with a wide network of ground receivers
a dedicated integrity determination system should always be able to
detect a potentially hazardous error on a broadcast signal before an
individual user’s RAIM algorithm.
This thesis attempts to evaluate the likely performance of RAIM
algorithms in a future GNSS environment in which users have access to
signals from more than one system simultaneously. This over-
determination of the navigation position solution from the large number
of received ranging measurements potentially allows users to apply
RAIM to a level appropriate for aviation precision approach.
1.6 Structure
The structure of this thesis is intended to allow the two discrete studies
discussed previously to be read and understood in isolation, if required.
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• Chapters 2 and 3 provides the background to the “Integrity
Justification Study”, along with a literature review and description of
the methods used. This effectively identifies the state of the art for the
cost benefit analyses for Galileo at the time this research was
undertaken.
• Chapter 4 provides the results and conclusions for this study,
including some simple financial analyses. Additional results from
surveys undertaken for this study are provided in Appendix A.
• Chapter 5 provides the background to the RAIM study including
literature search, whilst Chapters 6 and 7 describe the various tools
used and assumptions taken.
• Chapter 8 presents a detailed processing model of the core
functionality utilised in the various simulation tools and techniques
used in the RAIM study.
• Chapters 9, 10 and 11 define, in some detail, the two RAIM methods
(one well established, one novel) evaluated in this thesis, along with
a numerical example for each. Chapter 12 presents the results
obtained from various forms of simulation used to evaluate the
performance of these algorithms.
• Chapters 13 and 14 discuss these results, and bring their conclusions
together with the findings from the Integrity Justification Study. These
lead to some recommendations, including identification of scope for
further work.
1.7 Originality of Work
Throughout this thesis extensive references are made to other people’s
work, and to work produced by the author when working as part of a
team. As a result, it is not always immediately apparent what elements of
the subsequent text, and associated figures and tables, are original work
produced by the author in the context of this thesis. To provide clarity
this section lists those elements of this thesis which the author does not
claim as original work.
The following figures and tables have been taken from the GALSAS
study [1], for which the author was co-credited, but which are not claimed
as original results for this thesis:
• Figure 4-2
• Table 3-1, Table 4-1.
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In addition, text appearing in Sections 2.3, 3.2, and 4.2 is largely taken
from the GALSAS study report, for which the author can only claim
partial credit.
The following figures and tables have been taken from GEMINUS [2]
GALA [3], and Inception study [4] documents or ICAO requirements
documents:
• Figure 3-1, Figure 3-2, Figure 4-3, Figure 4-4, Figure 4-7.
• Table 4-2, Table 5-1, Table 5-2.
Within the RAIM Study, the following figure is taken directly from the
GALA study describing the Galileo baseline Integrity system:
• Figure 5-1
Also within the RAIM Study, when describing the Least Squares
Residuals, Marginally Detectable Errors and Errors in Variables RAIM
methods, a number of equations and some explanatory text has been
taken directly from the source documents referred to in the
corresponding sections. Sections within this thesis which use equations
and text in this way are:
• Sections 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 10.1 and 10.2.
Any other direct quotations from source documents are clearly marked
and attributed in the text.
The software and simulation tools used in the RAIM study have been
developed either by the author, or under the direction of the author.
Specifically, all prototype tools developed in Excel or Matlab were
produced by the author, whereas the further development of these tools
as C++ or Matlab applications were produced by the author’s colleagues
at VEGA, as previously acknowledged. The underlying specifications for
all of these tools were defined by the author, and are as given in the
detailed processing model and RAIM method definition sections of this
thesis. The author acknowledges that these tools were coded with an
elegance and efficiency for which he has boundless admiration.
These software and simulation tools are held by VEGA Group plc
(www.vega-group.com) and could be made available under licence to
any interested parties, on request.
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2. BACKGROUND TO THE INTEGRITY JUSTIFICATION STUDY
2.1 Introduction
When the European Council of Transport Ministers failed to endorse the
European Commission’s proposals for the full-scale development of
Galileo at their meeting on 20th December 2000 the most critical open
question regarded the plans for a PPP. Specifically, the Council
demanded evidence that the programme would be sufficiently attractive
to private investors that public funding for the project could be capped.
The EC position paper presented at this meeting presented a cost and
funding profile for the programme that showed a total cost of 3.25 Billion
Euro up until 2008, of which 1.5 Billion Euro were expected to come from
the private sector. In addition, annual running costs of 225 Million Euro
were presented as an additional cost that the private “Galileo Vehicle
Company” (GVC) would be expected to cover.
2.2 The PwC “Inception” Study
Similarly, when the Council of Transport Ministers again failed to agree
on plans for the next phase of the Galileo programme in December
2001, the major cause was the then recently published “Inception” study
[4], performed by a team led by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), which
concluded:
“…our analysis shows that the economics of Galileo do
not support investment by the private sector on purely
financial criteria, but that the benefit to the European
economy should be significant. The reason is a market
imperfection. Many of the benefits, such as improved
efficiency in the use of airline fleets, are likely to accrue to
consumers rather than be captured by the industries that
use Galileo services, because competition will ensure that
the value cannot be realised in higher prices. Industrial
users of the service will not therefore be able to increase
margins to make a payment to the Galileo operator. There
should however be a case for the public sector to promote
Galileo if it can do so at a cost which represents value for
money for the economy as a whole taking account of the
wider economic and strategic benefits.”
As will be discussed subsequently, the Inception study goes on to
propose a PPP based on a “Concession Company Model”, in which an
annual  “Level of Availability Payment” (basically, a service charge) is
made from public funds to the GVC (or “Concession Owner”). The
amount of this payment is related to the amount of public funding
provided for the development and deployment phases (e.g. with 0.8
13
Billion Euro public funding of deployment costs, the Level of Availability
Payment would be about 390 Million Euro per year. With 1.4 Billion Euro
public funding of deployment costs, the Level of Availability Payment
would be about 270 Million Euro per year).
In January 2002, and in preparation for the eventually decisive meeting
of the Council of European Transport Ministers in March 2002, the
European Commission issued an “Information Note” on the Galileo
programme. Although not explicit in the amount of private funding the EC
envisages the project requiring, and whilst proposing a funding
mechanism at odds with the conclusions of the Inception study (the EC
preferring a “Joint Undertaking”, for which Galileo required the first such
company structure to be set up under Article 171 of the Treaty under
which the EC operates), the overall costs to deploy and operate Galileo
broadly agreed with PwC’s estimates.
This thesis will demonstrate that such a high level of annual public
payments or private investment is both implausible and unnecessary; the
design of Galileo arising from the CSS and GalileoSat studies contains
elements which add significant cost to the system but, in practice, will
offer little direct benefit to users. Specifically, the proposed Integrity
Determination System (IDS1), which in many ways is currently driving the
whole system architecture, offers no functionality that cannot be more
easily achieved at user-segment level by combining free-to-air signals
from Galileo with those from GPS. As a result, in its incarnation at the
time of writing, Galileo will not gain sufficient private investment to be
viable.
2.3 Galileo Structural Analysis Survey (GALSAS)
The technical component of this thesis is put into context by combining
its results with the satellite navigation market analysis study performed
as the non-technical component. The Galileo Structural Analysis Survey
(GALSAS) provides information on current and forecast markets for
various satnav applications, and these results are used to estimate
revenues for the different architectural cases analysed in the technical
component.
The European Commission contracted the study “Structural Analysis of
the European Satellite Navigation Application Segment” [1] to obtain an
improved understanding of the European satellite navigation market and
                                           
1
 In a major revision to the Galileo architecture in December 2001, the IDS as a discrete element
was removed from the baseline. However, the functionality remains, with the earlier “Integrity
Control Centre” and “Navigation Control Facility” now combined into a “Mission Control Facility”.
Although the term IDS is now not used in the Galileo programme, it is kept in this thesis because
it covers the functionality whose value is questioned, rather than physical elements of the system.
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the driving forces for future market development. The major objectives of
the study were to provide:
• Market segmentation and structural characteristics of the
downstream value chain of the service supply segment
• An outline of future development scenarios regarding the European
satellite navigation industry over the next 10 – 15 years putting
particular emphasis on the intended GALILEO programme
• Recommendations concerning improving and sustaining Europe's
competitiveness in the area of satellite navigation as a conclusion of
the analysis.
The study, which was executed by TECHNOMAR and its partners VEGA
and METAMARKET during 2000, is based on extensive field research;
nearly 100 face-to-face and telephone interviews with suppliers of
satellite navigation based products and services, authorities and
additional experts were conducted. During these interviews the market
figures collected from various studies were completed and checked for
plausibility. Additionally, an Executive Seminar to deepen the study
findings was held with representatives from industry.
This study provides an objective and independent market-oriented
picture of the position of the European satellite navigation industry and
its perspectives at the time of the early definition of the Galileo system.
From May – October 2000 the author was on the team responsible for
the GALSAS study, and the results of this industrial and market survey
provide a key input to this thesis, as discussed subsequently. Some
elements of the description of methods and consolidated results have
been taken directly from the published study report [1].
2.4 ESA GalileoSat Phase B and Galileo Phase B2
In November 1999 ESA issued the contract for the GalileoSat Phase B
(System Definition) study (the Comparative System Study having
effectively been the Phase A activity). This 20M Euro contract was not let
competitively; instead, Alenia Spazio of Italy was encouraged by ESA to
form a consortium comprising nearly 50 different countries from all over
Europe, and work-packages were issued to these countries in order to
meet the ESA principle of juste retour for financial contributions from
member states. Within the GalileoSat Phase B study the author,
representing VEGA Group PLC of the UK, led a team of technical staff
from which produced a number of documents which together comprise
the Operations and Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) Analysis for
GalileoSat Phase B.
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In August 2001 the next phase of ESA’s programme began. Since this
phase was not yet a full development/deployment phase (Phase C/D in
ESA terminology), and since the terms “Galileo” and “GalileoSat” had
caused confusion in the earlier studies (GalileoSat being specifically the
ESA programme), the new contract was entitled “Galileo Phase B2”.
Once again awarded to Alenia Spazio, although now acting in a joint
venture with Alcatel Space Industries of France, Astrium GmbH of
Germany and Astrium Ltd of the UK, known collectively as “Galileo
Industries” (GaIn). Again, the author led a multi-national technical team,),
this time on the development of the “Operations Support Requirements
Document” (OSRD) for Galileo.
These activities provided the design information and performance
specifications that are used in development of the arguments in the
conclusion of the Integrity Justification Study.
2.5 Other Studies – GALA and GEMINUS
Although a number of studies purporting to be market assessments, cost
benefit analyses and service definition for Galileo have taken place since
the June 1999 Declaration to proceed with Galileo’s definition, the most
prominent (along with “Inception”) are GALA (Galileo Overall
Architecture Study) and GEMINUS (Galileo system and service
definition).
As stated in [2], the objectives of GEMINUS were
 “to provide:
• A review of existing and new user requirements investigations;
• A comprehensive list of institutional requirements;
• A comprehensive list of economic and financial requirements and
recommendations required for the implementation of the ad-hoc
financial mechanisms;
• Timely inputs to the Galileo Program Management Board for
coordination with the PPP approach.”
The GALA study was decomposed into a number of work packages. The
most significant for this Integrity Justification Study are:
• WP 1 Market Research Methods and Overall Results;
• WP 2 Overall Requirements and System Trade-Offs;
• WP 9 Programmatics and Business Issues.
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The intention was that GALA and GEMINUS combined would produce a
set of Galileo service specifications, along with system-level
requirements and a high-level system architecture, closely aligned with
the needs and market prospects of satellite navigation system users.
These two studies were undertaken in parallel, with activities within both
GALA and GEMINUS intended to ensure the consistency of the results.
The extent to which this was achieved is debatable. There is much
overlap in the scope of the outputs from both studies, and the
terminology used, for example to define services, is inconsistent across
the studies. Nevertheless, these studies were used to produce Galileo
Mission Requirements and System Requirements documents on which
the subsequent Galileo Phase B and Phase B2 activities have been
based. A critical conclusion derived from these studies is that Galileo
needs an Integrity Determination System included within its architecture
[3].
The Integrity Justification Study described in the following sections
provides a critique of the methods used to form this conclusion.
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3. METHODS AND LITERATURE (INTEGRITY JUSTIFICATION
STUDY)
3.1 Introduction
This section of the thesis brings together various assessments of the
market for satellite navigation applications in order to derive conclusions
relevant to the problem statement for this thesis. Two surveys
undertaken by the author (for the GALSAS Study and the UK Industrial
Space Committee’s “Galileo Working Group”) provide the primary
research for this section. In addition, results from the Inception study
have been analysed, and the business case reproduced using an
architecture without an Integrity Determination System. Other relevant
reports and working notes arising from the GALA and  GEMINUS studies
have also been analysed, with key results presented subsequently.
Inevitably, the process of selectively extracting quotations, figures and
opinions from a limited number of study reports and interviews in order to
support a problem statement cannot be presented as objective and
definitive evidence. However, it is hoped that the methods used in this
section demonstrate a logical argument regarding the way the Galileo
architecture has developed, and how this architecture is inconsistent with
the other demands on the programme.
Section 4 presents the results arising from the primary research and
literature survey conducted in this part of the thesis, concluding with a
consolidation of these results into a logical argument that links this
Integrity Justification Study with the subsequent RAIM Study.
3.2 The GALSAS Study
The results from the GALSAS study presented in Section 4 have been
derived using two distinct methods:
1. “Primary Research”, i.e. the results from face-to-face and telephone
interviews conducted by the author, some of which are presented in
summary form at Appendix A;
2. “Consolidated Research”, i.e. results presented in the Structural
Analysis Survey final report, which brought together the primary
results from a number of researchers and derived a number of
estimates regarding the likely market for GNSS applications over the
next two decades.
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3.2.1 Primary Research Interview Guidelines
The primary research interviews were conducted following simple
interview guidelines with the following headings:
• Profile of the company
• GNSS related product or service programme
• Brief description of the programme content
• The company's position within the satnav value-adding chain
• Geographical area of related business activity
• When were these activities started?
• Motivation of the company to enter the GNSS market
• Intended further extension of activities (what, when, why)
• Core business activity of the company and strategic links to
GNSS activities
• Company data
• Total employment
• Total turnover
• Independent company or subsidiary/part of a group of companies
• Competitive Environment
• What or who are the major competitors of the company in the
relevant market segment?
• What is the market position of the company and of the major
competitors (market share or ranking; are there any companies
dominating the market? Which ones?)
• What does the company expect as the development of the
competitive environment? Will there be new suppliers and for
what reasons, e.g. motivation for entering the GNSS market, core
business and links to GNSS, strategic orientation?
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• How does the company expect the future role of the European
satnav industry in the relevant market to develop? Differentiate
between receiver, system, and service suppliers.
• Market Data
• Company's market estimates (by country, European, global):
market potential, current market volume, mid-term trend.
• Technology
• How far do the current GNSS systems (GPS, GLONASS) or any
other relevant navigation sources such as Loran, or GSM
extensions NOT meet the requirements in the market segments
covered by the company? What are the major deficiencies to be
improved?
• What are the expected mid- to long-term technological trends
influencing market development in the  market
segments/applications covered by the company, e.g.
• Reduction of currently existing technical market barriers
• New product solutions
• Extension or alteration of existing applications due to new or
improved product solutions
• New/additional applications
• New service concepts expected due to new or improved
products and technological trends
• Market trends and factors
• Introduction or modification of regulations, legal measures, etc.
requiring or stimulating a new application of the GNSS signal
(navigation, positioning, timing etc.), particularly in the transport
sector, e.g. road pricing, Free Flight, etc.
• Emergence of new product or service markets using GNSS as a
component
• Development and introduction of new applications by the users
themselves, e.g. telematic systems, mobile communication
services
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• Mid-term trends related to costs/prices of the relevant products
and services
• What are the factors hindering market development?
o Technological factors (on GNSS side, on user side), e.g.
accuracy, availability, etc.
o Economic factors, e.g. product price, service fees, etc.
o Regulatory factors (standards, regulations, etc.)
• What should be done to reduce these barriers?
• What are the basic requirements (e.g. completed certification,
agreement of frequencies, etc.), and what time would be required
to launch a new Galileo based product / service on the market?
• Market reaction to the introduction of Galileo
• Conclusions
Results from this survey are presented in Section 4.1
3.2.2 Consolidated Research
The following description is taken verbatim from the final report of the
Structural Analysis Survey [1].
“The data collection phase of this study was performed as follows:
• Desk research
• Evaluation of relevant literature, market studies provided by DG
TREN or previously produced by members of the study team;
• Database research to collect additional market information,
suppliers of satnav products and services, and to identify those
market players to be interviewed during field research
• Field research
• Face-to-face interviews and telephone interviews  with:
• Suppliers of GNSS-based products and services
• Major users of GNSS-based products and services
• Industrial associations
• Research institutes
• Regulatory bodies and supervisory authorities
21
• Governmental institutions and agencies
• The interviews have been conducted by the members of the
project team with industry managers or officers in charge of the
company's or authority's GNSS related activities, i.e. usually the
marketing or business development manager in the case of
suppliers.
• In accordance with the objectives of this study, i.e. a qualitative
analysis of the satnav downstream value chain, an informal
approach has been adopted rather than data collection based on
a standardised questionnaire. Each interview had to be adapted
to the specific market involvement of the respondent
• Within each market segment face-to-face and telephone
interviews were conducted with major players, including the
market leaders with the European industry, and some less
important players to achieve a representative sample. The
structure of the interviews related to market activities and location
of the interviewees is summarised in the table below. Additional
telephone interviews not included in the list have been conducted
with users and distributors of related products to identify market
players and to check market or technical details.”
Aviation 10 Germany 34
Maritime 5 France 19
Rail 4 United Kingdom 17
Car nav + telematic services 19 Spain 11
Fleet management 14 Italy 9
Surveying, augmentation 12 USA 3
Agriculture, timing 4 Belgium 2
Mobile communication 10 Sweden 1
Leisure 4 Denmark 1
Chipsets, receivers 2 Switzerland 1
Authorities, R&D, associations 10 98
Others (GNSS-Systems, etc.) 4
98
Table 3-1: Distribution of surveys, by market segment and
nationality
N.B. Of the interview reports identified above, the seventeen attributed to
UK organisations (i.e. 17.3% of the total field research activities in the
GALSAS study) were performed by the author of this thesis. The
remainder were undertaken by other GALSAS study partners. The
results from this consolidated research are presented in Section 4.2 of
this thesis.
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3.3 Inception Study
The PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PwC) Inception Study [4] has two main
sections: “Business Plan” and “Structure, Procurement and Finance “.
Although both sections are of some interest for this thesis, only the
business plan has been analysed in detail.
The Inception study presents independent estimates of the costs of the
various phases of the Galileo programme, and revenues from a list of
potential markets and applications. From these estimates, a business
plan is developed, concluding with recommendations regarding the
amount of public subscription likely to be required in order for Galileo to
have a credible business case to attract private investment.
Although the results of the Inception study have already had a profound
effect on the Galileo programme, the study did not adequately address
the question at the heart of this thesis, i.e. is there sufficient justification
for including an integrity signal in the Galileo architecture, from a
business perspective. The study does include a brief discussion of
alternative means of providing global integrity information (the implication
being that the case for a European-only integrity determination system is
taken for granted), but concludes with the statement:
“… there is insufficient basis for determining whether or
not the lack of a global integrity service will affect the take-
up of Galileo at all, still less for estimating the extent of
such an impact.”
Section 4.3 of this thesis attempts to undertake such an analysis. A
simple Excel spreadsheet was produced which was intended to
reproduce the Inception results, and which could then be used to model
alternative assumptions. This spreadsheet has three distinct
components:
• A section in which the assumed costs are stated year by year from
2002 to 2027, for the Development, Deployment and Replenishment
Phases, plus recurring Operations costs. These are summed by year
to produce the total pre-finance cost figures per annum;
• A section in which the assumed public funding is stated, per year
from 2002 to 2006 or beyond (depending upon the case being
analysed). These are then combined with the Costs figures to
determine the annual public funding shortfall;
• A section in which assumed rates for the cost of finance and the
mean rate of tax on profits are stated, along with the assumed annual
revenues. These are combined to generate a cash flow forecast.
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The final step is to use Excel’s “IRR” function to estimate the Internal
Rate of Return corresponding to the cash flow forecast. The results from
the preceding steps are plotted as the various figures presented in
Section 4.3.
Note that this is a far simpler model than is actually used by the
Inception study. Specifically, the handling of tax and finance costs have
been simplified, and the assumed rates (12% for finance, 20% for tax)
are intended to be indicative, and have no supporting justification. This
analysis is intended to present a relative quantitative analysis, rather
than a definitive statement on the amount of public funding required to
support the architectures analysed in Section 4.3 (i.e. the baseline case
presented in Inception, and a “No Integrity” case in which the capital and
operating costs associated with the IDS have been removed, as have
the service revenues the Inception study associates with the Safety of
Life and Commercial Access services).
Internal Rate of Return is a well known method for comparing the
effective interest rate on a set of cash flow figures. IRR is the metric
used in the Inception study to compare different assumptions regarding
the financial structure of Galileo, and is therefore also used in this thesis
to consider the effect of alternative assumptions.
3.4 Other Studies – GALA and GEMINUS
3.4.1 GALA WP 1 Market Research Methods and Overall Results
Figure 3-1, taken from [5], presents an analysis of the number of user
applications with a given accuracy/integrity requirement – the bigger the
circle, the larger the number of applications. Note this refers solely to the
number of applications, not the value of the market or number of users.
In GALA, four basic classes of user were defined from the studies of the
user needs, as shown in Figure 3-1:
• Position, Velocity and Time (PVT) – This basic class covers mass
market applications. The associated service is intended to be
delivered free of service charges (following the assumption that GPS
continues as a free service)
• Accuracy and Integrity (AI) – This class is defined to provide high
accuracy and availability for less demanding safety of life users and
professional markets. The service is intended for subscribed users
only.
• Ranging and Timing (RT) – This class is for users with very precise
ranging, positioning and timing requirements, i.e. for the
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knowledgeable professional. Again this service is intended for
subscribed users only.
• High Integrity service (HI) – This class of users require the highest
integrity, availability, continuity and resistance to signal interference.
The associated service is suitable for demanding safety of life
markets. Access to this service would be restricted to trusted
subscribers.
Figure 3-1: GALA Classification of User Classes by Accuracy and
Integrity Requirements [5]
Inevitably, this method of grouping requirements into service classes is
rather coarse. Specifically, this approach does not take into account
user’s Continuity requirements, which in some applications (such as
aviation precision approach, as discussed subsequently) drive the
overall system performance as much as accuracy and integrity risk.
The GALA “Market Research Methods and Overall Results” document2
[6] presents a detailed discussion of the number of applications, and
associated revenues, expected within each service type. A “bottom-up”
approach was taken, in which one hundred discrete applications for
satellite navigation services were identified, the associated performance
requirements (accuracy, integrity, availability, etc.) were derived, and
                                           
2
 also referred to as the WP1 Report, because it presents the results from GALA Work Package
#1
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likely market revenues estimated. By consolidating the results for each
application, the likely market for these four basic user classes were
presented.
This GALA document also includes a brief analysis of the potential threat
on Galileo revenues from competition from combined Galileo and GPS
free-to-air services. Although the WP 1 document does recognise that
this is a significant threat to the potential business case for Galileo, it
doesn’t give this issue the emphasis it may deserve.
3.4.2 GALA WP 2 Overall Requirements and System Trade-Offs
Within the GALA Work Package 2 activities, the key document relevant
to this thesis is a report entitled “Integrity” [3]. This document, produced
by Alcatel Space Industries, presents an analysis of the options available
for the provision of integrity to users of Galileo, and is the cornerstone of
the justification used to include the IDS in the system baseline.
The key conclusion stated in this report is:
“For some applications simple RAIM techniques may be
sufficient to achieve the require [sic] performance, but to
reach higher requirements an external monitoring of the
Galileo satellites integrity will be necessary.”
This conclusion is derived from the analysis of a risk model in which the
ground-based integrity system and the RAIM algorithm are treated as
separate “integrity barriers” which, when combined, yield a lower value
for the total user integrity risk than a model using either of the “integrity
barriers” alone.
However, there is an unstated assumption, which is prerequisite for the
conclusion to be valid: in order for a system with both “integrity barriers”
to be better than one with RAIM alone, the ground integrity channel
must:
a) be able to detect integrity failures that the RAIM system would not;
and
b) provide this increased integrity without significantly increasing the
false alarm probability.
The only evidence presented in this document to support the argument
for an IDS is the statement:
“…the response of user integrity monitoring techniques
(like RAIM) to the failure of more than one satellite is often
unpredictable; which confirms the need to monitor from
Ground Mission Segment each SIS individually.”
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Although it is true that for traditional RAIM algorithms it is theoretically
possible for multiple failures to combine in such a way that a protection
limit is exceeded without an alarm being generated, this situation is very
unlikely [7]. This statement therefore adds little weight to the case for an
IDS.
Annex 4 to GALA WP2 [3] is, perhaps, the most directly relevant report
to this thesis arising from all the preceding Galileo development
activities. This report, “Galileo System Definition – GPS integrity
monitoring assessment” [8] by Dr Washington Ochieng and his team at
Imperial College, London, was produced for Alcatel Space Industries
under GALA WP 2.2.2.4.
Dr Ochieng’s report undertakes an analysis very similar in scope and
approach to the RAIM study component of this thesis. Unfortunately,
both this report and the WP 2 “Integrity” document to which it is
appended have not been placed in the public domain, making it
inappropriate to use as the key reference document for this work that it
deserves to be. However, a number of papers derived from this work
have been published, and these are discussed in Section 5.8.3, within
the RAIM Study component of this thesis.
3.4.3 GALA WP 9 Programmatics and Business Issues
Under GALA WP 9, Astrium UK produced a document entitled “Galileo
Cost-Benefit Analysis” [9] which makes an interesting comment on the
potential market for integrity-based services:
 “There have been several comments made that Galileo is
being design too much as a GPS look-alike and so
competing on equal terms with a free service. This leaves
the main differentiators as integrity and service
guarantees which are attractive only to a small fraction of
the market. In addition local services provide some level
of integrity for many user groups.
If Galileo could adopt a signal design that was more
attractive to the larger market sectors then there may be
some scope for charging or at least being able to charge a
reasonable royalty. The most promising markets are
probably the in-mobile market and the in-vehicle market. A
signal, for example, that was useable inside a jacket
pocket or a handbag would be have [sic] advantages over
GPS. In addition TTFF [Time to First Fix] and reacquisition
time are key parameters where improvements could be
offered.”
This comment demonstrates a key point: those involved in defining the
Galileo architecture have, to some extent, specified services to
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differentiate Galileo from GPS, only because they will differentiate the
systems, and not because there is any clear evidence that the market
needs these services.
3.4.4 GEMINUS
The GEMINUS Study produced a number of detailed reports covering a
broad spectrum of issues under the study’s remit. The key deliverable
items relevant to this thesis, and hence analysed in detail, are:
• Deliverable D4 “Service Definition” – Annex D to the Final Report
• Deliverable D6 “Business Model” – Annex E to the Final Report
• Ad-Hoc Working Paper Assessing the Commercial Opportunities for
the Galileo Operator – Annex F to the Final Report
• Deliverable D1.1.2 “GALA User Requirements Review”
• Deliverable D2.2 “Operator’s Requirements”
• Deliverable D8.2 “GEMINUS Final Summary Report” [2]
Unlike GALA, GEMINUS took into consideration what performance
specifications are feasible for a satellite navigation system when defining
its proposed set of services and concluded that Galileo should provide:
• OAS-1: A global Open Access Service, which meets public
requirement for basic free of charge service – single frequency,
similar to current GPS. Matches or improves on GPSIII and/or
GPSIIF;
• OAS-2: A global Open Access Service, which meets public
requirement for a fuller free of charge service – multiple frequency.
Matches or improves on GPSIII and/or GPSIIF;
• RSS: Regional Safety Service, a commercial safety service,
unencrypted and charged for through institutional means rather than
direct user charge. Meets needs of aviation over Europe as a
minimum.
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Figure 3-2: GEMINUS and GALA Galileo Services [2]
Figure 3-2, extracted from the GEMINUS final report [2] shows:
“…a comparison of the GEMINUS proposed service with
GALA WP1 service requirements...The Integrity and
Accuracy figures from the GALA WP1 study (broken
bubbles) are the figures required by the market whereas
the figures from the GEMINUS study (solid bubbles) are
the figures that approach the user requirements - but
which are also technically feasible, without any local
augmentation or RAIM integrity protection.”
The GEMINUS services are defined in more detail in Deliverable D4
“Service Definition” – Annex D to the Final Report, in which the
requirements for the Regional Safety Service (the service most relevant
to this thesis) are specified as:
• Vertical Alert Limit: 10 – 15m;
• Horizontal Alert Limit: 7.5 – 12.5m;
• Integrity Risk: 1 x 10-6 per hour;
• Continuity Risk: 2 x 10-3 per hour;
• Availability: 99.75%
29
As will be discussed subsequently in the RAIM Study section, these
requirements are broadly in line with the specifications for aviation
precision approach (with the exception of the Continuity requirement,
which is considerably less stringent than is required for aviation). The
Final Report [2] also states:
“It was agreed that limiting the scope of regional Galileo
services to meeting Cat I requirements was reasonable,
as CAT2/3 will be achieved by local augmentation.”
The GEMINUS Study is therefore explicit in associating the most
demanding requirements on Galileo with Category I precision approach.
3.5 UKISC Galileo Working Group Survey
In October 2001, the author took an action at a meeting of the “UK
Industrial Space Committee, Galileo Working Group” (UKISC Gal WG) to
produce a list of “challenging questions” regarding the justification for the
Galileo system. By attempting to form a consensus on the answers to
these questions, the UKISC Gal WG hoped to be in a position to provide
a robust justification for the development of the Galileo system in the
event of wavering support from within UK Government. Unlike the
majority of activities associated with the Galileo project, this exercise had
no acronym associated with it, labouring instead under the cumbersome
title “Galileo – Key Questions For Which We Ought To Have Good
Answers”.
The author produced a set of questions which was distributed to the
members of the Working Group. These questions were:
1. Why do we need Galileo? In what way is GPS augmented by
EGNOS inadequate? What will Galileo offer above GPS + EGNOS?
2. What services are planned for Galileo? What performance does
Galileo promise, and how does this compare with plans for GPS
upgrades, and the position location functions of 3G telecomms
systems?
3. Will Galileo offer a free-to-air dual-frequency service, of similar
performance to that expected from GPS Block IIF?
4. How does the timescale for Galileo deployment compare with plans
for competing satellite and terrestrial positioning systems?
5. How much will Galileo cost European taxpayers? How much will
Galileo cost UK taxpayers? What are the expected development,
deployment and recurring costs? What are the current estimates of
the required annual charge to taxpayers for Galileo as a ‘public
service’?
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6. What mechanisms will allow private investors to get revenue back
from Galileo? What evidence is there that the Galileo system will
attract private investment?
7. If the US accelerate their “GPS Modernization Program”, and/or
increase the size of their constellation, would there still be a revenue
stream for investors in the Galileo system?
8. Given that combined Galileo/GPS free signal receivers will inevitably
be produced, and that the projected positioning accuracy of such
receivers exceeds the projected specifications for any of Galileo’s
satellite-only services, what user groups are expected to be willing to
pay for Galileo’s commercial services? How big is this projected
market?
9. Who is the customer for the Galileo system (as opposed to its
services)? Who is ensuring that the service specifications meet real-
world requirements, and that development costs are minimised? Who
will ensure that it’s not another Channel Tunnel or Concorde –
technically brilliant but unable ever to cover its development costs
from commercial operations in a competitive market?
10. What plans are there for Galileo to be used by European military
forces as an alternative to GPS? Will it offer some form of “protected”
signal for authorised users? If Galileo is to be operated as a
commercial venture, what controls will there be on access to this
protected signal by forces other than those of the Western European
Union? Will US forces be given access to such signals? Russians?
11. The US retains the right to turn SA back on to prevent GPS being
used against US interests. On what services will Galileo have the
same facility? How is this reconciled with Galileo’s “guaranteed
availability” which is meant to differentiate Galileo from GPS?
12. Much store is made of the claim that Galileo will provide some
‘liability cover’ for users. What are the technical, legal and financial
implications of this requirement? What evidence is there that such
cover adds value to the system?
13. What test will be made of the commitment for private investment to
Galileo? When is this test likely to be undertaken? How much public
money will be spent on the programme before this test? If the
outcome of the test is that there is not enough private investment
forthcoming to take the system to full deployment and operations,
what options are available to the EU? Are the strategic arguments in
favour of an independent European satellite navigation system so
strong that deployment of the system would continue even if private
investment was not forthcoming?
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14. From the point of view of the various consortia apparently considering
investing in Galileo, the best strategy might be to support and direct
the development of the programme without making any major
financial commitment to its future, until it has passed the point of no
return at which time they can choose not to invest, knowing that the
system will be deployed entirely from public money. What plans are
in place to defend the programme against such a strategy?
15. Given that the case for Galileo is basically ‘strategic’ (in a political,
rather than a military sense), what are the arguments for and against
Galileo as an entirely public-funded  programme from the outset?
16. Which end-user groups are actively involved in defining the
requirements for Galileo? How much demand has the European
transport market shown for an alternative to GPS?
17. Given that GPS and WAAS/EGNOS is expected to become a
standard fit on civil aircraft over the next few years, how does the civil
aviation community, in Europe and globally, view Galileo?
Since respondents to this set of questions were supplying opinions to the
Working Group, it is not appropriate to present their responses as
attributable quotations within this thesis. However, the responses fall
broadly into two camps
• Those representing potential Prime Contractors for spacecraft,
ground system and receiver development activities (the “Primes”
view);
• Those representing smaller companies, or organisation closer to the
service delivery aspects of the programme, rather than hardware
manufacture (the “Non-Primes” view).
A summary of the responses for these two positions is presented at
Appendix B. These results also influence the logical argument presented
as a conclusion to the Integrity Justification Study, in Section 4.4.
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4. RESULTS FOR THE INTEGRITY JUSTIFICATION STUDY
4.1 Results from the GALSAS Survey – Primary Research
In Appendix A, a summary of the interview reports produced by the
author as part of the GALSAS study [1] are presented. Although not the
complete set of survey results, this representative sample is sufficient to
demonstrate the conclusions from this survey of organisations involved
(or potentially involved in the future) with UK satellite navigation
applications summarised below:
1. Applications developers expect a fairly rapid surge in the number of
installed GPS receivers (mobile phones, vehicles, etc.), and that the
next stage in the market’s development will be based around
applications sold without a bundled receiver. This requires some kind
of interface standard to be developed;
2. Galileo must be sufficiently compatible with GPS that any
applications developed and intended to use a standard “GPS
interface” could also be connected to the output from a Galileo
receiver;
3. Galileo is too far away to have an impact on most application
developer’s strategic thinking. From their current understanding of the
system, the market for the Controlled Access Services will be very
limited;
4. In order to succeed, Galileo receivers need to be cheaper than GPS,
or the OAS needs to offer better accuracy and availability than GPS;
5. A key opportunity for improvement would be in-building performance.
The in-building performance of GPS is a weakness; if Galileo can
offer better performance in buildings and in built-up areas, this would
be a significant advantage;
6. The drivers for change in the GNSS market are integrated
GNSS/comms receivers, and the increase in uptake of in-car GPS;
7. There is a huge potential market for location-based services, which
require integrated comms and navigation receivers;
8. Now that SA has been turned off, and with the introduction of WAAS,
EGNOS, etc., GPS offers some advantages over cellular-based
location systems, and this will be exploited in the next few years;
9. Within the US, the availability of the GPS signal has been accepted
as a “given” – it is unthinkable that it will ever be turned off or
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significantly degraded. As a result, for non-safety critical applications,
the mass market will only choose Galileo receivers ahead of GPS if
they are cheaper, more accurate, smaller or require less power; the
higher availability, integrity and guaranteed service features of
Galileo do not in themselves offer a marketing advantage;
10. In order to penetrate markets established by GPS, Galileo receivers
must be compatible with GPS. This will offer enormous benefits to
users, but will make it difficult for Galileo to market chargeable
services, since the accuracy and availability possible from
GPS/Galileo OAS combined will meet the needs of the vast majority
of mass-market location service applications.
11. With SA off, GPS offers the accuracy required by most mass-market
applications – the next few years will see a major expansion in the
number of GPS receivers installed;
12. Applications developed to provide services based on derived
positioning information will require a standard interface, so that the
application is independent of whether the positioning data comes
from satnav, communications station triangulation or any other
source. Any positioning system that does not comply with such a
standard will not succeed;
13. The satnav market is expected to begin to accelerate once the
integration of the receivers into the host (mobile phone, vehicle,
watch, etc.) becomes transparent to the user (i.e. in terms of physical
size, power usage/battery requirements, additional cost and user
interface).
14. Operators of cellular telephone networks in the UK see a large
market for Wireless Location Services, which require some position
technology to be either built into the network, or into the handset
itself;
15. Wireless Location Services now being introduced are based on
network infrastructure (i.e. do not use satnav). With SA off, GPS
offers a significant improvement in the accuracy available;
16. Mobile phone network operators see 10m accuracy as the limit for
their requirements;
17. The major growth period for this market is expected to be well before
the likely start of Galileo operations;
18. Although the better urban performance of Galileo compared with
GPS is a marketable feature, it is unlikely that the Controlled Access
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Service would be implemented as the Wireless Location Services
technology by cellular network operators.
19. The UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) regard the Galileo programme
as “not sufficiently user driven”, and this is a source of frustration.
Based on their current understanding of the system, Galileo in itself
does not offer any significant advantages over GPS with EGNOS and
other augmentation systems;
20. However, Galileo in conjunction with GPS/EGNOS would provide a
redundant, independent GNSS, which does offer the opportunity for
greater reliance on GNSS (and, potentially, a scaling down in
terrestrial navigation aids);
21. There is a significant concern about the use of “controlled access
signals” on Galileo. Encryption of navigation signals, possibly with a
“pay-to-use” mechanism for the decryption key, adds a number of
failure modes and other complications to a safety-critical service
which the aviation community is unlikely to support – especially given
that the GPS/EGNOS signal will be free-to-air;
22. There is a strong probability that GPS and augmented-GPS based
navigation systems will become de facto international standards,
through the way European civil aviation standards and regulations set
by the Joint Aviation Authority (JAA) and EUROCAE tend to follow
behind equivalent American bodies. This could present a significant
delay to the acceptance of Galileo by the aviation community, and in
order to mitigate this risk European delegates to the International
Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) should ensure that as regulations
are developed for the use of GPS, these should be extended to
include Galileo at the same time.
4.2 Results from the GALSAS Survey – Consolidated Results
The following results are presented verbatim from the Structural Analysis
Survey final report [1].
4.2.1 Current Size and Structure of the European Market
Market data compiled during the study indicate that the value of the
current European satellite navigation market is in the order of 935
MEURO; nearly 30 % of the world market in 1999. The market size is
defined as sales revenue from product units or service packages, which
make use of satellite navigation, e.g. car navigation systems, surveying
systems, etc. About 85 % of the European market is  product sales and
the remaining 15 % is revenue created by GNSS related services.
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By far the largest market segment in Europe (and on the world market) is
car navigation: about 680 MEURO, of which 88 % are hardware sales.
Among the remaining market segments personal navigation, surveying,
aviation, fleet management, and augmentation services show some
market importance with about 40 – 50 MEURO each:
car 
navigation
73%
fleet mgmt
4%
aviation
5%
surveying
5%augment.
5%
leisure
5%
others
3%
Figure 4-1: The European GNSS market by market segments –
1999:  935 MEURO
4.2.2 Mid-Term Trends In The European Market
The majority of GNSS applications and market segments are still in an
early growth phase, thus considerable growth rates are expected in the
mid-term, e.g. in agriculture, aviation, fleet management. However,
saturation effects will start to reduce growth rates in a few years time in
several major applications such as car navigation.
Both the size and the structure of the market may change dramatically in
about 2 years from now depending on the further development of GNSS
application in mobile communications. The introduction of location-based
services by mobile communication service providers and the intended
mandatory localisation of emergency calls in Europe (E-112) will boost
the satellite navigation market, provided that GNSS is the localisation
source of choice. Depending on the still to be defined technical
requirements for localisation in mobile communication applications the
total European satellite navigation market in 2005 could be in the order
of:
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• 2,800 MEURO (without GNSS localisation in mobile communication),
• 8,300 MEURO (partial GNSS localisation in mobile communication),
or
• 22,000 MEURO (mandatory GNSS localisation in mobile
communication).
According to the assumptions and market expectations gathered during
interviews the European satellite navigation market in 2005 will probably
show a completely different picture to the current market: mobile
communication will be the most important market segment with 72 % of
the total market, followed by car navigation with 23 %:
car navigation
23%
others
0% fleet mgmt
1%
aviation
1%
surveying
1%
augment.
1%
leisure
1%
mobile phones
72%
Figure 4-2: The European GNSS market by market segments –
2005: 8,383 MEURO
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Market segment European market:1999 MEURO
European
market:
2005 MEURO
Aviation – products & services 44 65
Commercial maritime 4 6
Car navigation – products & services 680 1 920
Fleet management – products & services 40 90
Rail 1 24
Surveying & mapping, off-shore 49 86
Agriculture 5 12
Augmentation services 45 60
Mobile communication (excl. services) 0 6 000
Timing 6 10
Personal navigation 50 90
Total European market 935 8 383
Table 4-1: Estimates of the current market and its mid-term development
4.3 Results from the Inception Study
4.3.1 Reaction to the Report
The Inception Study [4] has been, arguably, the most influential analysis
regarding the market and business case for Galileo, probably because it
was led by a well-respected, independent consultancy firm
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers). Most previous Galileo activities had been
undertaken by organisations with a vested interest in the continuation of
the programme.
The final report from the Inception study provides an excellent example
of how a set of results can be interpreted in diametrically opposing ways.
The immediate public reaction to the study came from the European
Council of Finance Ministers (“ECOFIN”), in which a group of ministers
(including, notably the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer and the German
Finance Minister) responded to the Inception study with a public
statement that Galileo requires more public funding than they had
previously been led to believe by the European Commission [10].  Given
that the Inception report includes statements such as:
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“…our analysis shows that the economics of Galileo do
not support investment by the private sector on purely
financial criteria…”
“…We estimate the cost of the system to be Euro 3.6
billion. The EC and ESA have budgeted Euro 1.25 billion
for the Development phase and application development.
This leaves a balance of Euro 2.35 billion to be spent on
deploying the system. This will need to be met by a
combination of public sector support and private sector
funding…”
“…The level of private funding which is needed depends
on the amount of support which the public sector is willing
to make available for Deployment costs up to 2008. If
support for Deployment is low then the project will only be
viable with a high availability payment during the
concession. If support for the Deployment costs is high
then there will be less need for private capital and the
availability payment during the concession can be lower...”
It is quite understandable that Finance Ministers might be concerned that
proceeding with Galileo might commit them to up to three times as much
public funding as they had previously been expecting, depending upon
the degree of reticence from the private sector to finance the
programme.
However, the European Commission, in their January 2002 Information
Note [11], have interpreted the Inception Study as unqualified support for
the programme, with statements such as:
“Except for the development phase funded by the
European Space Agency, national budgets will not bear
any of the public funding costs for the various phases of
the GALILEO programme”
and
“…There are no financial, economic or technical
arguments which can justify postponing the start of the
development phase of the GALILEO programme”
Clearly, the report lends itself to selective interpretation. The following
sub-sections reassess some of the analyses in the Inception report, as
they apply to this thesis. This is all original work, and has not been
previously published in any form.
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4.3.2 Baseline Case
The Inception Study produced an independent assessment of costs for
the Galileo system, as follows:
• Development Phase –  1367M
• Deployment Phase –  2029M
• Replenishment  –  1781M
• Operations (pa) –  135M
Table 4-2 also presents the base case estimated revenues made by
PwC and used in the Inception Study analyses. Given reasonable
assumptions regarding the time distribution of these costs and revenues,
they can be combined to produce Figure 4-3. Note that this figure is
derived from Inception Study data, with operating costs and capital
expenditure combined, unlike corresponding figures presented in the
PwC report.
Application Service 2010 2015 2020
Personal communications and location OS 47.7 275.8 288.1
Cars (route guidance etc) OS 10.2 17.2 17.7
LCVs (route guidance) OS 3.1 5.3 5.5
Trains & Buses (route guidance etc) OS 0.4 0.8 0.8
Road Tolling OS 0.0 0.2 0.3
Police & Fire (vehicle resource) PRS 0.3 2.6 5.6
P&F (pedestrian resource) PRS 0.8 10.5 19.0
P&F (vehicle tracking) PRS 0.0 0.1 0.2
Oil & Gas (marine seismic exp) CS 0.2 1.3 2.0
O&G (high resolution seis site survey) CS 0.2 1.0 1.5
O&G (land and trans zone seis) CS 1.7 9.3 13.7
O&G (FPSO positioning) CS 0.1 1.1 2.8
O&G (rig positioning) CS 1.0 7.6 16.0
O&G (VSP) CS 1.6 8.7 12.7
Commercial Aviation SOL 0.0 21.0 98.1
General Aviation SOL 0.0 3.3 14.9
Marine Engineering & Navigation CS 0.2 2.2 6.4
Personal Outdoor recreation OS 0.1 0.2 0.5
Mining 3D Positioning CS 0.0 0.8 3.8
Mining surveying CS 0.1 2.5 5.4
Mining autonomous vehicles CS - 0.2 0.4
Mining truck dispatch CS 0.0 0.2 0.7
Total 67.7 371.8 516.1
Table 4-2: Inception Study Base Case Estimated Revenues (M
2001 prices) [4]
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Figure 4-3: Inception Study Costs and Revenues
The costs presented in this chart are net of any financing requirements.
The Inception report goes on to combine the “Net Operating Cash Flow
with tax obligations in the [Galileo Operating Company], capital
expenditure for the Development and Deployment, and asset
replenishment programme” to produce a pre-finance cash flow forecast.
The report then concludes:
“…the Project IRR [Internal Rate of Return] in our base
case is just 4.1% real. This is less than the cost of private
capital and means that public sector support will be
needed for capital expenditure on Deployment or in the
operating phase if any private sector finance is to be
obtained.”
However, closer analysis suggests that even this figure of 4.1% IRR is
optimistic. Firstly, as mentioned above, this uses a pre-finance costs
cash flow. Secondly, it assumes a far higher public sector contribution
than is currently budgeted for Galileo. In fact, some 48 pages after the
base case analysis is presented in the Inception report, the following
statement is made:
“In the case of Galileo, we understand that a budget of
Euro 1.25 bn has been made available by the EC and
ESA to fund the Development phase of the project,
including some applications development.
Our base case funding assumptions suggest that up to
Euro 1.4bn of public sector grant will be needed in the
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Development phase, and a further Euro 700m in the
deployment phase.”
Applying these values (i.e. an initial public commitment of 2.1 Bn) to the
Base Case cost and revenue model presented above, with no finance
cost and an assumed mean rate of tax of 20% on operating profit does
indeed produce an Internal Rate of Return of 4.1% for the period 2005 to
2027, as shown in Figure 4-4. This chart shows that positive cash flow
would be expected to begin around 2012, which agrees with PwC’s
analysis.
Cash Flow. (Finance = 0%. Tax = 20%. IRR = 4.1%)
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Figure 4-4: Inception Study Base Case Cash Flow (public funding =
2.1 Bn)
Clearly, with such a low IRR using pre-finance cash flow, adding in the
cost of money will make the case much worse. Figure 4-5 demonstrates
that with a cost of debt servicing of only 4.6%, the IRR diminishes to
zero, and positive cash flow will not occur until 2015.
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Cash Flow. (Finance = 4.6%. Tax = 20%. IRR = 0%)
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Figure 4-5: Base Case, with Finance rate of 4.6% (public funding =
2.1 Bn)
Note that this analysis uses a significantly simplified financial model,
whereas the Inception Study goes in to great detail regarding potential
funding models for Galileo (which is beyond the scope of this thesis).
Nevertheless, this does demonstrate the basic point that Galileo will
need much more than even the 2.1 Bn of public money for development
and deployment assumed by PwC before any credible business case for
investment can be made.
Cash Flow. (Finance = 12%. Tax = 20%. IRR = 11.1%)
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Figure 4-6: Base Case, with Finance rate of 12% (public funding =
3.2 Bn)
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Figure 4-6 presents a more realistic case, in which the cost of finance
has been taken as 12% pa. In this case it has been assumed that there
is full public funding for the entire Development and Deployment phase
(i.e. public funding of all Galileo activities before 2008). Total public
funding of  3.2 Bn is required which, when applied to the model used
previously results in an Internal Rate of Return of 11.1%, which is similar
to the cost of finance assumed in this model and hence may be assumed
to provide a reasonably attractive business case for private investors.
These assumptions are clearly at odds with the EC’s position that private
funding will be forthcoming in the deployment phase of 2006 to 2007.
However, this model suggests that the additional public funding
requirement is an inevitable consequence of the long time before
positive cash flow can be expected (2015, in this case).
4.3.3 Effect of Loss of Safety of Life and Commercial Service Revenues
A key assumption in the Inception report’s Business Plan is that the
Galileo Operating Company will be able to collect both “Purchase
Revenues” (i.e. a 5% royalty on the chipset sales for Galileo receivers)
and “Service Revenues” (i.e. revenues that service providers will pay the
GOC for making the signal in space available to their customers). Figure
4-7 (taken directly from the Inception report) shows the estimated split
between these revenue streams.
A large part of the Service Revenue contribution has been assumed to
come from the aviation sector. Indeed, the report states their estimated
revenues:
“…assume that a percentage of the costs saved by the
aviation industry from the elimination of the need for
terrestrial infrastructure will be captured by the GOC. In
the base case, it is estimated that GPC will receive 50% of
the value of the cost of these savings.”
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Figure 4-7: Inception Estimate of GOC Market Revenues (K 2001
prices) [4]
This is obviously a very contentious assumption. Indeed the UK’s
National Air Traffic Services (NATS) has produced a robust rebuttal of
the aviation revenues claimed by Inception [12]. Given the investment
that that aviation industry in Europe and the US have made to EGNOS
and WAAS respectively, they are understandably very resistant to any
attempt to build a business case for Galileo based on revenues from
aviation.
So what would be the impact on Inception’s business plan if service
revenues arising from licensing access to Galileo’s integrity signal were
not forthcoming? Table 4-2 includes a column indicating for each
application whether it is associated with the Open Access Service
(shown as OS). Public Regulated Services (PRS), Commercial Access
Service (CS) or Safety of Life Service (shown as SOL). It is possible
using this table to remodel the cash flow forecast, to consider the case in
which no service revenues associated with CS or SOL are forthcoming
(i.e. only the PRS provides service revenues). The cash flow in this case
is shown in Figure 4-8.
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Cash Flow. (Finance = 0%. Tax = 20%. IRR = -3.3%)
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Figure 4-8: Cash Flow without Service Revenues (public funding =
2.1 Bn)
Note that the IRR demonstrated by this cash flow is negative (-3.3%), i.e.
without service revenues, even at 0% finance this programme still would
not make money in the period before 2027.
Using the higher public subscription of 3.2 Bn discussed previously, the
business case becomes a little more attractive, as long as the cost of
money is still 0%. However, as shown in Figure 4-9, even this case
would not be regarded as a particularly good investment, with an IRR of
5.3%.
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Cash Flow. (Finance = 0%. Tax = 20%. IRR = 5.3%)
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Figure 4-9: Cash Flow without Service Revenues (public funding =
3.2 Bn)
4.3.4 Exclude the Cost of Integrity
Taking the results from the previous section further, if there is serious
doubt about the ability to raise revenues based on the sale of the
Integrity service, why include this service at all? What would be the effect
on the business case if the Integrity Determination System were
removed?
Section 5.7 of this thesis, within the RAIM study, presents the costs for
the European Integrity Determination System taken from the GalileoSat
Phase B Baseline Design Review report [13]. These figures are given at
1998 economic conditions. Escalating these figures at 3% pa for 3 years
to bring them approximately to the same 2001 conditions as used with
the Inception study yields:
• IDS Development and Deployment Phase Costs - 448M
• IDS Recurring Costs (pa) -  19M
Figure 4-10 presents the costs and revenues associated with these
revised assumptions, whilst Figure 4-11 shows the associated cash flow.
47
Costs and Revenues - IDS Removed
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Figure 4-10: Costs and Revenues, excluding IDS development and
operations
Cash Flow. (Finance = 0%. Tax = 20%. IRR = 0.9%)
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Figure 4-11: Cash Flow for System with no IDS (public funding =
2.1 Bn)
Although this demonstrates a positive internal rate of return, it is clearly
not sufficient to be an attractive investment. This highlights the
fundamental flaw in the assumption that the Integrity system has a
justifiable business case: Depending upon the amount of public
contribution to the programme, private funding (much of which would be
spent on development and deployment of the IDS) will be required to
start in 2005 or 2006, whilst significant returns (if any) are unlikely to
start coming in from high-integrity users until around 2015 [4]. It is
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extremely difficult to build a viable business case for the IDS with around
10 years between the start of the investment and the start of the revenue
stream.
Given the evidence previously presented which suggests that there is a
significant risk associated with relying on revenues from the aviation
sector, it appears to make financial sense to remove the IDS from the
baseline. With such a slimmed-down architecture, the amount of public
funding required to make a PPP feasible should reduce. So how much
public money is required to make this a workable proposition?
In Section 4.3.2 it was shown that for the Inception Study baseline case,
assuming both purchase and service revenues, an initial public
subscription of 3.2 Bn would allow private investors to earn an IRR of
11.1%, assuming a cost of finance of 12% pa. In order to generate the
same IRR in this revised case, with no service revenues and no Integrity
Determination System costs, total public subscription is reduced to
around 2.9 Bn, a saving of over a quarter of a billion Euro, with a
business case that is not reliant on service revenues. This is
demonstrated in Figure 4-12.
Cash Flow. (Finance = 12%. Tax = 20%. IRR = 11.1%)
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Figure 4-12: Cash Flow for System with no IDS (public funding =
2.93 Bn)
4.4 Integrity Justification Study Conclusions
The results of the preceding analyses, including the survey results
summarised in Annexes A and B, have been brought together into the
following set of points which develops the central argument arising from
the Integrity Justification Study, and leads naturally into the RAIM Study:
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1. The overriding argument in favour of deployment of Galileo is one of
sovereignty for Europe, in a technical field dominated by the United
States.
2. A huge industry has built up around GPS, and is growing. Galileo
could also reasonably be expected to generate business for
European industry in this area.
3. Since private industry is expected to generate profits from the
existence of a Galileo Signal in Space (SIS), the view of the
European Commission is that private investment should be available
to partly fund the development of the system.
4. In order to provide a supporting justification for the development of
Galileo (other than that of sovereignty), a number of features were
proposed to differentiate Galileo from GPS. These include the
provision of ground-based signal integrity; a guaranteed level of
signal availability; better accuracy than GPS from the stand-alone
system; and a legal liability cover for fee-paying users of the signal.
5. These distinguishing features generated the key specifications which
define the system architecture produced in the Galileo Phase B2
study, such as the existence of an Integrity Dissemination System
(IDS).
6. The currently planned constellation, with 27 MEO satellites (plus 3
spares) providing accurate SIS as well as ground-generated integrity
and Signal in Space Accuracy (SISA) signals has been driven almost
entirely by the intention to design a system which on its own (i.e.
without GPS, EGNOS or any other current or planned system) will
meet the requirements of ICAO for civil aviation precision approach
or approach with vertical guidance.
7. In parallel with the system engineering activities performed under
GalileoSat, the studies on service definition and business case
analysis have presented conclusions which suggest that these
distinguishing features would not in fact offer a significant marketing
advantage to anyone trying to sell a pay-for-use Galileo service.
8. For the aviation community the existence of WAAS in the US, and the
current development of EGNOS and MSAS in Europe and Japan
respectively, cannot be ignored or wished away. The general
perception is that GPS satellite navigation augmented by integrity
signals delivered from Geostationary satellites is accepted for use by
ICAO, and that the world’s airlines will be using these systems for the
next twenty-five years at least.
9. A number of studies have projected a massive growth in the demand
for satellite navigation services in the next decade, and that this
growth will occur with or without the existence of Galileo. The vast
majority of this market is expected to come from land vehicle
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applications (car navigation, vehicle telematics, rail) and wireless
location services (WLS) for mobile communications.
10. These users do not need high levels of integrity, guaranteed
availability or liability cover, and would not be prepared to pay any
significant premium for a service which could, by-and-large, be
provided free by GPS.
11. However, much of the expected growth in the satnav market
discussed in the previous point will come from urban areas. In such
an environment GPS availability is sometimes limited.
12. In order to provide a better service (in terms of overall availability,
continuity of service and time-to-first-fix (TTFF)) to urban users the
obvious solution is to offer dual-mode receivers, in which ranging
measurements from any combination of visible Galileo or GPS
satellites could be combined to give a navigation solution.
13. There are a number of viable models by which some revenue could
be generated for the Galileo system operator in such a scenario –
most typically this would come from some form of royalty payment on
the Galileo portion of dual-system receiver electronics.
14. However, taken to its logical conclusion this suggests that the vast
majority of any possible commercial revenue streams for private
investors in Galileo could be generated by a system which is to all
intents and purposes a facsimile of GPS.
15. Any potential investor in Galileo is likely to ask: “What is the
commercial advantage in providing a high-quality integrity system,
redundant control centres, liability cover, etc, from a constellation with
30 satellites and dozens of discrete terrestrial components. Why not
have fewer MEO satellites and ground stations, and a single control
centre, just like GPS, and let EGNOS provide the ground-based
integrity signal, augmented by RAIM as required. How much
additional revenue would all these additional bells and whistles offer
me, and is it worth the investment?”
16. There is therefore likely to be a conflict between the desire of private
investors for a system which has minimum development risk and the
best projected rate of return on investment, and the European
Commission which has very publicly promoted Galileo as a system
with significant distinguishing features from GPS.
17. The Integrity Determination System has been included within the
Galileo baseline architecture with no real evidence that it adds value
to the programme.
18. The amount of public money required to make Galileo attractive as a
public/private partnership is far in excess of the  1.25Bn currently
presented as the planned public contribution.
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19. Within industry there are widely divergent views as to whether or not
a PPP is workable.
20. If it can be demonstrated that a combined Galileo and GPS system
will offer integrity performance suitable for aviation precision
approach, there will be a powerful argument for the removal of the
IDS from the Galileo system baseline.
The technical component of this thesis presented in the following
sections attempts to provide this demonstration.
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5. BACKGROUND TO THE RAIM STUDY
5.1 Introduction
The main analytical sections of this thesis are based on two projects
undertaken by the author, as an employee of VEGA Group PLC:
• The “Combined GPS/Galileo Receiver Autonomous Integrity
Monitoring (RAIM) Performance Evaluation Study” for the British
National Space Centre (BNSC) under the BNSC SATCOM 2001
programme;
• The “User Integrity Algorithms Stand-Alone Test Case” for the
European Space Agency (ESA) under the Galileo System Test Bed
(GSTB) programme from 2002 to 2004.
The first study provided the initial development of the novel RAIM
algorithm discussed subsequently. The second study, for ESA, produced
a far more detailed analysis of this algorithm and of the potential
performance of RAIM algorithms for Galileo-only and Galileo + GPS
receivers.
5.2 Purpose and Scope of the RAIM Study
The Integrity Justification Study presented previously argues that there is
little commercial merit in the investment required for Galileo’s Integrity
Determination System (IDS). The Galileo System Requirements
Document (SRD) specifies a 20m Vertical Alert Limit (VAL) for the Safety
Access Service when using a satellite-only receiver, and an overall
availability of 99.5%. Such a specification does not enable the system to
be used for Cat I precision approach, which has a more demanding
requirement on VAL.
The SRD specification for Galileo’s Safety Access Service (SAS), may
therefore offer aviation users an alternative to the GPS-based Wide Area
Augmentation System (WAAS) and European Geostationary Navigation
Overlay Service (EGNOS) systems for non-precision phases of flight, but
in itself it does not offer any more functionality to meet more demanding
specifications. Indeed, both WAAS and EGNOS have 20m VAL as an
interim target capability, with Cat I performance as a long term objective
[14].
An alternative method of providing signal integrity information is through
Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring techniques. These algorithms
rely on users being able to access more satellites than the minimum
number required for a navigation solution, in order to estimate the
integrity of the signal from these redundant measurements. Currently,
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with a GPS constellation of 24 satellites providing only a single
frequency in its Standard Positioning Service (SPS), RAIM cannot meet
Cat I requirements, although RAIM-enabled receivers can be used as a
navigation aid for less demanding phases of flight. However, by using
both Galileo and upgraded GPS systems together the quality of the
integrity information available from RAIM algorithms will increase
dramatically, due to both the increased size of the useable constellation
and the improved accuracy of the signals compared with current GPS.
The first aim of this RAIM Study is to present an analysis of the projected
integrity performance for receivers combining the free-to-air Galileo
Open Access Service signals and dual-frequency signals from GPS
Block IIF satellites. The availability of integrity using standard RAIM
techniques is compared with the current specifications for the Galileo
IDS.
The second aim of the analysis is to introduce a novel RAIM technique
developed by the author which improves on the performance of
traditional RAIM algorithms when applied to very large constellations.
Integrity performance exceeding that specified for Galileo’s Safety
Access Service (SAS), and approaching that required for Cat I, is
demonstrated, using only the free-to-air signals from Galileo and GPS.
The impact that these results have on the justification for an integrity
dissemination system within the Galileo architecture is presented and
discussed.
The integrity performance (in terms of availability and protection limit)
provided by RAIM receivers is a complex function of:
• The size of the effective available constellation (i.e. the number of
satellites that can be accessed at any time), and the relative
geometry of the satellites in view;
• The probability density function (PDF) of the error distribution in the
received pseudorange signals from each satellite;
• The availability of each broadcast signal (i.e. the percentage of time
that each satellite broadcasts a ranging signal).
RAIM performance for receivers using the current GPS constellation has
been thoroughly analysed and the conclusions have been enshrined in
RTCA Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) [15]. Also,
some work has been performed which shows how RAIM performance
varies with changes in the three parameters listed above (notably by US
navigation equipment manufacturers such as Litton) [16]. However, this
work has concentrated on the limited improvements that might be
expected from upgrades to the GPS constellation.
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Although some analyses have been undertaken to demonstrate the
RAIM performance that might be expected from a combined GPS/Galileo
Open Access Service (OAS) receiver under the EU GALA and ESA
GalileoSat programmes, these reports have made a number of
simplifying assumptions that do not fairly reflect the potential
performance of a combined system. Specifically, work undertaken by
Imperial College, London on behalf of Alcatel used only a relatively dated
RAIM technique, and its conclusions were ambiguous regarding the
value of a discrete Integrity Determination System [17]. There was,
therefore, a need for an independent study, looking at the performance
of state-of-the-art RAIM algorithms, to assess the benefits that a fee-
charging IDS might offer. This analysis was the basis of the study
undertaken for the BNSC.
The initial study led to the development, and application for patent [18],
for the novel RAIM algorithm discussed subsequently. Furthermore, ESA
awarded a contract for additional research and development of this
algorithm as part of the experimentation plan for Galileo algorithm
development. These two studies together provide the technical core of
this thesis.
5.3 Objectives of the RAIM Study
The objectives of this study are to demonstrate or disprove the following
statements:
• That by combining the free-to-air signals from a 24-satellite GPS
constellation broadcasting freely available signals on two
frequencies, with the free-to-air signals from a 27-satellite Galileo
constellation broadcasting OAS signals on two frequencies, currently
implemented standard RAIM algorithms can provide overall
performance that exceeds the current specifications for the Galileo
Commercial Access Service (CAS);
• That the same combined constellation, using a novel RAIM
technique, offers accuracy and integrity performance that is
comparable to the requirements for civil aviation Category I (Cat I)
precision approaches, and hence exceeds the current specifications
for the Galileo Safety of Life Service;
• That this novel RAIM technique can be shown, by simulation, to meet
the specified requirements for false alarm and missed detection
probabilities.
5.4 Performance Metrics
The elements of navigation system performance are:
• Accuracy (e.g. of position and time);
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• Integrity (e.g. integrity risk and time to alarm);
• Continuity (e.g. of position accuracy, or of integrity)
• Availability (e.g. of position and time, or of integrity);
Each of these terms needs to be precisely defined to ensure that the
various cases are compared consistently. A number of different
definitions of these figures of merit are used in the literature. Those used
throughout this thesis are those used by ICAO in its definition of “total
system parameters” for Required Navigation Performance (RNP) [19].
Each phase of flight or type of flight operation has a set of  RNPs which
are used in its definition. For example, in the approach and landing
phase a number of standards are defined to be appropriate for all types
of aircraft landing at all types of airfield. Terms such as “Approach with
Vertical Guidance II” or “Category I” define precision approach
navigation services with various demands on their RNP. These terms
and distinctions are discussed in a little more detail below.
5.4.1 Accuracy
“The degree of conformance between the estimated, measured, or
desired position and/or the velocity of a platform at a given time and its
true position or velocity”.
There are many ways to express accuracy (e.g. 1σ RMS error, Spherical
Error Probable, etc.). It is necessary to decide which definition of
accuracy is most appropriate for each case in which accuracy is
specified. RNP Total System Error (TSE) accuracy specifications for
approach and landing standards state accuracy limits at the 95th and
100th percentile, laterally and vertically, e.g.:
Decision
Height
Lateral
(95%)
Lateral
(100%)
Vertical
(95%)
Vertical
(100%)
60 m 40m 121 m 12 m 37 m
Table 5-1 : RNP Cat I TSE accuracy to minimum decision height
(DH)
In the subsequent analysis, where User Equivalent Range Error (UERE)
is specified, this refers to 1σ RMS error. Where vertical or horizontal
error performance requirements are specified, these are generally 95%
confidence limit errors. In general this is stated, to avoid confusion.
Where no qualifying statement is given the accuracy referred to is a 1σ
RMS error.
In addition, the difference between Total System Error and Navigation
System Error (NSE) needs to be explained. NSE is, unsurprisingly, the
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error (typically at 95% confidence) allowable for the end-to-end
navigation system measurement, processing and display chain. TSE is
(typically but not definitively) the root sum square of NSE and the pilot or
autopilot Flight Technical Error (FTE) specification.
5.4.2 Integrity
“…the trust which can be placed in the correctness of the information
supplied by the total system. Integrity includes the ability of a system to
provide timely and valid warnings to the user when the system must not
be used for the intended operation”.
Integrity specifications are presented as two parameters: Integrity Risk
(IR) and Time To Alarm (TTA). For example, TSE values for Cat I
approach are IR = 3.3 x 10-7, TTA = 6 seconds [20]. This means that the
probability that the error in position measurement exceeds the accuracy
stated above at any instant during a Cat I approach and is not warned to
the user within 6 seconds must be less than 3.3 x 10-7.  Cat I integrity
requirements are presented in Table 5-2.
5.4.3 Availability
“…the percentage of time that the services of the system are within
required performance limits. Availability is an indication of the ability of
the system to provide useable service within the specified coverage
area” - i.e. probability that specified service is available.
Note this will vary depending on the specifications of the application
being analysed. For example, for an application that requires only 3-
dimensional positioning information with a given accuracy, the availability
figure would relate to the fraction of time in a given environment (i.e.
given minimum elevation blocking angles) for which at least 4 satellites
can be simultaneously observed with suitable geometry to provide a
sufficiently accurate navigation solution.
For an application which includes, for example, RAIM, and for which
inaccurate signals are to be identified and removed from the navigation
solution (i.e. Fault Detection and Exclusion, or FDE), at least 6 satellites
need to be in view. In this case the figure for availability would be very
different from the previous example, even if exactly the same
constellation were being analysed.
5.4.4 Continuity
“…the capability of the total system…to perform its function without
non-scheduled interruptions during the intended operation. The
continuity risk is the probability that the system will be unintentionally
interrupted and not provide guidance information for the intended
operation”.
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Continuity requirements are therefore specified as a probability and a
time period. For example, for Cat I approaches, the Total System Error
Continuity requirement is “8.0 x 10-6, 15 secs”. This means that in any
continuous 15 second period during a Cat I approach, the probability that
the system fails to deliver a valid navigation solution is less than one in
125,000. Cat I NSE continuity requirements are presented in Table 5-2.
5.5 Required Navigation Performance for Precision Approach
The required performance specifications for Global Navigation Satellite
Systems (GNSS) used in aviation applications are defined in ICAO
Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS) [20]. At present
signal-in-space performance requirements for approach with vertical
guidance (APV) and precision approach have been specified for APV-I,
APV-II and Category I. Category II and Category III GNSS performance
requirements are under review and should appear in SARPS at some
point in the future. Table 5-2 below presents the defined specifications
for APV-I, APV-II and Cat I, along with the provisional specifications
assumed for Cat II. These values are used in the subsequent analyses in
this study to estimate the availability of RAIM to meet these performance
specifications.
Operation Accuracy
(H, 95%)
Accuracy
(V, 95%)
Horiz
Alert
Limit
Vertical
Alert
Limit
Integrity Time to
Alert
Continuity Avail-
ability
APV-I 220 m 20 m 556 m 50 m 1-2 x 10-7 10 s 1- 8 x 10-6 .99 to
.99999
APV-II 16 m 8.0 m 40 m 20 m 1-2 x 10-7 6 s 1- 8 x 10-6 .99 to
.99999
Cat I 16 m 6.0 m to
4.0 m
40 m 15 m to
10.0 m
1-2 x 10-7 6 s 1- 8 x 10-6 .99 to
.99999
Cat II
(provis.)
TBD TBD 21 m 10 m to
5.0 m
1- 0.5 x
10-9
1 s 1- 4 x 10-6 .99 to
.99999
Table 5-2: Required Navigation Performance Specifications
Note that the “Integrity” risk is specified per approach (which is
commonly taken as a period of 150 seconds), whilst the “Continuity” risk
is per 15 second interval.
5.6 Galileo IDS System Specifications
The following extract is taken from the Galileo Master High Level
Definition (HLD) document, Issue 2 dated 3 April 2001 [21]:
“The performance of the Safety-of-Life service…is
compatible with the requirements of the Approach with
Vertical Guidance (APV-II) as defined by ICAO SARPs.
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Performance would be equivalent to CAT-I precision
approach requirements except for the vertical accuracy and
integrity performance for which some design margins have
been taken. As the studies and the experimentation on
GALILEO progress, it may be possible to reduce those
design margins and therefore to state better performance
with the goal of achieving CAT-I performances.
Through the Definition Phase, it has been verified that the
performance needs of other modes of transport (land, rail,
maritime) are covered adequately through those
requirements. The service availability above 99.9% would
make it usable for primary means only. Combination of this
GALILEO service either with the current GPS as augmented
by EGNOS corrections, or the future improved GPS and
EGNOS integrity-only, would support CAT-I performance and
offer the prospect of sole means availability. Other
applications covered would be ship docking, train control,
advance vehicle control, robotics (satellite signals combined
with local components when required).
The coverage area of the GALILEO integrity service is
global, and to this extent, the system architecture is being
optimised for this requirement.
Safety-Of-Life Service
Carriers Dual Frequency (single frequency
under evaluation)
Computes
Integrity
YesType of Receiver
Ionospheric
correction
Based on dual-frequency
measurements
Coverage Global
Accuracy (95%) H:  4 m
V:  8 m
Alarm Limit HAL: 12 m
VAL:  20 m
Time-To-Alarm 6 seconds
Integrity
Integrity risk 2x10-7 / 150 s
Continuity Risk 8x10-6/15 s
Timing Accuracy wrt UTC/TAI 50 nsec
Certfication/Liability Yes
Availability 99 % - 99.9 %
Service Performance for Safety of Life Service  with the Satellite
Navigation Signals only and without any other augmentations/elements”
Issue 2 draft 3 of the ESA Galileo System Requirements Document
(SRD) [22] also states that:
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“A Galileo Safety-of-Life Service Satellite-Only Receiver,
• located at any point within the Full Earth Coverage
Area…,
• receiving the Safety-of-life Service Navigation
Message,
• under the General Environment,
shall be able to generate an Alert whenever the
calculated horizontal position error exceeds 12 metres or
the vertical position error exceeds 20 metres.
…with an Integrity Risk of 3.5 x 10-7 over 150 secs…with
Continuity of 1 – 10-5 per 15 seconds…”
I.e. the current Galileo integrity signal specifications are for a
performance level broadly aligned with APV-II TSE requirements.
Furthermore, Issue 1 of the IDS Requirements Specification,
produced by Alcatel [23], makes the following statement:
“The main function of the Integrity Processing Facility
(IPF) is to provide the integrity flags (IF) for the
GalileoSat satellites. The IF support the integrity level of
GalileoSat system which at the maximum is defined by
the provision of CAT I precision approach requirements.
Note that providing just only integrity level
comprising three parameters – Integrity Risk, Alert
Limit, System Time-to-Alert – might be insufficient to
meet the Required Navigation Performance (RNP),
which, apart from the integrity parameters,
introduces accuracy, availability and continuity
requirements. Therefore, the IPF has to satisfy also
these main requirements particularly the continuity level
expressed as the probability of false alarms.”
Taking these three statements together, it is clear that as currently
defined the Galileo IDS alone will not meet Cat I precision
approach specifications. An article by ESA project team members in
the Summer 2001 issue of “Galileo’s World” magazine [24] also
makes the following statement regarding integrity performance
drivers:
“For Galileo, as for satellite navigation in general, the
aviation community has formulated the most detailed
requirements. However, this is not expected to be the
largest sector of Galileo users.
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Moreover, the aviation requirement has been formulated
for the demanding case of landing at an airport in poor
visibility, which…may best be served by global or
regional integrity facilities enhanced by local services.
A less demanding requirement, either on alert limit or on
alert time, could have a major impact on the
configuration of the integrity system, including an impact
on the trade-off between multiple regional systems and
unified global systems.”
This statement is consistent with the sentiment of the previous
extracts, i.e. that the IDS should provide a vertical alert limit of only
20m, and that aviation users intending to use Galileo for Cat I
precision approach will need to augment the system, either using
some local augmentation system or by combining the signals with
those from GPS and/or EGNOS/WAAS.
5.6.1 Galileo SAS Service Specifications
The Galileo requirement for safety of life service is detailed in the
following table.  It has been extracted from the Galileo System
Requirements document (SRD) [22] .
Performance parameter Requirement
Horizontal Alarm Limit 12 m
Vertical Alarm Limit 20 m
Time to Alert 6 s
Integrity risk 3.5 x 10-7 /150s
Continuity risk 10-5 / 15 s
Availability 99.5 %
Table 5-3: Galileo Safety Of Life Performance requirement
Although not stated explicitly here, in the course of Galileo System Test
Bed experimentation the Availability requirement has been taken to
mean the availability at the worst user location [45], rather than a global
average of availability. This is a significant constraint, as will be
demonstrated and discussed later.
5.6.2 The Challenge of “Time to Alarm”
The term “TTA” defined as either “Time to Alert” or “Time to Alarm” has
occurred at a number of points in the preceding discussion, and warrants
some amplification., as it is an integral part of defining integrity service
performance specifications. TTA is the amount of time for which a user
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may be given hazardously misleading information without an alert being
provided by an integrity system. For example, considering the
specifications in Table 5-3, a user of this service may at some instant
have a navigation position solution whose vertical component differs
from truth by more than 20m. The probability that in any 150 second
period such a transgression can occur for more than 6 seconds without
the user receiving an integrity alert must be less than 3.5 x 10-7, as
discussed previously.
Meeting this particular requirement presents a significant challenge to
designers of the Galileo IDS. Indeed this one requirement determines
the number of uplink stations that Galileo requires, the quality of service
required from the various global data networks used by the ground
segment, the level of redundancy required in control systems and the
amount of testing required to certify the safety of life service. It is no
surprise that the extracts quoted above both cast doubt over the systems
ability to meet this demanding TTA requirement.
Note that a 6 second TTA requirement is demanding for a ground-based
integrity system, but is almost insignificant for a RAIM-based system. We
can assume, with some justification, that a system determining its
integrity from signals received on-board should be able to process these
signals and deliver a valid output to the user well within 6 seconds.
5.7 IDS System Costs
The following cost estimates, provided by Alenia Spazio, have been
extracted from the ESA Galileo Definition Study Final Presentation,
dated 22 March 2001 [13]:
• The overall cost of the Galileo Development, IOV phase and
Deployment (i.e. all activities from 2001 – 2007) is estimated at
3.1 Billion, at 1998 economic conditions.
• Within this total, the European Integrity Determination System
(EIDS) has an estimated cost of  410M.
• Replenishment costs attributed to the EIDS are estimated at  17M
per year, for 20 years (from a total recurring cost of  270 M per
year for the whole system).
• Therefore, total costs from 2001 to 2027 attributable solely to
the European component of the IDS are around  750M at
1998 economic conditions.
• Considering the option to have a Global IDS:
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• The additional cost of the Development, IOV phase and
Deployment (i.e. all activities from 2001 – 2007) is estimated at
8% of  3.1 Billion, i.e.  248 M at 1998 economic conditions
(assuming that the “Global Centralised Integrity” option
discussed in the Final Review is taken as the Global IDS
system architecture).
• Additional recurring costs, based on the same assumptions,
are 2.8% of  270M, i.e.  7.6M per year.
• Therefore, additional costs from 2001 to 2027 attributable to
the non-European components of the IDS are around
400M at 1998 economic conditions.
• Hence the estimated cost of a complete (European plus
Global) IDS, deployed and operating for 20 years is
around  1.15 Billion at 1998 economic conditions.
Note these estimates exclude the cost of development or deployment
of any local augmentation systems. Therefore, on current
assumptions and issued specifications this is the cost of a system that
would not meet the specifications for Cat I, and would not improve
upon the specifications for WAAS and EGNOS, other than providing
global coverage.
5.8 Existing Literature on Combined RAIM Systems Performance
The following sub-sections present a brief review of recent papers
covering combined Galileo/GPS RAIM systems performance. In each
case, an assessment of the methodology employed is presented, along
with a synopsis of the main results.
5.8.1 The Integrity Requirement in Satellite Navigation: System Design
Trade-Offs
The first two listed authors of this paper [25] are from Tor Vergata
University of Rome. The two others are from Alenia Aerospazio, Rome.
The main conclusion of this paper is that in order to support Cat I
requirements through RAIM a combined dual-frequency GNSS
constellation would require a minimum of 18 satellites in view above 5°
masking angle. Although the paper does not state the corollary explicitly,
it is clear that 27 Galileo satellites with 24 GPS satellites could not
consistently provide the required degree of coverage
However, the methodology employed in this paper is seriously flawed.
Specifically, constellation geometries as seen by the user are generated
randomly, with a large number of iterations used to estimate the
availability of RAIM integrity for a given number of satellites in view. The
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problem with this, as opposed to using real constellation geometries
propagated over time, is that random geometries will occasionally
(indeed, often) cluster satellites into a small patch of sky, effectively
producing a poorer position solution and protection limit than would be
expected in practice. Given that availability requirements for Cat I are of
the order of 99.99%, even one or two unnecessarily poor geometries out
of 10,000 iterations will lead to a false conclusion that RAIM cannot meet
the availability requirements.
Two RAIM approaches are used in this paper – a “classical” RAIM
algorithm, and a “modified” or weighted RAIM algorithm. Both
approaches use standard Least Squares Residuals techniques, the
“modified” approach being identical to the “Weighted RAIM for Precision
Approach” presented in [26].
5.8.2 Integrity Performance Models for a Combined Galileo/GPS
Navigation System
This paper [17] was based on work produced under the EC GALA
programme, discussed previously. The first three listed authors are from
Imperial College, London. The fourth author is from University College
London and the other authors are from Alcatel Space. This paper does
not focus on specific navigation performance standards and so it is not
possible to compare the estimated RAIM performance with Cat I
requirements directly. However, results are presented for a Vertical Alert
Limit of 18m, which suggest that RAIM availability using combined
Galileo and GPS will be greater than 99% globally, and approaching
100% over all of the ECAC region except in the extreme North, for a
missed detection probability of (1-0.999) and a false alarm probability of
(1-0.9998). The RAIM method used in the analysis by Imperial College is
based on the “Marginally Detectable Error” (MDE) algorithm formalised
in [27].
In order to assess the merit of this work, the author of this thesis
modelled the MDE algorithm and compared the results with a weighted
least squares residuals approach. The results were relatively close for
small constellation sizes (representative of GPS or Galileo alone), but
when the constellations are combined the MDE method was found to
give significantly lower values for VPL (and hence higher expected
availability values) than are found from the LSR approach. The reasons
for this discrepancy are discussed in Appendix C; at this point it suffices
to say that the MDE approach appears to underestimate the false alarm
probability when the number of redundant measurements becomes
large.
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5.8.3 Potential Performance Levels of a Combined Galileo/GPS
Navigation System
This paper [28] was based on work produced under the EC GALA
programme discussed in Section 3.4.2. The first three listed authors are
from Imperial College, London. The fourth and fifth authors are from
University College London and the other authors are from Alcatel Space.
The content of this paper is very similar to that discussed in the previous
section. However, this paper makes the explicit statement that in order to
meet an 18m VAL a combined GPS/Galileo RAIM system would “require
additional augmentation or system enhancement” such as the ground
integrity channel (GIC) to be provided by the IDS or EGNOS.
Alternatively, the paper suggests that without a separate augmentation
or integrity channel, the potential system capability would be a VAL of 25
to 30 m.
There is no evidence to support this statement. Indeed, the original
GALA document quite clearly shows that over almost all of the world,
RAIM availability approaching 100% can be expected with a VAL of 18m.
Unfortunately the GALA document has not been placed in the public
domain.
This paper has therefore been used within the Galileo programme as
evidence of the need for the Galileo IDS, because RAIM would be
inadequate. However, as discussed previously (and subsequently in
Appendix C), the underlying methodology, and many of the supporting
assumptions, do not stand up to close scrutiny.
It should be noted that this work was supported by Alcatel Space who,
within the Galileo Industries consortium, are positioning themselves to be
the prime contractor for the IDS and hence have a vested interest in
concluding that a GIC is still required.
5.8.4 New Integrity Concept at User Level for a Future Galileo and GPS
Environment
All authors are from GMV of Spain. This paper [29] appears to be the
first public acknowledgement that with new RAIM algorithms, combined
Galileo/GPS RAIM receivers can be expected to give better than 20m
Vertical Protection Limit, and therefore the value of the IDS is
questionable. This paper also introduces a new RAIM algorithm used for
fault detection and exclusion (FDE) being developed by GMV. An
interesting additional conclusion from this paper is that a Galileo
constellation optimised for RAIM performance as part of a combined
GNSS will not be a symmetrical Walker as is the current baseline for
Galileo.
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Although the precise analysis method used by GMV is not presented in
this paper, two points stand out which question the relevance of the
results. Firstly, the analysis was performed with a Galileo constellation of
30 operational satellites, not 27. This will inevitably produce an over
optimistic estimate of combined systems RAIM performance. Secondly,
the analysis appears to use Position Dilution of Precision (PDOP) as a
figure of merit for constellation geometry, which implies that a weighted
RAIM solution is not being used. As is clearly demonstrated in [25]
discussed above, using a classical, unweighted RAIM approach will
produce a pessimistic estimate of combined systems RAIM performance.
5.9 Existing Literature on Advanced Integrity Monitoring
Algorithms
A number of papers discussing advanced or novel approaches to
integrity monitoring have been reviewed. The most significant papers are
discussed below.
1. Weighted RAIM for Precision Approach
The authors are from Stanford University. This paper [26] presents an
excellent description of the standard weighted least squares residuals
RAIM technique, modelled and discussed subsequently in this report.
The emphasis of this paper is on the expected RAIM performance for
users of GPS with measurement error corrections provided by
geostationary space-based augmentation systems such as WAAS, for
which a vertical protection limit of 26m is estimated using RAIM, with
99.8% availability.
2. On GPS Positioning and Integrity Monitoring
The author is from National Cheng Kung University, Taiwan. This paper
[30] is discussed in some detail in Section 10 of this thesis, since it
provides the basis for the “Errors in Variables” technique modelled
subsequently.
3. Advantages of Autonomous Integrity Monitored Extrapolation
Technology for Precision Approach
The authors are with Litton Aero Products and Litton Guidance & Control
Systems, respectively. This paper [16] presents a proprietary approach
to autonomous integrity called Autonomous Integrity Monitored
Extrapolation (AIMETM). This technique involves integrating RAIM-type
algorithms with inertial navigation systems to provide the ability to “coast”
for several minutes when some or all satellite signals are absent, hence
increasing RAIM continuity and availability. This paper concludes that
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AIME combined with SBAS corrections can potentially be used for Cat II
precision approach.
5.10 Current Galileo Integrity Concept
5.10.1 SISA/IF Concept
The proposed integrity service to be provided by the Galileo system is
based on the so-called Signal In Space Accuracy/Integrity Flag concept
(SISA/IF) [31]. An estimate of satellite range accuracy is generated at
the Galileo Orbitography and Synchronisation Processing Facility
(OSPF), this basically indicates the quality of the ephemeris and clock
data. A bound is then placed on this error to represent the predicted
range error at a certain confidence level for the worst user location within
a given region – this SISA value is then uplinked and broadcast by
Galileo satellites. An independent network of monitoring stations then
performs a statistical analysis on the measured pseudorange residuals
(for a given satellite and service region) to determine the probability that
the broadcast SISA value actually bounds the residuals. An integrity flag
is generated and broadcast if the probability parameter fails to meet a
defined threshold.
5.10.2 Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM)
Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) methods check the
consistency of the measurements to infer the quality of the position
estimate. For RAIM to be available, the user receiver requires redundant
measurements and suitable satellite geometry. RAIM availability can be
examined by checking the number of redundant measurements and the
relative geometry of the observed satellites from the user to ensure that
the undetected measurement errors cannot make the position error
exceed a pre-defined alarm limit. RAIM availability and/or protection
limits can be improved by increasing the number of satellites and the
precision of the measurements.
A number of different RAIM algorithms have been developed over the
years.  Some are primarily design tools that predict whether or not RAIM
will be available for a given position at a given time, whilst others are
implemented within receivers to perform the fault detection procedure.
Some techniques use a filtering or averaging technique such as the
position comparison method [32]. However, the majority of RAIM
techniques use a “snapshot” approach in which only measurement data
from a single epoch is used to check the consistency of the solution.
Such techniques include the range comparison method [33], the residual
analysis method [34], and the parity method [35]. It has been shown [36]
that with decision boundaries set to yield the same false alarm rate,
these methods provide the same level of integrity, i.e. fundamentally
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these methods are identical, although conceptually they appear quite
different. Within this thesis they are represented by a single Least
Squares Residuals (LSR) method.
Some RAIM techniques have also been designed to use data collected
and filtered over multiple epochs. This generates predicted
measurements (receiver-satellite ranges) with which to compare each
new measurement. Although such techniques promise very high
performance, especially when combined with additional sensors such as
inertial navigation system [16], they are difficult to model and analyse in
the general case, and evaluation of their predicted performance is
excluded from the scope of this thesis.
5.10.3 RAIM and SISA/IF Integration
The Integrity Determination System within the Galileo architecture is
intended to provide timely information regarding the integrity of the
signals being broadcast by the Galileo satellites (and, potentially, also
from the GPS and GLONASS constellations). This information is vital for
high-integrity, safety-of-life applications, the most demanding of which is
likely to be aviation precision approach.
In practice, users of an integrity service will generally include Receiver
Autonomous Integrity Monitoring algorithms in their receivers [15]. RAIM
allows the receiver to detect local integrity failures, caused for example
by multipath effects, meteorological conditions, local interference or even
deliberate jamming, which could not be protected by the IDS, therefore
the use of RAIM is likely to be mandated for all high-integrity
applications.
The problem then is to find a way in which information provided by the
IDS can be combined with a RAIM algorithm to maximize the level of
integrity or, more precisely, to minimize the horizontal and vertical
protection limits for a given False Alarm and Missed Detection probability
(PFA and PMD respectively).
Consider an aviation user of a combined RAIM/IDS system processing
signals from all Galileo and GPS IIF satellites in view. With no faults on
any satellites the IDS system will normally declare all satellites as “OK”
and, independently the RAIM algorithm should conclude that all
measurements are consistent therefore it is safe to continue with the
approach. However, with any error distribution on the ranging signals,
there will occasionally be cases where even with no faults one satellite’s
ranging signals will be an “outlier” – sufficiently inconsistent with other
measurements as to cause doubt as to the quality of the calculated
navigation solution. The RAIM algorithm would be expected to generate
an alarm in this event, and the frequency with which such events can be
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tolerated is set by PFA (which is in turn set by the Continuity
specifications for the corresponding phase of flight).
If IF/SISA information provided by the Galileo system is to be included in
the receiver’s integrity determination process, the RAIM algorithms
should adapt their fault detection thresholds dynamically, to prevent the
false alarm rate from increasing and becoming a problem. If the
detection threshold doesn't adapt dynamically, and the receiver is set to
indicate a fault detected by either the IDS or the RAIM then there is a
real chance of the required false alarm or missed detection probability
being exceeded.
Treating the RAIM and IDS-processing elements of the receiver
separately, there are four distinct cases:
1. RAIM and IDS both show no fault, therefore it is safe to continue the
approach;
2. RAIM and IDS both show a fault, therefore the approach must be
aborted;
3. RAIM shows a fault, but IDS shows no fault, in which case the
assumption must be that there is some local effect on the received
signals, therefore the approach must be aborted;
4. IDS-processing shows a fault, but RAIM shows no fault, in which
case it is not clear what should happen.
At first glance one might assume that a conservative approach should be
taken, so that if either independent system declares a fault, the approach
should be aborted. However, this is in itself a risky manoeuvre, which is
why the continuity requirements for landing aids are so demanding.
Where RAIM and IDS-processing are used together it is imperative that
the overall false alarm probability does not exceed the Continuity
specifications in RNP standards.
This raises the question “What failure or combination of failures can the
IDS detect and generate an appropriate alert, but which might not be
detected by RAIM”.
This is not a trivial problem: In its current inception the IDS has the task
of calculating and uplinking SISA for every satellite, at a rate of the order
of every 100 minutes [31]. This SISA should bound the approximately
Gaussian distribution of normal end-to-end system noise. When a
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“feared event3” such as an evil waveform4 or a clock error is detected,
the IDS must ensure that Integrity Flags are set to warn users that the
satellite in question has errors exceeding the broadcast SISA.
So how should the receiver respond to a set Integrity Flag? Consider a
case where a user is in a phase of flight that requires 15m vertical alert
limit, and the calculated RAIM VPL is 14.8m with all satellites operating
normally. If an IF is then detected instructing the receiver to exclude a
satellite, which would raise the VPL to 15.1 m, but the RAIM algorithm
shows no significant inconsistency, should the approach be aborted?
The answer will depend upon the value of SISA and the relative
geometry of the failed satellite and the user.
Within the GALA study report on Integrity [3] previously discussed, a
decision tree is presented in order to demonstrate how RAIM and SISA
monitoring information can be combined to provide an improved overall
Total User Integrity Risk. This figure is reproduced at Figure 5-1.
This figure displays two fallacious assumptions:
1. That RAIM does not provide an integrity barrier for multiple SIS errors
(which is not true; LSR RAIM may, in some circumstances, not
detected certain combinations of multiple failure, but in the majority of
cases RAIM will detect multiple failures [26]);
2. It does not take into account the inevitable overlap between ground
detections and RAIM detections. The overall performance can only
be improved if the ground detection system can detect errors the
RAIM system would miss. No evidence has been provided that this is
the case. Other studies looking at the robustness of GPS against
intentional and unintentional interference effects [37] are
unambiguous in stating that RAIM can detect failures that ground
based systems would inevitably miss, but that there is no evidence of
a reciprocal case.
This, therefore, provides the context and starting point for the analytical
part of this thesis: To demonstrate that RAIM algorithms using Galileo
and GPS together can provide Integrity performance that exceeds that
specified for the Galileo IDS.
                                           
3
“Feared Event” or “FE” is a term used in satellite navigation meaning a possible cause of noise
or bias on one or more measurements, for which system designers need to develop appropriate
mitigation techniques and/or limit the applicability of the services accordingly.
4
 An “Evil Waveform” is a specific example of a Feared Event. Experience from GPS has shown
that under certain circumstances particular combinations of signal structure and receiver design
can lead to a particularly insidious form of ranging error, which affects only users of particular
types of receiver, at particular times. Evil Waveforms are very rare events, but they are regarded
as the classic kind of FE which define the need for sophisticated integrity determination systems.
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Figure 5-1: “GALA” Study Integrity decision tree showing two “Integrity Barriers” - RAIM and ground-based
monitoring (using Boolean Logic “AND” & “OR” gates)
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6. SIMULATION TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES
6.1 Set of Tools
In order to meet the objectives of this study as stated in Section 5.3, the
following set of simple simulation tools have been developed.
• “RAIM Availability” spreadsheet – Excel/Visual Basic application that
calculates RAIM availability for a particular user visibility geometry
using the “Least Squares Residual” (LSR) weighted RAIM approach
discussed in Section 9 and the novel “Errors in Variables” (EIV) RAIM
techniques presented in Section 10.
• “Bias Modelling” spreadsheet – Excel/Visual Basic application that
develops the techniques for Monte Carlo analysis of RAIM
performance, by simulating the application of Gaussian noise and
biases to pseudorange measurements.
• “Service Volume Simulator” (SVS) – An application written in C++
which produces the same outputs as the “RAIM Availability”
spreadsheets, but which runs three orders of magnitude faster, and
hence produces high temporal and spatial resolution graphical
outputs of RAIM availability. This tool also produces a simple output
data file which is post-processed using Excel.
• “Navigation Engine” (NavEng) – An application written in C++ which
produces similar outputs to the “Bias Modelling” spreadsheet, but
which enables large numbers of samples to be used in Monte Carlo
simulations to determine the false alarm and missed detection
performance of RAIM algorithms under evaluation. This tool also
produces a simple output data file which is post-processed using
Excel.
•  “Flight Trials Simulator” – An application running under Matlab which
uses accurate aircraft position information from a series of flight trials
and simulates the reception of navigation signals from Galileo and
GPS constellations. These signals are processed by LSR and EIV
RAIM algorithms, and the ability to detect Feared Events (i.e.
unexpected biases on a pseudorange measurement) with various
characteristics is evaluated.
These tools are briefly discussed in the following subsections.
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6.2 “RAIM Availability” spreadsheet
The RAIM Availability spreadsheet provides the basic analytical tool from
which all subsequent tools have been developed. The complete tool
comprises the worksheets discussed below.
6.2.1 Input
This is the worksheet on which the scenario is defined. The Galileo and
GPS satellite parameters and UERE curves are set on this worksheet,
along with the plane difference between constellations and the minimum
masking angle. Against each satellite’s parameters, a flag can be set to
“F” which will exclude that satellite from the subsequent analysis.
This worksheet also calculates the orbital rate, sine and cosine of
inclination and right ascension for each satellite, in preparation for the
next stage of the calculation.
6.2.2 Cartesian
This worksheet extracts the time (epoch) at which the required snapshot
calculation is to be performed and calculates the position of each
satellite in x, y, z co-ordinates. The transformation from Keplerian
elements to Earth-centred, inertial (ECI) cartesian co-ordinates is
performed using a standard “3-1-3” transformation [38]. This
transformation is simplified, since the eccentricity of each satellite’s orbit
is assumed to be zero. In this case there is no “argument of perigee”
component in the Keplerian elements. The transformation of any
satellite’s position to ECI Cartesian coordinates is described under the
Detailed Processing Model in Section 8.2.
6.2.3 User_Position
This worksheet extracts the user latitude and longitude for which the
required snapshot calculation is to be performed and calculates the
position of the user, at the epoch, in the same ECI x, y, z co-ordinate
frame as was used for the satellites. The process is described in Section
8.2.
6.2.4 LOS (“Line of Sight”)
For each satellite, this worksheet evaluates the distance between the
user and the satellite (“Range”), the elevation angle (by application of the
cosine rule) and hence whether or not each satellite is visible above the
defined masking angle. This worksheet also presents figures for the
degree of coverage (DoC, i.e. the number of satellites in view) for each
constellation individually and for the two combined. It is also possible to
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extend this worksheet to present these DoC figures as a function of time
for the specified user location.
6.2.5 Table
The primary function of this worksheet is to evaluate the components Dx,
Dy and Dz of the unit vector from the user to each visible satellite.
These are then transformed to North, East and Up components of a unit
vector by performing a 3-2-3 [38] coordinate transformation from the ECI
coordinate system to local user cartesian coordinates.
A secondary function translates these components into a coarse
statement of direction (i.e. a quadrant) to each satellite. Although not
used directly, this information is extremely useful in understanding the
relative influence of each satellite when considering specific cases.
6.2.6 G_Sheet
The majority of the data processing activities are performed on this
worksheet. The satellites in view are first presented in descending order
of elevation angle. The UERE for each satellite is then evaluated, from
the lookup tables on the “Input” sheet. The Observation matrix or G
matrix is also produced, along with the Weighting or W matrix.
With N satellites in view, the G matrix is simply an N x 4 matrix in which
the first three columns contain the North, East and Up components of the
unit vector previously derived, and the fourth column contains “1”, which
represents the existence of a clock offset.
By using a series of Visual Basic macros in Excel to cater for the variable
size of the matrices (which are set by the number of satellites in view),
the various steps of the LSR RAIM method discussed subsequently in
Section 7 are performed, culminating in the calculation of the Vertical
Protection Limit available for the specified user position, epoch,
constellation types and continuity/integrity risk probabilities.
6.2.7 Availability
This worksheet provides an interface in which the user location is
specified, along with start time, end time, time step size and required
minimum vertical alert limit. Using this data, a macro runs through the
preceding steps of the analysis and calculates the vertical protection limit
at each time step. When complete, a figure for the percentage availability
of RAIM to the specified alert limit is presented.
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6.2.8 Display
Taking the previous worksheet a stage further, this sheet provides an
interface in which North, South, East and West spatial limits and step
sizes are specified, along with start time, end time, time step size and
required minimum vertical alert limit. A macro then evaluates whether or
not RAIM is available for each combination of time and user position.
-10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80
80 78.7% 79.3% 79.3% 79.3% 78.0% 79.3% 78.7% 77.3% 78.7% 79.3% 78.7% 78.7% 78.0% 80.0% 81.3% 84.7% 88.7% 83.3% 84.7%
75 71.3% 73.3% 77.3% 74.7% 74.7% 74.0% 71.3% 74.7% 74.7% 72.0% 72.0% 72.7% 72.0% 73.3% 76.0% 76.0% 76.7% 73.3% 75.3%
70 77.3% 76.0% 76.7% 76.0% 78.0% 78.0% 78.7% 76.0% 75.3% 74.7% 74.0% 76.0% 75.3% 76.7% 78.0% 81.3% 82.0% 81.3% 79.3%
65 89.3% 86.0% 88.0% 88.0% 84.0% 86.0% 84.7% 85.3% 84.7% 83.3% 84.0% 85.3% 84.7% 86.7% 88.0% 89.3% 90.0% 92.0% 94.7%
60 96.7% 96.7% 95.3% 98.0% 96.0% 94.7% 93.3% 92.7% 91.3% 91.3% 90.7% 92.0% 94.7% 96.7% 96.7% 96.7% 98.7% 99.3% 100.0%
55 100.0% 100.0% 99.3% 98.0% 98.7% 98.7% 96.7% 97.3% 97.3% 95.3% 96.7% 98.0% 98.7% 98.7% 99.3% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
50 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 99.3% 98.7% 98.7% 97.3% 98.0% 98.0% 98.0% 100.0% 100.0% 99.3% 100.0% 99.3% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
45 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 99.3% 99.3% 98.0% 100.0% 96.7% 96.0% 98.0% 98.7% 99.3% 98.7% 98.7% 98.7% 98.0% 100.0% 100.0%
40 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 98.7% 98.7% 97.3% 98.0% 98.7% 99.3% 100.0% 98.0% 98.0% 98.7% 100.0% 100.0%
35 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 99.3% 100.0% 100.0% 99.3% 99.3% 99.3% 98.7% 99.3% 100.0% 98.7% 98.0% 98.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
30 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 99.3% 99.3% 100.0% 99.3% 100.0% 100.0% 99.3% 100.0% 100.0% 99.3% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
25 97.3% 100.0% 98.7% 99.3% 99.3% 99.3% 98.7% 98.0% 96.7% 96.0% 95.3% 95.3% 97.3% 97.3% 97.3% 96.7% 100.0% 98.7% 96.7%
20 92.7% 93.3% 93.3% 94.7% 94.7% 95.3% 94.7% 90.7% 92.0% 91.3% 92.7% 92.7% 94.0% 95.3% 91.3% 92.7% 94.0% 93.3% 92.7%
15 87.3% 88.0% 90.0% 91.3% 92.0% 91.3% 92.0% 87.3% 87.3% 91.3% 92.0% 88.7% 90.0% 89.3% 88.7% 90.7% 90.7% 88.7% 90.0%
10 88.0% 91.3% 91.3% 93.3% 90.7% 92.7% 93.3% 88.7% 90.0% 92.0% 89.3% 95.3% 89.3% 92.0% 90.0% 91.3% 90.7% 92.7% 92.7%
5 92.0% 89.3% 88.0% 87.3% 84.7% 86.7% 84.7% 84.0% 83.3% 82.0% 81.3% 83.3% 86.7% 86.7% 88.0% 86.7% 89.3% 94.0% 95.3%
0 88.7% 84.7% 86.7% 82.7% 80.7% 81.3% 78.7% 77.3% 77.3% 79.3% 78.0% 77.3% 80.0% 84.0% 82.0% 87.3% 86.7% 88.7% 94.0%
Table 6-1: Example output from “Display” function
Table 6-1 presents a sample output from this function.
6.2.9 SVD
The EIV process is performed on a worksheet called “SVD”, which
includes a number of macros to perform the necessary matrix
manipulations with matrix dimensions that are a function of the number
of satellites in view. Within this worksheet the EIV RAIM process
described in Section 10 has been modelled.
Unlike the previous methods described, Excel does not include all of the
functions necessary to perform the EIV/Total Least Squares analysis.
Specifically, the Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) linear algebra
function at the heart of this method has been included using an Excel
add-in called “PopTools”. This is freely available on the internet [39] and
uses validated mathematical methods, along with routines for iterating
spreadsheets and performing Monte Carlo simulations. PopTools was
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developed by Greg Hood at the Pest Animal Control Co-operative
Research Centre, based at Wildlife and Ecology, CSIRO, Canberra,
Australia. It depends heavily on a numerical library developed by Dr
Jean DeBord, which is available at his TPMath web site.
6.3 “Bias Modelling” spreadsheet
This tool uses the same worksheets as the “LSR RAIM” spreadsheet,
with the addition of macros and a user interface to include a random
noise error on any or all satellite’s signals, along with a discrete bias if
required. To model Gaussian noise, a random number between 0 and 1
is generated for each satellite, which is then used in Excel’s “Normsinv”
function to produce the number of standard deviations (and sign)
associated with this probability level. When this is then multiplied by the
UERE value associated with the satellite’s elevation angle a random
error (in metres) is generated. By adding this value (which may be
positive or negative) to the “true” modelled distance between the receiver
and the satellite, a pseudorange is generated.
A routine has been added to the “G_Sheet” worksheet which calculates
the weighted least squares position solution (as described in Section 9.1)
and generates a flag if the vertical position error exceeds the LSR RAIM-
calculated vertical protection limit.
6.4 Service Volume Simulator (SVS)
Although Excel is an extremely useful application for simple and rapid
development and visualisation of the techniques discussed in this thesis,
it is relatively slow computationally – when calculating protection limits
using both LSR and EIV RAIM methods simultaneously, each
geometrical case takes of the order of two seconds to process on a 1.47
MHz AMD Athlon PC. Clearly, it is impractical to attempt to calculate
RAIM availability statistics with reasonable temporal and spatial
resolution using Excel – the number of cases, and hence the processing
time required, rapidly becomes prohibitive. As a result the LSR and EIV
RAIM VPL protection algorithms and RAIM availability calculations were
coded in C++ to produce a tool running approximately three orders of
magnitude faster. Figure 6-1 shows the window for snapshot (i.e. single
geometry) analysis. A separate window enables the user to run multiple
analyses, with relatively high spatial and temporal resolution.
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Figure 6-1: SVS Snapshot Case Window
Validation of the software implementation was performed simply by
comparing the results produced by this tool with those produced by
Excel, for a large number of cases. As can be seen in Figure 6-1, this
window displays all of the individual parameters produced by the Excel
spreadsheet.
In order to model the EIV method in this tool, it is obviously necessary to
include the Singular Value Decomposition function which is the key
element of the Total Least Squares solution. This can be taken from an
appropriate text providing numerical recipes for C++ programs or, as in
this case, a dedicated linear algebra toolset can be used. The tool used
here is called “gMatVec C++ Matrix/Vector Library”, which is freeware
downloadable from a number of internet sites [40], although any
commercial linear algebra package including the SVD function, such as
the widely available LAPACK, could be used. Alternatively, MATLAB
could also be used.
One point to note is that different implementations of the SVD function
have different conventions which need to be borne in mind. Specifically,
the SVD function in “Poptools” for Excel always ranks the singular values
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extracted from the matrix in descending order of size. Some C++ SVD
functions may not sort the singular values automatically. Therefore this
ordering process must be manually coded in order for the EIV process
described subsequently to work correctly.
Both the LSR and EIV methods discussed subsequently require some
statistical functions to be employed. For LSR, normal distribution and
central 2 distribution functions are required. For EIV, non- central 2
distribution functions are also required, as will be demonstrated. In order
to evaluate these techniques, statistical function libraries have been
incorporated into these tools [41]. These libraries use statistical functions
defined in [42].
The Service Volume Simulation was developed with the following
requirements:
• Allow the user to specify a “snapshot” analysis case, which is a
combination of epoch, receiver latitude and longitude, minimum
masking angle, false alarm probability (PFA) and missed detection
probability (PMD);
• Allow the user to specify a “service volume” analysis case, which is a
combination of:
o start and end epoch;
o time step/number of time steps;
o receiver latitude and longitude;
o latitude/longitude step size or number of steps within the
range;
o minimum masking angle;
o false alarm probability;
o missed detection probability.
• Accept constellation definition files which specify the orbital elements
for the satellites to be used in a service volume analysis, and tables
which specify the relationship between UERE and elevation angle.
This table may be different for different satellite types (i.e. a different
table may be specified for Galileo SAS, Galileo OAS and/or GPS IIF
satellites);
• Include Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) in which RAIM algorithms to be
evaluated are defined;
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• Allow the user to exclude any satellites from the analysis at run-time;
• Present the Vertical Protection Limit calculated using any included
algorithms, for a snapshot geometry (i.e. combination of epoch and
user latitude/longitude);
• Present maps of the specified service area, overlayed with colour-
coded (grey-scale) plots showing percentage of time for which RAIM
is available to the specified Vertical Alert Limit (VAL);
• Allow the user to change the specified VAL;
• Allow the user to specify the availability percentages associated with
each grey scale element;
• Allow the user to copy maps to documents for reporting purposes;
• Allow service volume simulations to be performed on a PC with a
resolution at least as demanding as:
o Time span – three days (i.e. the repeat period of a combined
Galileo/GPS constellation);
o Time step – 1 minute
o Global coverage (180 degrees to –180 degree longitude, 90
degrees to –90 degrees latitude)
o Spatial resolution down to 1 degree for global coverage. Finer
for analysis over small service areas (e.g. 0.5 degree in lat and
long over ECAC region)
o Up to one hundred million iterations in a service volume
analysis.
Given the large number of samples required to produce high-definition
service volume analyses, the SVS is optimised for speed rather than for
high-fidelity. Specifically, a spherical earth approximation is used, and
orbits propagated using a Keplerian model, assuming zero orbital
eccentricity.
The SVS also provides as an additional output a single figure
representing the overall availability of integrity (as a percentage) for the
specified service volume and conditions. This figure use a weighting
function to ensure that each geographical location (i.e. a given latitude
and longitude) is weighted according to the surface area associated with
the latitude of the location (i.e. points close to the equator are weighted
more highly than points close to the poles).
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The SVS does not provide a direct assessment of integrity availability
taking into account assumed satellite outage probabilities. However, by
running each test case a number of times, with 0, 1 or 2 satellites out at
any time, and by combining the overall integrity availability figures with a
weighting corresponding to the probability of each degraded
constellation state, a figure for the overall availability of integrity taking
into account satellite outages can be evaluated.
Output from the Service Volume Simulator takes the form of a map,
overlayed with a grid, the shade of which represents the percentage
availability of RAIM with the specified PMD, PFA requirements and vertical
alert limit.
Figure 6-2: Example output from Service Volume Simulator
A text file representation of this availability plot is also available as an
output. This allows runs to be repeated with 0, 1, 2 or 3 satellites
disabled, and the availability figures combined based on these state
probabilities. This combination of data is performed in Matlab or Excel.
In addition, the SVS outputs the following data:
• Average RAIM availability, weighted to take into account the surface
area associated with each latitude/longitude step;
• RAIM availability at the worst user location;
• Latitude and Longitude of worst user location.
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6.5 Navigation Engine (NavEng)
As previously discussed, the required navigation performance
requirements of continuity and integrity for aviation precision approach
and the associated Galileo Safety of Life service are very demanding. In
order to demonstrate that a RAIM algorithm can meet these
requirements, simulations are required to be performed using a very
large number of samples. To this end the Navigation Engine Monte Carlo
Simulation (“NavEng”) was developed, to enable the performance of
RAIM algorithms to be evaluated in terms of false alarm probability and
probability of missed detection.
The NavEng tool was developed with the following requirements:
• Allow the user to specify a “snapshot” analysis case, which is a
combination of:
o Epoch;
o receiver latitude and longitude;
o receiver altitude;
o minimum masking angle;
o false alarm probability (PFA);
o missed detection probability (PFD);
o Number of pseudo-random samples to be used.
• Accept the same constellation definition files as used by the SVS;
• Include Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) in which full RAIM algorithms to
be evaluated are defined. These algorithms will include the
calculation of VPL and of test statistics, based on simulated
pseudorange measurements;
• Allow the user to exclude any satellites from the analysis at run-time;
• Allow the user to apply a fixed bias to one or more satellites in view at
run-time;
• Present the Vertical Protection Limit calculated using any included
algorithms, for a snapshot geometry (i.e. combination of epoch and
user latitude/longitude);
• Output a text file containing:
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o Vertical error arising from Least Squares navigation solution
using simulated pseudorange measurements, for each
sample;
o Horizontal error arising from Least Squares navigation solution
using simulated pseudorange measurements, for each
sample;
o RAIM test statistic, for each sample, for each algorithm
included in the analysis.
• Output a second text file containing:
o The variation of vertical error with increasing bias on each
satellite in view, in a noise free system;
o The variation of horizontal error with increasing bias on each
satellite in view, in a noise free system;
o The variation of test statistic for the Least Squares RAIM
algorithm with increasing bias on each satellite in view, in a
noise free system;
o The variation of test statistic for the RAIM algorithm under test,
with increasing bias on each satellite in view, in a noise free
system
A NavEng Post-processor (in the form of an Excel spreadsheet)
application is then used  to:
• Plot the relationship between true vertical error and test statistic for
each analysed RAIM algorithm;
• Plot the probability density of test statistic values, and compare this
with standard distributions such as the Chi-squared distribution, to
provide a comparison of the strength of the tails of the distributions
produced by the algorithms under analysis;
• Plot the relationship between true horizontal error and test statistic for
each analysed RAIM algorithm.
A separate post-processor is used to produce RAIM Algorithm
Characteristic curves, presenting plots of the relationship between error
(vertical or horizontal) with test statistic, for the RAIM algorithm under
test.
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The Navigation Engine Monte Carlo Simulations are based on the same
input data set as discussed for the Service Volume Simulations. Figure
6-3 presents a screenshot of the NavEng user interface.
Figure 6-3: Navigation Engine Input Window
Unlike the SVS, NavEng runs are performed for a single, snapshot
combination of user location and epoch. However, random noise is
applied, therefore the user selects the number of samples to be
performed in each Monte Carlo simulation. In addition, the user may
disable any satellite in view, apply a bias to the ranging signal from any
satellite, or increase the noise by multiplying the UERE for a satellite by
any desired amount.
The NavEng tool provides three distinct types of data:
1. Output displayed on the MMI:
After confirmation of the inputs (satellite file, user location and epoch,
disabled satellites, biases and noise) the MMI displays information such
as:
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• the number of useable satellites in view;
• the VPL, calculated using the weighted least squares residuals
algorithm;
• the Critical Satellite, i.e. the satellite with the steepest slope of vertical
error against LSR test statistic;
• the Critical Bias, i.e. the bias which, in the absence of any other
noise, would just generate the LSR test statistic when applied to the
Critical Satellite.
After running the Navigation Engine Simulator the MMI also displays two
sets of four figures, representing the number of samples falling into each
of four categories:
• Normal operations – vertical error is below VPL and test statistic is
below test threshold;
• Alarm – vertical error is above VPL and test statistic is above test
threshold;
• False Alarm – vertical error is below VPL and test statistic is above
test threshold;
• Missed detection – vertical error is above VPL and test statistic is
below test threshold.
The two sets of numbers cater for RAIM algorithms such as EIV which
generate two independent test statistics. With eight figures displayed it is
possible for the user to determine the number of samples in which either
or both test statistics are exceeded, and whether or not the VPL is also
exceeded.
The user can then change the values displayed for VPL and Test
Threshold(s), which offers a coarse check that the number of false
alarms (with no bias applied) or missed detections (with a critical bias
applied) approximates the values determined by PFA and PMD.
2. File Output from Navigation Engine Simulator:
On completion of a run the NavEng tool writes a text file to the hard disk,
with the date and time of the run included in the file name for ease of
reference. The content of this text file is in three parts:
• Header data – presenting the input case specified by the user on the
MMI (satellite file, receiver latitude, longitude, altitude, epoch, etc.);
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• Columns of data representing, for each sample:
o Vertical Error;
o Horizontal Error;
o LSR RAIM Test Statistic;
o Test statistic(s) from the RAIM algorithm implemented in the
attached DLL.
• The probability density associated with each test statistic. The
maximum and minimum value occurring for each test statistic is
evaluated, and the range between the two extremes divided into 50
“bins”. The number of samples with a test statistic falling into the
value of each bin is reported.
These data are post processed to produce appropriate graphical output
3. File Output from Characteristics Simulator:
A key concept in the development of new RAIM algorithms is the idea of
a RAIM test statistics “characteristic”.  This characteristic represents the
relationship between the test statistic and the vertical error, for the case
of increasing bias applied to each satellite in view in turn, in the absence
of any other noise or bias. Typically, each satellite will have a different
gradient of this characteristic, and the maximum value occurring
(referred to as “VSlope(max)”) identifies the most critical satellite, and drives
the value of VPL in the LSR RAIM algorithm.
The output from the NavEng Characteristics Simulator is a set of tables
presenting:
• The variation of vertical error with bias applied to each satellite;
• The variation of horizontal error with bias applied to each satellite;
• The variation of LSR Test Statistic with bias applied to each satellite;
• The variation of RAIM Test Statistic(s), for the DLL-installed RAIM
algorithm, with bias applied to each satellite.
These data are post processed to produce appropriate graphical output.
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6.6 Matlab Flight Trials Simulator
Although the NavEng tool demonstrates the ability of a RAIM algorithm
to detect a bias on a pseudorange measurement, it does not allow the
nature of the bias to be specified. In effect, NavEng can only
demonstrate the ability to detect step biases. In practice, a Feared Event
(FE) acting on a pseudorange measurement is likely to have some
ramping function, and the ability to detect such FE’s needs to be
demonstrated.
To this end the Flight Trials Simulator was developed using Mathworks’
“Matlab v6.5” mathematical modelling tool. The basic Matlab tool was
augmented with the Matlab Statistics library in order to provide the
functions required by the LSR and EIV RAIM algorithms. It is referred to
as a “Flight Trials” Simulator, because it uses a trajectory file provided by
National Air Traffic Services Ltd (NATS) which gives very accurate 1 Hz
position data for a set of flight trials performed by a BAC 1-11 aircraft into
Boscombe Down airfield in September 2001. This data set acts as “truth”
in the flight trials simulator.
This tool simulates broadcast almanacs and pseudorange
measurements from the Galileo and GPS constellations as discussed
subsequently and used elsewhere in this thesis. A standard, unfiltered
Least Squares navigation position solution is generated to produce user
position and clock estimates corresponding to the “truth” data. In
addition, RAIM algorithms produce test statistics using the same
almanacs and pseudorange measurements. By injecting a bias which
has a specified rate of increase and duration of application, Feared
Events with various characteristics are simulated and the ability of the
RAIM algorithms to detect these FEs is evaluated.
The process used in this tool is as follows:
1. Define a “Broadcast Almanac” for the Galileo constellation. This is
effectively the set of parameters defined in Table 7-3 which define the
nominal Galileo constellation;
2. Define a “True Almanac” for the Galileo constellation. This is very
similar to the broadcast almanac, except for small changes that are
made to each satellite’s semi-major axis, inclination, right ascension
of ascending node and mean anomaly. Also, for each satellite, a
small “satellite clock synchronisation error” is incorporated, to
represent the difference between Galileo System Time and the local
estimate of system time at the satellite. These position and time
biases together constitute the “Orbit Determination & Time
Synchronisation “ (OD&TS) Error for each satellite. Each value has
been randomly selected from a distribution such that the overall
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OD&TS error has a normal distribution with a standard deviation as
specified for the Galileo constellation.
3. Repeat steps 1 and 2 for the GPS constellation defined in Table 7-4.
Note that in addition to the randomly selected satellite time
synchronisation error between each GPS satellite and GPS system
time, an offset is also included to simulate the synchronisation error
between the GPS and Galileo system times. [48] states that although
it is planned to disseminate information regarding the synchronisation
of the two system times, the residual error (i.e. the error after taking
this disseminated correction into account) may be up to 5 ns,
therefore this figure has been used as a fixed offset between the
system times.
4. Define UERE vs Elevation characteristics for each constellation, to be
used by the user in setting the weighting matrix used in the weighted
least squares solution.
5. Define an initial true user receiver clock error.
6. Define a randomly selected value for the tropospheric zenith delay
(ZTD).
7. Initialise the user receiver’s estimate of position and user clock error.
8. At runtime, the user defines an epoch at which a bias begins to be
applied, the rate at which this bias increases, the duration for which
the bias increases and duration for which the bias is held at its
maximum value, before dropping off as a step function to zero.
9. For each simulated 1 second interval:
a. Get the “true” user position;
b. Propagate the Galileo and GPS constellations using the “true”
almanacs;
c. Calculate the “true” distance from the user to each satellite;
d. Determine the “Critical Satellite”, i.e. that satellite for which an
applied unit bias generates the largest vertical positioning
error;
e. Generate the measured pseudorange, by adding to this “true”
distance:
 i. An elevation dependant component of tropospheric
residual error, as a function of elevation angle from the
user to each satellite, using the ZTD parameter fixed
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during initialisation. NB This component is correlated
across all observations;
 ii. An elevation dependant component of ionospheric
residual error, randomly selected and uncorrelated
across observations;
 iii. Elevation dependant components of noise representing
multipath jitter;
 iv. Non-elevation dependant components representing
additive white Gaussian receiver noise;
 v. A component representing the pseudorange error due
to “true” satellite and user clock synchronisation errors;
 vi. If appropriate, add an additional Feared Event Bias
component to the pseudorange of the critical satellite.
f. Calculate the expected range to each satellite, based upon the
broadcast almanac and the user’s estimate of position and
user clock error;
g. Generate the Observation Matrix;
h. Generate the elevation dependent Weighting matrix using the
appropriate UERE vs Elevation curves;
i. Generate the vector of pseudorange residuals, i.e. the
difference between the expected range and the measured
pseudorange to each satellite;
j. Calculate the navigation position solution (Latitude, Longitude,
Height and clock error) using a standard weighted least
squares position solution (as defined in Section 9.1), and
update the user estimate accordingly;
k. Pass the Observation matrix, Weighting matrix and range
residuals vector to LSR and EIV RAIM algorithms, and
calculate the vertical protection limits, detection thresholds and
test statistics;
10. Evaluate for each epoch the vertical error, and the detection state
from each RAIM algorithm, i.e. were there any instances in which an
alarm was triggered when the vertical protection limited was not
exceeded (false alarms) or cases where the VPL was exceeded
without an alarm (missed detections).
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7. ASSUMPTIONS, PARAMETERS AND VARIABLES
The tools discussed in the previous section require a set of validated
input data in order to produce meaningful results. This section presents
the key assumptions, parameters and variables which have been set in
the subsequent analysis, and discusses the validity of these
assumptions.
[43] presents a “Reference Set Of Parameters For RAIM Availability
Simulations”. This document, produced for the European Organisation of
Civil Aviation Equipment Manufacturers (EUROCAE) working group on
Galileo, attempts to produce a harmonised set of assumptions for use in
RAIM availability simulations of the type presented in this thesis. To the
greatest extent possible the assumptions presented by EUROCAE are
used in the subsequent analysis. However, as will be discussed below,
there are a number of points on which the reference set of data used in
this thesis diverge from that presented in [43].
7.1 UERE vs Elevation Characteristics
As demonstrated in [43] the parameter which has the greatest impact on
the predicted RAIM performance is the UERE vs Elevation characteristic
assumed for the satellites in view. This section discusses the selection of
the UERE curves used in the subsequent analysis, from those available
in published literature.
7.1.1 GPS IIF UERE Characteristics
There is considerable disagreement regarding the likely performance of
the freely available signals provided by the future GPS Block IIF
satellites. Figure 7-1 compares the characteristics for a dual frequency
(L1/L5) open access service extracted from three different sources:
• The EUROCAE reference set of RAIM parameters [43];
• Estimates presented in the public domain by the US Department of
Defense (DoD) [44];
• Assumptions taken by Alcatel Space Industries on behalf of the
Galileo System Test Bed programme and published in a “Context
Assumptions” document [45].
Clearly the Galileo programme has made a more conservative estimate
of future GPS performance than the US DoD. In the absence of any
better information, it has been decided to use the EUROCAE estimate
(effectively the compromise solution) of future GPS performance in the
subsequent analysis. This characteristic is presented in Table 7-1.
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Figure 7-1: Comparison of Published GPS Block IIF UERE
Characteristics
ELEVATION (°) 5 10 15 20 30 40 50 60 90
Total Error cm 227 186 171 164 159 157 156 156 156
Table 7-1 : Baseline GPS IIF L1/L5 UERE budget (from EUROCAE
Reference Set)
7.1.2 Galileo UERE Characteristics
Figure 7-2 presents a comparison of published estimates for Galileo
UERE vs Elevation performance, for freely available (i.e. unencrypted)
signals using the L1 and 5b signals together to provide a dual frequency
service. Note that these estimates are much closer than the equivalent
estimates for GPS IIF performance.
As before, the median estimate has been taken for use in the
subsequent analysis. This is the UERE characteristic taken as the
baseline for a free-to-air aviation service from the Galileo System Test
Bed programme’s UERE budget document [46], and is presented in
Table 7-2. The OD&TS contribution is 65 cm across all elevations.
Note that this curve is slightly more optimistic regarding the performance
of Galileo than the EUROCAE reference set of RAIM parameters
assumptions.
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Galileo UERE Characteristics
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Figure 7-2: Comparison of Published Galileo L1/E5b UERE
Characteristics
ELEVATION (°) 5 10 15 20 30 40 50 60 90
Total Error cm 166 114 96 88 83 81 80 79 79
Table 7-2 : Baseline Galileo L1/E5b UERE budget (from GSTB Test
Case Experimentation Plan)
The Galileo and GPS characteristics are presented again in comparison
to one another in Figure 12-1 when introducing the results from the
Service Volume Simulation analyses.
7.1.3 Orbit Determination & Time Synchronisation Errors
In the Flight Trials Simulations tool described previously it was stated
that the Orbit Determination & Time Synchronisation (OD&TS)
component of the UERE for each satellite has to be separated from the
overall UERE, in order for the Signal in Space Error to be distinguished
from the error due to local effects. This allows for OD&TS errors to be
modelled for each satellite, as components of its clock offset, semi-major
axis, inclination, right ascension of ascending node and mean anomaly.
[43] estimates the OD&TS error for GPS Block IIF to be 1.5m. It has
been assumed in this thesis that this total comprises the following
random vector components:
• 0.8m GPS time synchronisation error;
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• 1.25m orbit determination error.
For Galileo [46] estimates the OD&TS error as, 0.72m, comprising:
• 0.6m Galileo time synchronisation error;
• 0.4m orbit determination error.
NB These components are added vectorially (i.e. the total is the square
root of the sum of the squares) to yield the overall OD&TS error.
7.2 Constellation Configurations
7.2.1 Galileo Constellation Parameters
Table 7-3 shows the nominal Galileo constellation parameters used for
all analyses in this thesis. It includes only the 27 satellites of the Walker
constellation 27/3/1 and does not consider the 3 operational spares.
The semi-major axis for this constellation leads to an orbital period of
about 14.4 hours, so that there are exactly five orbits in three days. This
results in a repeating ground track such that every three days the
geometry of the constellation relative to a user on the ground is
repeated. Furthermore, because the satellites in each plane are regularly
spaced, every 24 hours the effective geometry of the nominal
constellation from a fixed user location is repeated, albeit with different
satellites in view.
Note that the epoch for which these parameters apply is set by the
epoch used for the GPS Constellation in the next section.
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SV
ID
Semi-
major Axis
(km)
Eccentricity Inclination(deg.)
RAAN
(deg.)
Arg. of
Perigee
(deg.)
Mean
Anomaly
(deg.)
1 29993.707 0.00 56.0 3175 0.00 0.00
2 29993.707 0.00 56.0 317 0.00 40.00
3 29993.707 0.00 56.0 317 0.00 80.00
4 29993.707 0.00 56.0 317 0.00 120.00
5 29993.707 0.00 56.0 317 0.00 160.00
6 29993.707 0.00 56.0 317 0.00 200.00
7 29993.707 0.00 56.0 317 0.00 240.00
8 29993.707 0.00 56.0 317 0.00 280.00
9 29993.707 0.00 56.0 317 0.00 320.00
10 29993.707 0.00 56.0 77 0.00 13.33
11 29993.707 0.00 56.0 77 0.00 53.33
12 29993.707 0.00 56.0 77 0.00 93.33
13 29993.707 0.00 56.0 77 0.00 133.33
14 29993.707 0.00 56.0 77 0.00 173.33
15 29993.707 0.00 56.0 77 0.00 213.33
16 29993.707 0.00 56.0 77 0.00 253.33
17 29993.707 0.00 56.0 77 0.00 293.33
18 29993.707 0.00 56.0 77 0.00 333.33
19 29993.707 0.00 56.0 197 0.00 26.66
20 29993.707 0.00 56.0 197 0.00 66.66
21 29993.707 0.00 56.0 197 0.00 106.66
22 29993.707 0.00 56.0 197 0.00 146.66
23 29993.707 0.00 56.0 197 0.00 186.66
24 29993.707 0.00 56.0 197 0.00 226.66
25 29993.707 0.00 56.0 197 0.00 266.66
26 29993.707 0.00 56.0 197 0.00 306.66
27 29993.707 0.00 56.0 197 0.00 346.66
Table 7-3 : Galileo Constellation Parameters
7.2.2 GPS Constellation Parameters
Table 7-4 shows the GPS constellation parameters for the constellation
used in this thesis [47]. These parameters are with respect to an epoch
of 1 July 1990 00:00:00.
The satellites in this constellation complete two orbits per day, giving
them a repeating ground track every day. Note that unlike the Galileo
constellation, the GPS nominal constellation is not symmetrical.
                                           
5
 The Right Ascension of Ascending Node (RAAN) assumed for all Galileo satellites has been set
as a function of the RAAN of the GPS satellites. In the baseline case (presented in this table) the
three planes of the Galileo constellation have been placed at a worst case with GPS, i.e. there is
a 0° offset between the RAAN of the first Galileo plane and the first GPS plane. The effect of
variations in this assumption are discussed in Section 7.2.3.
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SV
ID
Semi-
major Axis
(km)
Eccentricity Inclination(deg.)
RAAN
(deg.)
Arg. of
Perigee
(deg.)
Mean
Anomaly
(deg.)
1 26559.7 0.00 55 317 0.00 280.7
2 26559.7 0.00 55 317 0.00 310.3
3 26559.7 0.00 55 317 0.00 60
4 26559.7 0.00 55 317 0.00 173.4
5 26559.7 0.00 55 17 0.00 339.7
6 26559.7 0.00 55 17 0.00 81.9
7 26559.7 0.00 55 17 0.00 115
8 26559.7 0.00 55 17 0.00 213.9
9 26559.7 0.00 55 77 0.00 16
10 26559.7 0.00 55 77 0.00 138.7
11 26559.7 0.00 55 77 0.00 244.9
12 26559.7 0.00 55 77 0.00 273.5
13 26559.7 0.00 55 137 0.00 42.1
14 26559.7 0.00 55 137 0.00 70.7
15 26559.7 0.00 55 137 0.00 176.8
16 26559.7 0.00 55 137 0.00 299.6
17 26559.7 0.00 55 197 0.00 101.7
18 26559.7 0.00 55 197 0.00 200.5
19 26559.7 0.00 55 197 0.00 233.7
20 26559.7 0.00 55 197 0.00 335.9
21 26559.7 0.00 55 257 0.00 142.2
22 26559.7 0.00 55 257 0.00 255.6
23 26559.7 0.00 55 257 0.00 5.3
24 26559.7 0.00 55 257 0.00 34.5
Table 7-4: GPS orbital parameters
7.2.3 Galileo/GPS Plane Offset
As mentioned above, the baseline combined Galileo/GPS constellation
has been defined as one in which the three Galileo planes are coplanar
with three of the six GPS planes. In practice, because of the difference in
the orbital altitudes of the two constellations, there is a relative
movement of the planes over time. The perturbation of the Line of Nodes
for an earth-orbiting satellite is affected mainly by the J2 harmonic term
of the earth’s magnetic field. Using the orbital altitude and inclination
values specified for Galileo and GPS above, it can be shown that there is
a relative plane movement of about 5.2° per year between the systems.
Given that there is 60° between each of the GPS planes, that implies
that there is a repeat period of about 11.5 years between occurrences of
this “worst”6 relative geometry, and the geometry will go from “worst” to
“best” case in just over 5 years. Put another way, for a Galileo design life
                                           
6
 Note that this is a simplification, disregarding the asymmetry of the GPS constellation. In
practice there will be a very specific “worst case” geometry between Galileo and GPS, taking into
account the relative position of the satellites within the planes. This has been disregarded in this
analysis.
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of 20 years, the “best” and “worst” case relative geometries are both
likely to occur twice. As a result, all analysis for combined constellations
have been performed using the “worst” case 0° relative plane offset
assumption described above.
For completeness, the relative effect on a service volume simulation for
the “best” and “worst” case relative geometries is presented below.
Algorithm:, LSR Baseline Algorithm
• No of  satellites = 51
• Masking Angle, 5°
• PFA = 8 x 10-6
• PMD = 0.012
Plane Separation (degrees) 30 0
Vertical Alert Limit (metres) 10
Lowest availability 64.35% 65.09%
@ Longitude -75 -73
@ Latitude 73 -1
Total availability 87.71% 87.04%
Vertical Alert Limit (metres) 12
Lowest availability 86.11% 85.14%
@ Longitude 143 -71
@ Latitude 69 -131
Total availability 98.29% 97.91%
Vertical Alert Limit (metres) 15
Lowest availability 98.52% 98.61%
@ Longitude -155 -17
@ Latitude -17 103
Total availability 99.99% 99.99%
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Figure 7-3 : vertical alert limit = 15m, Plane Separation = 0 degrees
Figure 7-4 : vertical alert limit = 15m, Plane Separation = 30 degrees
7.2.4 Galileo/GPS Time Offset
In Section 6.6 the functional description of the Matlab-based Flight Trials
Simulator discusses the offset between Galileo and GPS time.
EUROCAE [43]  recommends that this parameter be treated as a “Fifth
Unknown” in solving the navigation problem for a combined Galileo/GPS
constellation. However [48] states that it can be assumed that the
synchronisation between GPS and Galileo system time will be
disseminated by either or both systems, with a relative error of at most 5
ns. Furthermore, [49] shows that for a combined Galileo/GPS
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constellation, the positional error induced by errors up to 5ns in relative
synchronisation have a negligible effect on positional accuracy.
In accordance with the conclusions of [48] these simulations therefore
assume that a residual time synchronisation offset of 5 ns exists
between the GPS and Galileo system times after consideration of any
broadcast parameter of the synchronisation between these systems.
7.3 Masking Angle
The EUROCAE paper [43] demonstrates that the parameter which has
the largest impact on RAIM availability results after UERE characteristics
is masking angle, i.e. the limiting angle above the horizon below which
satellites are assumed to be either not seen or excluded from the
navigation solution processing algorithms. In line with common practice
for aviation use of GNSS, EUROCAE recommends 5° masking angle as
the baseline for RAIM availability calculations.
However, the Galileo programme has defined a “Use Case” for Galileo
Safety of Life service users with a minimum masking angle of 10°, and
the performance specifications for the Galileo SAS service is defined
with respect to this masking angle.
The baseline assumption taken within this thesis is a 5° masking angle,
to be consistent with EUROCAE. However, where a result is required for
comparison with Galileo SAS specifications the analysis is repeated
using a 10° mask. In all cases it is assumed that the user receiver can
adequately process all satellites in view above the masking angle, i.e.
the receiver is not restrict to, for example, 12 satellites in view.
7.4 Service Volume Simulation Resolution
The EUROCAE paper [43] states that the consistency of service volume
simulation results is relatively unaffected by the temporal resolution of
the analysis. That is to say, a run of the SVS using 15 minute time steps
will yield overall RAIM availability figures very similar to those from an
equivalent run using a 5 minute time step. It therefore concludes that a
15 minute time step is adequate for RAIM availability simulations.
However, [45] provides far more stringent requirements for SVS
temporal resolution, and also places requirements on spatial resolution
(i.e. the number of degrees in latitude and longitude between each point
on the ground in the simulation service volume).
As previously stated the SVS developed for this thesis was optimised for
speed in order to undertake very high resolution service volume
simulations. The highest resolution that can be accommodated is in fact
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limited by the memory available in the PC running the simulation, rather
than the time taken to perform the analysis.
In order to demonstrate that the time step and spatial resolution of 2
minutes by 2° latitude by 2° longitude is sufficient the following results
have been reproduced (Table 7-5), using a baseline simulation period of
4320 minutes (3 days).
• Number of satellites = 27 (i.e. Galileo only)
• Masking Angle = 5°
• PFA = 8 x 10-6
• PMD = 0.012
Time step (minutes) 2 1 3
Time steps 2160 4320 1441
Latitude step
(degrees)
2 2 1
Latitude steps 90 90 180
Longitude step
(degrees)
2 2 1
Longitude steps 180 180 360
Vertical Alert Limit
(metres)
10
Lowest availability 47.36% 47.71% 47.74%
Total availability 67.65% 67.65% 67.65%
Vertical Alert Limit
(metres)
12
Lowest availability 76.85% 77.15% 76.96%
Total availability 89.45% 89.45% 89.52%
Vertical Alert Limit
(metres)
15
Lowest availability 93.75% 93.87% 93.47%
Total availability 98.60% 98.60% 98.64%
Table 7-5 : Comparison of SVS results for different spatial and
temporal resolutions
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7.5 Translation of RNP Specifications to RAIM Requirements
In order to evaluate the performance of RAIM algorithms against RNP
specifications, these specifications need to be expressed in terms of the
mathematical parameters used by the RAIM algorithms. Specifically, the
acceptable Integrity Risk and Continuity requirements must be
expressed as a Probability of Missed Detection (PMD) and a Probability of
False Alarm (PFA) respectively.
7.5.1 Vertical Alert Limit (VAL)
The vertical alert limit is set in the Required Navigation Performance
requirements for different phases of flight. In this analysis the following
thresholds are used:
• 20m VAL for APV-II, and for comparison with Galileo SAS
specifications;
• 15m VAL for the upper allowable band of Category I precision
approach requirements;
• 12m VAL as a general limit for Category I precision approach
requirements
7.5.2 Probability of False Alarm (PFA)
The Probability of a False Alarm, PFA, caused by the RAIM detection
threshold being exceeded in a fault-free case has been taken directly
from the Continuity requirements.
For the precision approach operations considered in this study (APV-I,
APV-II and Cat I), the NSE Continuity requirement in all cases is 1 – (8 x
10-6) in any 15 seconds. Although updates to the GNSS navigation
system may be received at a rate of the order of 1 Hz, the correlation
time for the components of noise on the system will be significantly
longer than 15 seconds [43], therefore it is assumed that there is only
one independent sample in any 15 second period. With this assumption,
the allowable probability of false alarm is equal to one minus the
Continuity requirement, i.e.:
For Precision Approach, maximum PFA is assumed to be 8 x 10-6.
Note that the recommendations in [43] are that PFA is set to 8.33 x 10-6
for en-route navigation. Since no value is specified for precision
approach we shall use the derived value of 8 x 10-6.
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7.5.3 Probability of Missed Detection (PMD)
The method for setting the value to be used for PMD in the RAIM
algorithms under test is a matter of debate. At one extreme it is argued
that where the Integrity requirement is stated as 1-(2 x 10-7) per
approach, the allowable probability of missed detection should be taken
to be:
PMD (conservative estimate) = 2 x 10-7
However, this is general regarded as an overly conservative approach. A
counter argument is to recognise that PMD is a conditional probability –
the integrity risk is the product of PMD x the integrity failure occurrence
probability of the navigation solution, per approach. This is the more
common approach, and indeed is used as the definition of PMD in [43].
7.5.3.1 WAAS MOPS Approach
In order to determine the required probability of missed detection, as a
conditional probability, the integrity failure occurrence probability for a
single satellite must be assumed.
From [15], the integrity failure occurrence probability for the GPS position
solution, assuming on average 8 satellites in view, is 10-4 per hour, which
is approximately equal to 4.17 x 10-6 per approach (assuming an
approach is 150 seconds, as defined in the RNP Integrity
specifications[19]). [43] uses this assumption and states that for
precision approach:
• PMD in the single constellation RAIM-only case (8 in view) =
2x10-7 / (150x10-4/3600)  = 0.05;
• PMD in the Galileo + GPS RAIM-only case (20 in view) =
2x10-7 / (150x2.5x10-4/3600)  = 0.02.
7.5.3.2 Signal in Space Integrity Failure Occurrence Probability
The overall integrity failure occurrence probability is the combination of
probabilities for Signal in Space Error (SISE) and local effects induced
error.
From [45], the SISE integrity failure occurrence probability for Galileo is
3.6 x 10-5 per hour per satellite. Assuming 9 satellites in view (i.e. one
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third of the nominal constellation, as in the GPS case), this is
approximately equal to 1.35 x 10-5 per approach.
At first glance this implies that Galileo is expected to be approximately 3
times worse than GPS in this respect. However, great care must be
taken in understanding these assumptions. The figure quoted for GPS is
the probability of a gross integrity failure, which may be assumed to be
the probability of a SIS error leading to a position solution with an
inaccuracy greater than 150m. The Galileo figure has been derived from
an analysis which regards a SIS error as one which leads to hazardously
misleading information. This would be expected to be more stringent
than the GPS case
7.5.3.3 Local Effects Integrity Failure Occurrence Probability
In this analysis, the probability of an Integrity failure caused by “local
effects” such as meteorological effects, multipath, interference, etc. has
been taken from [45]:
Probability of occurrence of local effect leading to hazardously
misleading information =
7.2 x 10-5 per hour =  3.0 x 10-6 per 150s
In addition, the user equipment integrity risk probability has been taken
from [45] as 3.0 x 10-8 per 150s.
NB Both of these figures are assumed to be independent of the number
of satellites in view.
7.5.3.4 Conditional PMD
Using these integrity failure occurrence probabilities presented above the
probability of an integrity failure (local + non-local) for Galileo only, with
no ground integrity channel, is 1.653 x 10-5 per approach. Taking these
assumptions:
PMD (Galileo only, conditional case) = 2.0 x 10-7 / 1.653 x 10-5 = 0.012
Using the same references, the probability of an integrity failure for
Galileo with no ground integrity channel, plus GPS is 1.77 x 10-5 per
approach. Taking these assumptions,
PMD (Galileo+GPS, conditional case) = 2.0 x 10-7 / 1.77 x 10-5 = 0.011
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However, taking a more conservative approach, in which it is assumed
that Galileo and GPS both have integrity failure rates of 3.6 x 10-5 per
hour per satellite, and assuming up to 20 satellites in view at any time,
the probability of an integrity failure for Galileo with no ground integrity
channel, plus GPS is 3 x 10-5 per approach. Taking these assumptions:
PMD (Galileo+GPS, conditional case) = 2.0 x 10-7 / 3.0 x 10-5 = 0.0067
7.5.3.5 PMD Conclusion
The weakness in this analysis is the difficulty in estimating the probability
of SISE and local effects leading to hazardously misleading information,
given the current immaturity of the Galileo design. Using the best data
currently available regarding these probabilities for Galileo and GPS, the
resulting PMD for both the Galileo only and Galileo+GPS case is,
intuitively, too high. It is unlikely that a safety case could be made, for
example for Galileo only RAIM using a PMD value of 0.012, which
equates to an acceptable missed detection rate of one in 83
occurrences.
Intriguingly, in the conclusions presenting the final list of recommended
parameters and variables to be used in RAIM analyses, [43] concludes
that for both single and combined constellation activities the value to be
used for this parameter is:
PMD = 4x10-4   
This figure is presented with no justification; however, it represents a
reasonable comprise between the overly conservative approach
presented initially and the values derived using unsubstantiated
assumptions regarding the predicted integrity failure rates for Galileo and
GPS. This figure is therefore used in all subsequent simulations in this
thesis.
7.5.4 Satellite Availability Rates and Outage Occurrence Probabilities
In order to calculate the overall availability of RAIM, the “state
probabilities” for the constellations have to be assumed. In this context,
“state probability” means the probability of all of the satellites in the
nominal constellation operating and providing a service, or of having
one, two or more satellites off-line for any reason. Note that this relates
to the chances of a satellite being unavailable; it is entirely separate from
the probability of an integrity failure, which was discussed earlier.
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Assumed Satellite Availability Rates and Outage Occurrence
Probabilities are taken from [45] as follows:
Constellation state State probability
27 operational satellites 0.98
26 operational satellites 0.019
25 operational satellites 0.001
24  or less operational satellites 0
Table 7-6: Galileo Constellation State Probability
Duration Unit
Short term MTTF 259 days
Short term MTTR 12.2 hour
Long term MTTF 6.25 Year
Long term MTTR 1.25 month
Manoeuvres none
Table 7-7 : GPS MTBF & MTTR
These have been consolidated to provide the following assumed
combined constellation state probabilities.
Constellation state State probability
51 operational satellites 0.96
50 operational satellites 0.038
49 operational satellites 0.002
48  or less operational satellites 0
Table 7-8 : Galileo + GPS Combined Constellation State Probability
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8. DETAILED PROCESSING MODEL
8.1 Basic Functions
The tools used in this part of the thesis use some or all of the following
basic functions:
• Calculation of Satellite to User Geometry;
• Generation of Observation Matrix;
• Simulation of Pseudorange Errors;
• Calculation of Navigation Solution and Position Errors;
• Application of RAIM algorithms.
These basic functions and their underlying equations are discussed in
the following subsections.
8.2 Calculation of Satellite to User Geometry
At the heart of the Service Volume Simulator and the NavEng tool is a
set of routines to calculate the position of the satellites in cartesian
coordinates, the position of the user in the same Earth-centred, inertial
reference frame, the true distance between the user and each satellite in
view, and the matrix of unit vectors in local North, East, Up coordinates
from the user to each visible satellite. The underlying equations to
generate this user geometry are presented in the following subsections.
8.2.1 Satellite position in ECI Cartesian Coordinates
This function extracts the time (epoch) at which the required snapshot
calculation is to be performed and calculates the position of each
satellite in x, y, z co-ordinates. The transformation from Keplerian
elements to Earth-centred, inertial (ECI) cartesian co-ordinates is
performed using a standard “3-1-3” transformation [38]. This
transformation is simplified, since the eccentricity of each satellite’s orbit
is assumed to be zero. In this case there is no “argument of perigee”
component in the Keplerian elements, so the transformation of any
satellite’s position to ECI Cartesian coordinates is described below:
Given:
• Semi-major axis length (a);
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• Right Ascension of Ascending Node (RAAN), Ω;
• Orbital inclination, i;
• Mean Anomaly, M;
• Orbital Rate, R (degrees/minute);
• Time from the coordinate system epoch, T (minutes).
Calculate the true anomaly (i.e. position around the orbit) from the
expression ω = (M + RT);
Calculate the x component from the expression
xsv = a (cos Ω cos ω - sin Ω sin ω cos i)
Equation 8-1
Calculate the y component from the expression
ysv = a (sin Ω cos ω + cos Ω sin ω cos i)
Equation 8-2
 Calculate the z component from the expression
zsv = a sin ω sin i
Equation 8-3
This transformation has been validated using “Satellite Tool Kit” (STK©).
A new scenario was created in STK and a satellite created with the
classical elements corresponding to GPS satellite SV1 in Table 7-4. The
scenario time and epoch time were both set 01 January 1990 00:00
UTC, which is the epoch time for the coordinate system definition. The
orbit propagator type was set to “Two Body”.
Using the STK Report “J2000 ECI Position Velocity” function a report
was produced showing the Cartesian coordinates and velocity of the
satellite. This was saved as a comma-delimited file and imported to
Excel. The format of the results was then set to display two decimal
places, with the results for the first 90 minutes shown in Table 8-1.
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Time (UTCG) x (km) y (km) z (km)
vx
(km/sec)
vy
(km/sec)
vz
(km/sec)
01/07/1990 00:00 -6602.95 -14311.95 -21379.80 3.07 -2.29 0.59
01/07/1990 00:10 -4740.90 -15632.01 -20944.95 3.14 -2.10 0.86
01/07/1990 00:20 -2842.56 -16832.45 -20349.82 3.19 -1.90 1.12
01/07/1990 00:30 -922.47 -17904.08 -19598.96 3.21 -1.67 1.38
01/07/1990 00:40 1004.67 -18838.71 -18698.13 3.21 -1.44 1.62
01/07/1990 00:50 2924.13 -19629.18 -17654.22 3.18 -1.19 1.85
01/07/1990 01:00 4821.21 -20269.43 -16475.21 3.14 -0.94 2.07
01/07/1990 01:10 6681.40 -20754.58 -15170.13 3.06 -0.68 2.27
01/07/1990 01:20 8490.46 -21080.91 -13748.96 2.96 -0.41 2.46
01/07/1990 01:30 10234.55 -21245.92 -12222.57 2.85 -0.14 2.63
Table 8-1: ECI Coordinates from Satellite Tool Kit for SV1
Table 8-2 presents the same case extracted from the “Cartesian”
worksheet on the “RAIM Availability” spreadsheet. It demonstrates
agreement in the position coordinates to within 10 metres This has been
taken as validation of this coordinate transformation.
Time x y z
0 -6602.95 -14311.95 -21379.80
10 -4740.90 -15632.01 -20944.95
20 -2842.56 -16832.45 -20349.82
30 -922.48 -17904.08 -19598.97
40 1004.67 -18838.71 -18698.14
50 2924.13 -19629.17 -17654.22
60 4821.21 -20269.43 -16475.21
70 6681.39 -20754.58 -15170.13
80 8490.45 -21080.91 -13748.96
90 10234.54 -21245.92 -12222.58
Table 8-2: ECI Coordinates from “RAIM Availability” spreadsheet
for SV1
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8.2.2 Calculate True User Cartesian Coordinates
This function takes the user latitude and longitude for which the required
snapshot calculation is to be performed and calculates the position of the
user, at the epoch, in the same ECI x, y, z co-ordinate frame as was
used for the satellites. A major simplification used at this point is that the
earth is treated as a sphere. It has been assumed that given the nature
of the subsequent RAIM analyses, the effect of this simplification on the
results is negligible.
The transformation is performed as follows:
Given:
• Radius of the Earth, taken as  6378 km in all directions;
• Rate of rotation of the Earth, P = 0.25069 degrees/minute;
• User Latitude;
• User Longitude;
• User Altitude;
• The epoch at which the ECI coordinate system is defined;
• Time from the coordinate system epoch, T (minutes);
• The angular offset between the x-axis of the ECI coordinate system
and the Earth’s prime meridian. In this case this is equal to 81.09°.
The ECI coordinate system used in this analysis is set by the definition of
the GPS nominal constellation as presented in Section 7.2.2, which has
an epoch of 01 July 1990 00:00 UTC. In order to find the coordinates of
a user on the Earth’s surface in the same coordinate system at some
point in time, the angular offset between the x-axis defined at this epoch
and an axis pointing through the Earth’s Prime Meridian at this epoch is
required. Using STK it was found that a satellite in circular orbit with
RAAN = 0° and Mean Anomaly=0° is found, at Time = 0 to have a sub-
satellite longitude of 81.09°.
However, this is not a critical step for the analysis. It merely fixes the
longitude of the calculated points for when the output is overlayed on a
map of the Earth. Any errors at this point would merely result in the
resulting plots being offset to the East or the West by a fixed amount,
which will not affect the overall results being derived in this analysis.
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1. Calculate the angle φ, equal to the user longitude minus the angular
offset discussed above;
2. Calculate the angle θ, equal to the user latitude;
3. Calculate the x component from the expression:
xu = (Radius + Alt) . cos (φ + PT) cos θ
Equation 8-4
4. Calculate the z component from the expression
zu = (Radius + Alt) .sin θ
Equation 8-5
5. Calculate the y component to make a right-handed set from the
expression:
yu = (Radius + Alt) . cos θ  (sin(φ + PT))
Equation 8-6
6. Calculate the True Distance and Elevation to each satellite
The true distance, TDi, to each satellite is easily found:
TDi = ((xsv - xu)2 + (ysv - yu)2 + (ysv - yu)2)1/2
Equation 8-7
Next, evaluate the components Dx, Dy and Dz of the unit vector from the
user to each visible satellite:
Dxi = (xsv - xu)/ TDi
Dyi = (ysv - yu)/ TDi
Dzi = (zsv – zu)/ TDi
Equation 8-8
These are then transformed to North, East and Up components of a unit
vector by performing a 3-2-3 co-ordinate transformation [38] from the
ECI coordinate system to local user cartesian coordinates:
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Up = (Dx cos θ cos φ ) + (Dy cos θ sin φ ) + (Dz sin θ)
East = Dy cos φ - Dx sin φ
North = (-Dx sin θ cos φ ) - (Dy sin θ sin φ ) + (Dz cos θ)
Equation 8-9
The Up component represents the tangent of the elevation angle of each
satellite relative to the horizon, from the user location’s local reference
frame.
Satellite Tool Kit has been used to validate the preceding steps, by
comparing the estimated azimuth, elevation and range from a fixed point
on the Earth to a number of satellites. Table 8-3 presents the output from
STK using the “AER” (Azimuth/Elevation/Range) reporting tool, from a
facility at 0° latitude, 0° longitude to satellites SV2, SV3, SV4, SV5 and
SV6, at 16:40 UTC on 1 July 1990. As before, a two-body propagator
has been used.
Facility1-To-SV2
No Access Found
Facility1-To-SV3
      Time (UTCG)         Azimuth (deg)    Elevation (deg)     Range (km)
1 Jul 1990 16:40:00.00          227.548             56.136    21026.755783
Facility1-To-SV4
No Access Found
Facility1-To-SV5
      Time (UTCG)         Azimuth (deg)    Elevation (deg)     Range (km)
1 Jul 1990 16:40:00.00          344.203             31.292    22683.787801
Facility1-To-SV6
      Time (UTCG)         Azimuth (deg)    Elevation (deg)     Range (km)
1 Jul 1990 16:40:00.00          129.345             14.315    24255.784514
Table 8-3: STK Az/El/Range Report for Facility 0°Lat 0°Long
Table 8-4 presents an extract from the output from the “Table”
worksheet, for the same case. Time was set to 1000 minutes, which
corresponds to 16:40 UTC on 1 July 1990.
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SV1 SV2 SV3 SV4 SV5 SV6
Azimuth ---------- ---------- 227.5 ---------- 344.2 129.4
Elev -50.6 -28.7 56.1 -33.5 31.3 14.3
Vis Blocked Blocked Access Blocked Access Access
Range 31184 29027 21029 29545 22679 24259
Table 8-4: Az/El/Range output from “Table” for Facility 0°Lat 0°Long
Time = 1000 minutes
These results show complete agreement (to 1 decimal place) for the
azimuth and elevation angles, although the Range values differ by three
to four kilometres. This is because the spreadsheet application has
assumed a spherical Earth, whereas STK uses a high-fidelity model of
the shape of the Earth.
Table 8-5 and Table 8-6 repeat the analysis for a point with a higher
elevation, in this case 70° latitude, 30° longitude. Again the azimuth and
elevation angles compare very closely, although the discrepancy in
range has increased to about 10 kilometres (greater than for the
previous example, because the effect of the spherical Earth assumption
is more pronounced at higher latitudes, due to the oblateness of the
Earth).
Facility1-To-SV2
      Time (UTCG)         Azimuth (deg)    Elevation (deg)     Range (km)
1 Jul 1990 02:30:00.00          197.415             27.643    22996.707086
Facility1-To-SV3
      Time (UTCG)         Azimuth (deg)    Elevation (deg)     Range (km)
1 Jul 1990 02:30:00.00           49.890              9.908    24726.668330
Facility1-To-SV4
No Access Found
Facility1-To-SV5
      Time (UTCG)         Azimuth (deg)    Elevation (deg)     Range (km)
1 Jul 1990 02:30:00.00           91.045             34.482    22438.913847
Facility1-To-SV6
No Access Found
Table 8-5: STK Az/El/Range Report for Facility 70°Lat 30°Long
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SV1 SV2 SV3 SV4 SV5 SV6
Azimuth ---------- 197.4 49.9 ---------- 91.0 ----------
Elev -0.3 27.6 9.8 -70.8 34.5 -14.1
Vis Blocked Access Access Blocked Access Blocked
Range 25818 22995 24717 32501 22428 27383
Table 8-6: Az/El/Range output from “Table” for Facility 70°Lat
30°Long, Time = 150 minutes
These results demonstrate the validity of the preceding steps in the
analysis. The differences in range from the “true” values provided by
STK are irrelevant for the purposes of the subsequent analyses, since
the absolute range value is not important.
8.2.3 Generation of the Observation Matrix
The Observation Matrix is given the annotation G in this thesis. With N
satellites in view, the G matrix is simply an N x 4 matrix in which the first
three columns contain the North, East and Up components of the unit
vector previously derived, and the fourth column contains “1”, which
represents the existence of a clock offset.
The number of satellites in view, N, is a function of the minimum mask
angle. All satellites with an elevation angle greater than the user-defined
masking angle are included in G, unless they have been set to “disabled”
by the user.
8.3 Simulation of Pseudorange Errors
Each satellite input file includes a table which defines how UERE varies
with elevation angle for each satellite (i.e. as a satellite gets closer to the
horizon, the noise on the measurement increases). The first step in the
simulation of pseudorange errors is to evaluate the UERE for each
visible satellite, from its elevation angle, using a lookup table and linear
interpolation.
The next step is to produce a Weighting Matrix, W. W is a diagonal
matrix with values on the leading diagonal equal to the value of the
corresponding satellite’s UERE.
For Service Volume Simulations no further simulation of errors is
required. However, for the Navigation Engine Monte Carlo simulations,
random noise (assumed to have a zero-mean Gaussian distribution, with
standard deviation equal to the UERE) is applied to each signal.
For each satellite in view, a pseudorange (i.e. distance to the satellite, as
measured by the receiver) is simulated as follows:
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Pseudorange = True Distancei + (UEREi x Noise) + Biasi +
Clock Bias
Equation 8-10
Where Noise is a randomly generated number representing a number of
standard deviations taken from a normal distribution. The function used
to generate noise in C++ implementations requires two random
numbers, U1 and U2, each taking values between 0 and 1. In Excel
appropriate random number and normal distribution functions are used.
Noise = [(-2 x ln (U1)) x cos (2pi x U2)]1/2
Equation 8-11
“Bias” is a user-definable parameter that applies a fixed range error to
one or more ranging signals.
8.4 Calculation of Navigation Solution and Position Errors
The basic linearized measurement equation [26] is
y = G . x + ε
Equation 8-12
where x is the four dimensional position vector (north, east, up and
clock) about which the linearization has been made, y is an N
dimensional vector containing the raw pseudorange measurements
minus the expected ranging values based on the location of the satellites
and the initial estimated location of the user (x), G is the observation
matrix and ε is an N dimensional vector containing the errors in y.
The weighted least squares solution for x can be found by
xls   =  (GTWG)-1GTW. y =  K. y
Equation 8-13
where W is the inverse of the covariance matrix and K is the weighted
pseudo-inverse of G. The diagonal elements of W are the inverses of the
variances (σι2) corresponding to each satellite. We assume that the error
sources for each satellite are uncorrelated with the error sources for any
other satellite. Therefore, all off-diagonal elements are set to zero. While
this assumption may not be strictly true, it should be a reasonably good
112
approximation. In the absence of any information regarding cross-
correlation, it is recommended to treat W as a diagonal matrix [50].
xls is a 4 x 1 vector which contains the difference between the old
estimated user position and the new estimated user position. However,
xls is in local (North, East, Up) co-ordinates, whereas user position is in
an Earth-centred co-ordinate reference frame, therefore in order to
calculate vertical and horizontal position errors it is necessary to:
1. Extract the first three elements of xls into a 3 x 1 position vector (the
fourth element being the estimate of user clock offset, which is not a
function of the co-ordinate system being used);
2. Multiply this vector by a 3 x 3 Direction Cosine Matrix (DCM) to
convert from local co-ordinates to a reference frame with axes
parallel to the Earth-centred co-ordinate system in which user
estimated position is defined;
3. Add the transformed matrix to the previous estimated user position to
yield the new estimated user position vector;
4. Subtract the new estimated user position vector from the “true” user
to yield the position errors, in the reference frame parallel to the
Earth-centred co-ordinate system. This is referred to as the True
Error Vector, TEV;
5. Multiply the True Error Vector by a DCM to convert back to local
(North, East, Up) co-ordinates. This DCM is the inverse of the DCM
used in Step 2;
North Error = TEVx sin θ - TEVz cos θ
East Error = (TEVx cos θ sin φ ) + (TEVy cos φ ) - (TEVz sin θ sin φ )
Vertical Error = (TEVx cos θ cos φ ) – (TEVy sin φ ) - (TEVz sin θ cos φ )
Equation 8-14
6. The third element of this new vector represents the Vertical Error;
7. The vector sum of the first two elements of this vector represent the
Horizontal Error.
8.5 Application of RAIM Algorithms
In the Service Volume Simulations analysis, the SVS simulation engine
provides to the RAIM algorithms under test:
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• G matrix;
• W matrix;
• PMD;
• PFA.
The RAIM algorithms return:
• Vertical Protection Limit;
• Test Statistic Threshold (or thresholds, where more than one
independent test statistic is generated).
In the Navigation Engine simulations, the NavEng simulation engine
provides to the RAIM algorithms under test:
• G matrix;
• W matrix;
• y vector;
• PMD;
• PFA.
The RAIM algorithms return:
• Vertical Protection Limit;
• Test Statistic Threshold;
• Test Statistic value.
The NavEng simulation engine also provides:
• Vertical Navigation System Error (VNSE);
• Horizontal Navigation System Error (HNSE).
8.6 Calculation of Availability, Including Satellite Outage
Probability
The Service Volume Simulator provides a plot of RAIM availability
overlaid on a map of the specified service area. It provides a single
consolidated value for the availability of RAIM over the entire service
area, weighted to take into account the variation in service area with
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latitude for a given latitude step size. The value of the lowest availability
occurring at a point in the service area, along with that point’s latitude
and longitude, is also provided.
The SVS also allows the user to undertake an analysis with one or more
satellites treated as “disabled”. However, it does not automatically
provide a figure for the overall RAIM availability given a specified
probability of satellite outage. In order to produce such a figure the
output from the SVS needs to be post processed.
As an example, consider a Galileo-only case. In Section 7.5.4 the state
probability for Galileo having 27, 26 and 25 satellites operational at any
time are given as 98%, 1.9% and 0.1% respectively. In order to calculate
the overall availability of RAIM taking these figures into account, a
baseline degraded case needs to be assumed; for a single satellite
outage it is irrelevant which satellite is considered to have failed because
the constellation is symmetrical. However, for multiple failures a baseline
case needs to be defined. The cases to be used are currently undefined
for Galileo, although they are defined in RTCA standards for GPS
degraded states.
By running the Galileo-only case with 27, 26 and 25 satellites available,
an approximate overall availability is produced thus:
Overall availability = [Avail(27 sat) x 0.98]  + [Avail(26 sat) x 0.019] +
[Avail(25 sat) x 0.001]
The Service Volume Simulator allows the user to produce a table of
availability for each grid location in the test case, using a specified VAL.
The relationship given above can then be used to derive the availability
at every point in the sample, taking into account the probability of
satellite outage, using the SVS Post processor spreadsheet.
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9. LEAST SQUARES RESIDUALS (LSR) RAIM METHOD
9.1 Weighted Position Solution and Vertical Accuracy
The Least Squares Residual or LSR RAIM technique modelled in this
thesis is based on that presented in “Weighted RAIM for Precision
Approach” [26]. The approach is a standard snapshot RAIM technique,
and the methods are well known and widely utilised.
The position solution is found by solving the basic linearized
measurement equation (Equation 8-12), by use of the standard least
squares method defined in Equation 8-13.
By introducing the W matrix to account for the unequal weighting to be
given to each satellite’s ranging measurement, we can no longer
separate the expected positioning errors into a Dilution of Precision
(DOP) and a user ranging accuracy (UERE, or σ , common to all
satellites), which was the common approach to estimating the accuracy
of a satellite navigation position solution up until the removal of Selective
Availability on GPS in May 2002. Instead these values are combined into
expected positioning confidences:
σv ≡ √[(GTWG)-1]33
Equation 9-1
HRMS≡√{[(GTWG)-1]11+[(GTWG)-1]22}
Equation 9-2
Equation 9-1 gives the 1σ expected accuracy in the vertical dimension,
and Equation 9-2 gives the 2-dimensional RMS expected accuracy in the
horizontal dimensions. The accuracy of these measures depends upon
the accuracies of the satellite covariances in the W matrix.
9.2 Weighted RAIM Test Statistic
In order to assess the accuracy of the least squares fit we need to
consider the positioning error (xls - x).
Clearly, it is not generally possible to obtain a direct measurement of this
quantity; if we did, the positioning problem would be trivial, because it
implies that we have prior access to a better estimate of the true
position. However, we can examine the overall consistency of the
solution.
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Provided we have more than four measurements, the system is
overdetermined and cannot be solved exactly. Since all of the conditions
realistically cannot be met exactly, there is a remaining error residual to
the fit. By quantifying how closely the observations agree, we can
produce some test statistic relating to the consistency of the
measurements. If this test statistic shows the measurements to be
consistent (i.e. the fit is good), we assume that the error in position is
most likely small. This is the foundation for RAIM.
The first step in the production of the required test statistic is rearrange
Equation 8-12, using the least squares position solution:
εls = y - Gxls
Equation 9-3
N residuals are then formed in the measurement domain, grouped
together as the N x 1 vector xls, formed by substituting Equation 8-13
into Equation 9-3, as follows:
εls = y – G(K. y)  = (I – G.K).y = (I – P). y
Equation 9-4
This is the linear transformation that takes the range measurement y into
the resulting residual vector. From these error estimates we define a
scalar measure to which we will refer henceforth as the Weighted Sum of
Squared Errors (WSSE):
WSSE = εlsT . W. εls = [(I-P).y]T. W.[(I – P). y]
= yT.W.(I-P).y
Equation 9-5
If εi is a normally distributed zero mean random variable with a standard
deviation of σi for all N satellites in view, WSSE is a 2 distributed
variable with N-4 degrees of freedom.
The square root of WSSE (√WSSE) plays the role of the basic
observable in this RAIM method, because this yields a linear relationship
between a satellite bias error and the associated induced test statistic.
(√WSSE is observable whereas the positioning error of the least squares
solution (xls - x) is not). Therefore, for integrity purposes we want to use
the statistic to flag bad position solutions. Typically, a certain threshold is
selected. If the statistic exceeds that threshold the position fix is
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assumed to be unsafe. However if the statistic is below the threshold,
then the position fix is assumed to be valid.
The fault detection plane is broken up into four regions consisting of:
normal operation points, missed detections, successful detections and
false alarms, as shown in Figure 9-1. This figure shows the results for
1000 samples with Gaussian noise for a single geometry with 18
satellites in view.
Figure 9-1 : Typical distribution of vertical errors and RAIM test
statistic for normal operations (Gaussian noise, no bias)
The test statistic threshold is chosen such that the probability of false
alarm is commensurate with the continuity requirement for precision
approach. With WSSE being a 2 distributed variable, the threshold T
can be selected analytically. T(N, PFA) will only be a function of the
number of satellites (N) and the desired probability of false alarms (PFA).
By examining the distribution it is possible to find the value T(N, PFA)
such that, for normal conditions, the statistic only has a probability of PFA
of exceeding it. The threshold may be found by inverting an incomplete
gamma function. In practice the values for T(N, PFA) can be easily
computed off-line using an iterative root finding process and stored for
use later by a RAIM algorithm, either from a lookup table or in a
mathematical functions library.
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9.3 Protection Levels
The N errors in the vector ε  are mapped into two orthogonal spaces;
one of dimension 4 corresponding to the position solution error and one
of dimension N-4 corresponding to the distribution of WSSE (hence
WSSE has N-4 degrees of freedom). Thus, in the general case, the
statistic cannot be used absolutely to indicate a bad or a good position
solution.
However, Brown [36] showed that for every satellite in view there is a
characteristic straight line relationship between the magnitude of the
vertical error and the value of the test statistic,
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where K3i represents the item on the third row of the K matrix associated
with satellite i. This value represents the relationship between an applied
bias on satellite i and the induced vertical position error, in the absence
of any other bias or noise on any other satellite.
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Figure 9-2 : LSR RAIM Test Statistic Characteristic
With a single satellite failure, it is possible to restrict the satellite
geometries such that a large bias that is mapped into a position error is
also mapped into the statistic WSSE with certainty. Thus, for this failure
mode we can guarantee that the position error will not grow too large
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without a corresponding growth in the statistic. Figure 9-2 shows this
“Test Statistic Characteristic” for a particular Galileo + GPS case (18
satellites in view).
If there is a fault on the signal received from a single satellite which
causes a bias to be added to the UERE of the ranging signal, the
expected distribution of operation points in the statistic-vertical error
plane is still an ellipse with roughly the same contours as in the absence
of failures. The difference is that now the ellipse has moved out along
the line with the corresponding Vslope for the failed satellite (see Figure
9-3). How far it moves along the line depends on the magnitude of the
bias.
From Figure 9-3 we can see that the Vertical Protection Limit (VPL)
available for any given satellite geometry has two major components:
• The product of the Test Statistic threshold (a function of the desired
probability of false alarms (PFA) and the number of satellites in view)
and the maximum value of Vslope;
• The product of the number of standard deviations corresponding to
the specified probability of missed detection (PMD), and the 1σ
accuracy in the vertical direction (σv).
 
Vertical Protection Limit 
Vslope(max) 
Figure 9-3 : Typical distribution of vertical errors and RAIM test
statistic with critical bias on failed satellite (Gaussian noise on all
satellites)
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The vertical protection limit can now be calculated using Equation 9-7:
VMDFASLOPE PkPNTVVPL σ)(),(]max[ +≡
Equation 9-7
9.4 Underlying Assumptions
This method contains a number of implicit assumptions that typically
produce a conservative estimates of the VPL for a given satellite
geometry. The major factors that lead to an over-estimate of VPL are
discussed briefly below:
There is an implicit assumption that any failure causing a ranging bias
will occur on the satellite which, by virtue of geometry, is the most
sensitive to errors, i.e. the satellite on which a ranging error causes the
greatest vertical shift error per unit increase in test statistic (Vslope(max)).
Making this assumption gives this technique increased integrity, but at
the cost of decreasing RAIM availability;
The noise on each measurement is likely to be closer to a “clipped
Gaussian” than a true Gaussian distribution, because various system
monitoring elements (not associated with the integrity determination
system) are likely to detect and prevent broadcast of a large proportion
of gross errors [51]. However, given that the tails are relatively weak on
Gaussian distributions, this clipping effect is unlikely to have a significant
effect on the validity of this RAIM approach.
As the number of satellites in view increases, so does the number of
degrees of freedom, and hence so does the detection threshold T (N,
PFA).  At some point, each additional satellite adds less to the increase in
the accuracy of the position solution than it does to increasing the
detection threshold. As a result, the vertical protection limit is less once
these satellites are excluded than when they are kept in the solution.
Figure 9-4 presents the SVS snapshot case window, showing the same
case as in Figure 6-1, but this time with five satellites disabled from the
analysis.
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Figure 9-4: Improvement in VPL with Satellites Disabled
Number of sats visible : 17 12
VSlope(max) : 1.0162 1.0399
v : 1.6435 1.6859
LSR VPL : 12.51m 12.05m
Note that even though v is slightly lower with seventeen satellites in
view compared with twelve, the LSR Vertical Protection Limit is improved
by nearly 0.5m by removing five satellites at medium elevation angles.
This appears to be a novel observation, for which the author has found
no other reference in published literature.
It is of course possible to identify, for any particular satellite geometry,
which satellites can be removed to optimise the VPL calculation.
However, the computational effort associated with this optimisation was
not felt appropriate for this thesis. Nevertheless, any real applications of
the LSR RAIM algorithm with big constellations would benefit from
investigation into this point.
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The method of least squares solution implicitly assumes that the
observation matrix G is known, and that all measurement errors (clock
bias, ephemeris errors, atmospheric delay, multipath, etc.) may be
lumped together into a single UERE. The weighted least squares
solution then minimises the weighted residual of these errors to find a
position solution. In practice, the observation matrix is itself subject to
perturbations associated with ephemeris errors and user’s position
errors. Although this assumption does not in itself result in errors in using
the LSR method, as will be shown when discussing the EIV technique,
recognising this assumption results in a more effective RAIM test metric.
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10.  “ERRORS IN VARIABLES” (EIV) RAIM METHOD
10.1 Introduction to EIV
The Errors in Variables or EIV method described in the following
sections is adapted from work produced by Professor Jyh-Ching Juang
at the National Cheng Kung University in Taiwan [30].
In Section 9 the least squares solution of the linearized measurement
equation (Equation 8-12) was demonstrated. Implicit in the least squares
positioning solution is the assumption that the observation matrix is
known, and that all errors can be lumped together as a user equivalent
range error. The Errors in Variables method recognises that ephemeris
errors will perturb the G matrix, and that the positioning model is better
solved as a linear equation with errors in both the observation matrix and
the measurement error vector.
To solve this new linear equation a “Total Least Squares” (TLS) method
is used, based on a matrix manipulation technique known as Singular
Value Decomposition (SVD). Although the positioning solution produced
by the TLS method will not in general be more accurate than that found
using standard least squares techniques, the TLS method is of interest in
the context of RAIM because the singular value decomposition yields
quantitative measures of the mismatches in both the error vector and the
observation matrix. Thus, with two independent observable metrics for
measurement consistency, it is possible to construct a RAIM algorithm
that, for given false alarm and missed detection probabilities, has far
higher availability than the LSR algorithm previously discussed.
However, as will be shown, in order to achieve this improved
performance in receivers using the EIV RAIM algorithm, the underlying
position algorithm requires a degree of management of the user clock
offset.  The detailed definition of the EIV technique is discussed in the
following sections.
10.2 Total Least Squares Positioning Solution
In Equation 8-12 as previously discussed, x is the four dimensional
position vector about which the linearization has been made, y is an N
dimensional vector containing the raw pseudo-range measurements
minus the expected ranging values based on the broadcast location of
the satellites and the assumed location of the user (x), G is the
observation matrix and ε is an N dimensional vector containing the errors
in y. The resulting least squares solution, presented in Equation 8-13,
minimises the objective function ||ε||2 (i.e. the norm of the error vector).
In practice, both the pseudo-range measurements and the broadcast
position of each satellite are subject to errors. Therefore, we can
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introduce a new matrix H to represent the errors associated with the
observation matrix, and a vector e (replacing ε in Equation 8-12) to
represent the errors not associated with the observation matrix. The
resulting linear matrix equation then becomes:
y = (G + H) . x + e
Equation 10-1
The matrix H may be used to account for errors in broadcast navigation
data, user linearization point, or differences in synchronisation between
clocks across the visible constellation. Of course, at any instant the
extent of the errors in H and e are unknown. Therefore, to solve
Equation 10-1 to provide a best estimate of x requires both H and e to be
minimized together; i.e. the idea is to find a vector x that best fits the
model in Equation 10-1, with the model mismatch characterised by H
and e as small as possible. In mathematical terms, the objective function
to be minimized in this process is the Frobenius norm7 of the augmented
matrix [H e].
The approach taken to solve this equation is commonly referred to as the
Total Least Squares method. The method is significantly different from
the standard Least Squares method previously discussed, because the
objective function is a full matrix, not a vector. The main computational
step in the TLS method is a matrix manipulation technique known as
Singular Value Decomposition. This technique is discussed in Appendix
D, using an explanation presented in [52].
The matrix to be decomposed by the SVD process is the matrix [G y],
i.e. the N x 5 matrix formed by co-joining the observation matrix with the
y vector. Before decomposition this matrix is pre- and post-multiplied by
two new matrices C and D. Both C and D are compatible, non-singular,
diagonal weighting matrices. C is an N by N matrix, whose entries are
used to weight the significance of the different satellite range
measurements. D is a 5 x 5 matrix, whose diagonal entries are related to
the relative importance of satellite North, East and Up position, user
clock and pseudo-range errors. Thus the D matrix allows the user to
“tune” the errors-in-variables model to emphasise vertical positioning
error, horizontal positioning error or clock bias, as required.
The matrix resulting from this pre- and post-multiplication is
subsequently referred to as the “augmented matrix”., and the objective
function to be minimised becomes ||C[He]D||.
                                           
7
 The Frobenius Norm of a matrix is the square root of the sum of the squares of all elements.
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The first step in the TLS process is the singular value decomposition of
the augmented matrix C[G y]D such that:
C[G y]D = UΣVT
Equation 10-2
In which U is an N x 5 column-orthogonal matrix, V is a 5 x 5 orthogonal
matrix and
σ1 0 0 0 0
0 σ2 0 0 0
Σ =
0 0 σ3 0 0
0 0 0 σ4 0
0 0 0 0 σ5
NB U is termed “column orthogonal” rather than orthogonal because the
“Thin SVD” process (see Appendix D) has been employed, and hence it
has no inverse.
The smallest singular value, σ5, represents the amount of model
mismatch that characterises the compatibility between the observation
matrix G and the measurement vector y. The next step is to partition the
U, V, Σ  and D matrices such that:
U = U1 U5
(N x 4) (N x 1)
V11 V15
(4 x 4) (4 x 1)
V =
V51 V55
(1 x 4) (1 x 1)
Σ1 0
(4 x 4) (4 x 1)
Σ =
0 σ5
(1 x 4)
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D1 0
(4 x 4) (4 x 1)
D =
0 d5
(1 x 4)
The Total Least Squares position solution, derived in [52] is given by:
xtls   =     - (D1V15) (V55 d5)-1
Equation 10-3
This is shown In Section 10.3.2 to be related to the Weighted Least
Squares estimate.
This approach to estimating the user’s position is of limited value, since
the error ellipse associated with the TLS estimate will in general be
larger than the error ellipse using the standard least squares approach.
However, the value of this technique will become apparent in the next
section when discussing integrity monitoring.
Using the matrix partitions defined above, the mismatches in the H
matrix and e vector may be expressed [30] as follows:
[ Htls  etls ] =     - σ5 C-1U5 [VT15 VT55] D-1
Equation 10-4
Thus the linear matrix equation becomes:
y = (G + Htls) . xtls + etls
Equation 10-5
10.3 Setting the Weighting Matrices
The paper which first introduced the idea of using an Errors in Variables
approach to RAIM [30] presented its analysis using Identity matrices for
the C and D weighting matrices introduced above. At the time of writing
this paper Selective Availability was still in operation, which of course
dominated the noise on GPS measurements (irrespective of elevation
angle), making the use of a weighting matrix on standard GPS position
solutions irrelevant. Although this simplified the problem in that the
values used for these matrices did not have to be justified, the underlying
distribution for the resulting test statistics is demonstrated to be
extremely complex.
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A key finding from this thesis is that it is possible to set the C and D
matrices such that test statistics are produced which are readily
applicable for a real RAIM application. This means producing test
statistics which:
• Have a simple (ideally linear) relationship between applied bias and
test statistic, and hence between navigation system error and test
statistic (such as the straight line characteristics described previously
for the LSR method);
• Have an underlying statistical distribution which is easily defined, and
hence readily provides a detection threshold given a specified false
alarm probability.
The following sections present the approach used in this research to
setting these weighting matrices which appears to provide test statistics
with these properties. The mathematical and analytical basis for these
results is presented to the extent appropriate to support the objectives of
this thesis. However, it should be noted that the approach presented
here has been derived empirically, with the aim of demonstrating that the
EIV algorithm could be developed into a RAIM application for safety of
life services. To fully develop and validate such an application a more
rigorous analytical justification would be required.
10.3.1 Setting the C matrix
Being an N by N matrix, the C matrix allows weightings to be applied to
each observation individually. In this way it acts like the W matrix
introduced earlier in the LSR method, and the intention here is to set the
weightings such that the Total Least Squares solution is weighted in a
way which is analogous to the Least Squares solution.
Equation 9-3 showed how in the LSR method a range residual vector is
produced which, using Equation 9-5, can be used to produced a
Weighted Sum of Squared errors test statistic. When the Total Least
Squares position solution is derived, as from Equation 10-3, a TLS range
residual vector (rtls) can be formed in the same way:
rtls = y - Gxtls
Equation 10-6
[52] shows that manipulation of Equation 10-3 and Equation 10-4 yields:
rtls = (σ5 C-1 U5) / (d5 V55)
Equation 10-7
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In a manner analogous to Equation 9-5, [30] shows that a modified Sum
of Squared Errors (SSE’) statistic is formed from:
SSE’ = rtlsT rtls
Equation 10-8
which has a statistical distribution that is
“…a summation of four Gamma distributions with different
parameters (due to different weights) and an n-4 degrees
of freedom chi-squared distribution…”
To set a detection threshold given a specified false alarm probability
would require either evaluating this function using convolutions, or
employment of simulation or some other numerical method, neither of
which is convenient for a real-time safety-critical application.
Where C is an Identity matrix, using the fact that U5 is a unit vector the
modified, unweighted SSE’ is seen to be
USSE’ = σ52 / (d52 V552)
Equation 10-9
This still has the computationally prohibitive statistical distribution
mentioned previously, and does not consider the application of
weightings to the different observations.
By analogy with Equation 9-5, a modified Weighted Sum of Squared
Errors, WSSE’ can be formed
WSSE’ = rtlsT W rtls
Equation 10-10
This is seen to be identical to SSE’ in Equation 10-8 above if the
elements of the C matrix are set to be equal to the square root of the
corresponding elements of the W matrix. Thus, for all subsequent
analysis the C matrix in the EIV method is set to equal the square root of
the W matrix used in the Least Squares positioning solution, since this
provides a TLS equation which is directly comparable to a weighted
Least Squares linear equation.
129
10.3.2 Setting the D matrix
[30] shows that where both the TLS and LS solutions are unweighted,
the position estimates are related by:
xtls = [I4  + σ52 (GTG - σ52 I4)-1] xls
Equation 10-11
Thus the error ellipse of the TLS solution is larger than that for the LS
solution, diverging with the square of σ5. Furthermore the two solutions
tend to converge as σ5 tends to zero. The singular value σ5 characterises
how close the rank of the augmented matrix is to 4. It is a measure of the
compatibility of the linear matrix equation.
Consider the constituent elements of the augmented matrix before
multiplication by the C and D matrices, i.e. the 5 x n matrix [Gy]. The D
matrix provides the means to weight the five columns of the augmented
matrix as required. Clearly the effect of the fifth diagonal term, d5, is to
control the order of magnitude of the measurement residuals column of
the augmented matrix.
Note that σ5 always represents the lowest singular value resulting from
the decomposition. It is not fixed to characterise the compatibility of the
fifth column compared with the first four. If we assume (as is valid for the
subsequent simulations) that measurement residuals are expressed in
metres, and given the measurement variances/UEREs previously
discussed, elements of the y vector would typically be of the order one to
ten metres. If the D matrix is set to be an Identity matrix the fifth column
of the augmented matrix would dominate the Singular Value
Decomposition process to the extent that σ5 would not, generally, relate
to the compatibility of the Total Least Squares solution, but could have
some spurious meaning with no obvious physical significance. It is
important therefore that d5 is set to some value less than the terms d1 to
d4 to ensure that the output from the process is meaningful.
The first three columns of this matrix constitute elements of unit vectors,
therefore the value of every element will be something between 0 and 1.
The unit vector indicates the direction from the User to a specific
spacecraft. Any Galileo or GPS spacecraft in contact will be around
24,000-30,000 km from the user. Thus, the impact of a small change to
any component of the unit vector implicitly changes the assumed
location of the spacecraft by a much larger amount (magnified by a
factor of around 24-30 x 106 ). The new geometry matrix produced by the
SVD process is not used in the position fix, but the fitting process (and
the metrics that are based upon its outcome) should take account of the
physical meaning of the terms. In other words, the weighting in the D
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matrix should reflect the physical meaning of each column in the [Gy]
matrix.
The fourth column, being the clock offset component, is set by default to
equal 1 for all elements. The physical interpretation of this column is as
follows: We are measuring time in terms of distance, based on the
constancy of the speed of light. Setting this value to ‘1’ states that a unit
change in the clock bias (measured in metres), leads to a unit change in
the pseudo-range error (also in metres). This is true for all observations,
so the value is set to ‘1’ for each spacecraft (row) in the observation
matrix. A 1m change in clock bias leads to a 1m change in pseudo-
range. Changing this value implies a change in the relationship between
time and distance travelled. If it is set to, say, 1.5 then that is the
equivalent of saying that a 1m change in clock bias leads to a 1.5m
change in pseudo-range error. Clearly, changes to this column should be
strongly suppressed if physical realism is to be maintained.
The values of the elements in the fifth column, representing the
measurement residuals, require some consideration. This column
represents the difference between the expected range to a spacecraft
and the measured distance. So long as changes are kept relatively small
(i.e. centimetres to a few metres), a change in this column might simply
represent measurement noise. Unlike the previous columns, it does not
represent a scaling factor – it is a measured value. The expected value
of a pseudorange error is on the order of 1-20m. Thus, a realistic change
(say, 1m) represents a much larger fraction than for the previous four
columns.
Having reviewed the meaning of the terms in the D matrix, it should be
noted that the position solution gained from the SVD process is NOT
used as the navigation solution. For that, we still rely upon the Least
Squares Residuals fit. The purpose of undertaking the SVD process is to
gain another ‘goodness of fit’ metric, via the [H e] matrix. Thus, strictly,
we do not need to treat the [G y] matrix in a physically rigorous way ; we
are only interested in deriving a metric which responds linearly to
induced bias.
If physical interpretation was of greatest importance, then typically, the D
matrix may be set to something like the following:
1
1
D = 1
100
3x10-5
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i.e. changes to the unit vector are scaled, in accordance with their effect
on the assumed spacecraft position. Changes to the ‘clock’ column are
heavily suppressed, as these are deemed to be unrealistic (or, at least,
only susceptible to very small variations). Changes to the pseudorange
column (column 5) are, in contrast, much easier to allow since there is a
one-to-one relationship between the perturbation and its effect on the
signal timing.
If this approach is adopted, the result is a strongly non-linear response to
bias. This is of little use in the current application, and so the D matrix
given above is a poor choice for EIV RAIM.
In fact, the primary criterion for a good D matrix is that it provides a linear
response to signal bias. Without that property, the process of estimating
vertical error from test statistic value becomes much more complex. In
practice, the best way to achieve that behaviour is to apply weighting
such that the clock and pseudo-range columns absorb most of the
changes. The reasons for doing this are as follows:
i) Suppressing changes to the unit vector (d1-3) – As mentioned
earlier, changes to the unit vector component must be
suppressed, to allow for the large effect that a change in direction
can have on the implied spacecraft position. Also, the SVD
process takes no account of the relationship between these three
components . It does not treat them as components of a unit
vector, but rather as independent values. Thus, in general, it will
change them in a way that changes the length of the vector. The
impact of a change varies depending upon the specific geometry.
For a spacecraft directly overhead, a change to the ‘Up’
component has a different effect on the projected spacecraft
location than a change to the North or East components. Thus, its
effect on the H/e metric will tend to be non-linear. For all these
reasons, it is best to keep changes to the vector columns
relatively small.
ii) Time and Distance (d4-5) – As described earlier, the d4 term
allows the SVD process to introduce changes to the timing of
received signals, relative to the clock bias. The d5 term has a very
similar role, since it measures the time/distance difference
between expected and received signals. Thus, these two values
can be seen as describing similar properties.
We can use the D matrix to encourage an even distribution of
ranging error between these two columns, while simultaneously
keeping corrections to the unit vector small. This leads to a much
more linear relationship between applied bias and induced H/e
test statistic.
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The following sections discuss the test statistics used by the EIV
method, and show how the D matrix is set to provide desirable
characteristics for these metrics. Note that no attempt is made at this
point to provide an analytical method for the determination of the
appropriate terms of the D matrix. Rather, the discussion above is
distilled into the following simple rules, which provide the basis for a “trial
and error” approach to finding an appropriate set of values:
a) The weighting associated with the physical dimensions North,
East and Up should all be the same, therefore set these values to
be equal to one;
b) The d5 term should have the largest value possible, whilst
remaining small enough to ensure that the singular value
associated with this column of the augmented matrix will always
be the lowest singular value of the SVD process;
c) The d4 term should be set to some value that provides test
statistic characteristics such as shown in Figure 10-12 which are
apparently linear over the range of biases under consideration,
and which can be extrapolated to pass close to the origin on the
test characteristic plot;
d) When running a simulation of a typical satellite-to-user geometry,
the test statistic probability density should closely match the ideal
probability density as shown in Figure 10-6.
It may be necessary to iterate around the values of d4 and d5 to optimise
the test statistic characteristic and probability density. At this point it is
not possible to make a statement regarding how linear or how close to
the origin the extrapolated characteristics should run, nor how well the
simulated probability density should correlate with the ideal. The figures
in Section 10.4 and 10.5 give an impression of the quality of fit that was
readily achievable through trial and error for the cases analysed in this
thesis, and the subsequent experimental results suggest that this is
adequate for this level of analysis.
Section 13.4, in the Discussion for this thesis, presents comments on the
physical significance of the parameters used in setting the D matrix,
which has become apparent from the experimentation and simulation
presented in subsequent sections.
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10.4 EIV RAIM Test Statistics
10.4.1 Unweighted EIV Fault Detection Plane
As discussed in Section 10.3.1, a test statistic based on the sum of
squared errors for the TLS position solution is readily formed. However,
[30] demonstrates that this has two disadvantages compared with the
standard LSR test statistic:
1. The underlying distribution is very complex, hence setting thresholds
and calculating protection limits is computationally very demanding;
2. The distribution itself has a smaller hump and longer tail than the χ2
distribution used in the LSR method, therefore at the very low false
alarm probabilities demanded by RAIM applications this test statistic
is likely to require a detection threshold which offers no improvement
in protection limit compared with LSR RAIM.
[30] goes on to demonstrate alternative candidates for use as test
statistics, which take advantage of the very important feature of the EIV
method that it produces more than one independent test statistic. In the
case where the C and D matrices are identity matrices, as analysed in
the reference, it is shown that a fault detection plane can be drawn in
which the axes represent etls and Htls, as previously defined. A line from
a point on this plane to the origin has a length equal to (σ5 / V55) and,
obviously, makes an angle with the x-axis equal to (Htls / etls). It is shown
that the length of this vector and its angle can be used as independent
test statistics, i.e. each increases when a bias is applied to an
observation.
Although this indicates that some fault detection scheme could be
developed using this technique, it leaves the problem of defining the
underlying distributions for these two test statistics open, and it does not
attempt to consider the added complexity of applying weighting matrices
C and D such that the TLS solution is comparable with the Least
Squares position solution.
10.4.2 √USSE’ Test Statistic
One would assume that by introducing the C and D matrices to the TLS
problem (i.e. if they are no longer identity matrices) the situation
regarding setting appropriate test statistics and defining thresholds would
become even more complicated. However, there appears to be a
remarkable effect when C is equal to the square root of the W matrix, as
discussed in Section 10.3.1, and the d5 term is sufficiently small, as
discussed in10.3.2.
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In Section 10.3.1 expressions were presented for the unweighted (i.e. C
is Identity) and weighted (C = W1/2) modified Sum of Squared Errors
statistic, and it was stated that the underlying distribution is a summation
of four Gamma distributions with different parameters and an N-4
degrees of freedom χ2 distribution, which is very difficult to deal with
analytically. In Section 10.4.1 it was stated that in the unweighted case
the term (σ5 / V55) can be used as a test statistic on the fault detection
plane. This clearly has a similarity with the unweighted modified Sum of
Squared Errors (USSE’) defined in Equation 10-9; the difference being
the inclusion of the d5 term in the denominator of USSE’.
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Figure 10-1 : Comparison of √USSE’ with √WSSE
Figure 10-1 presents the output from a run using the NavEng tool, in
which the square root of USSE’ is used as a test statistic for the EIV
algorithm. The run comprised one million samples. The range between
the lowest and highest value of test statistic for both √USSE’ and
√WSSE is split into 50 equal sized “bins” and the number of samples
falling into each bin is counted. The resulting plot shows the probability
density for the test statistic in question. In this case the probability
density of √USSE’ appears identical to that of √WSSE. Indeed, using the
“Correl” function in Excel to find the correlation on the first 10,000
samples from this run found a perfect correlation between the two.
Therefore, although no rigorous mathematical justification is presented, it
appears that when the C matrix introduced in Equation 10-2 is set to the
square root of the W matrix, and d5 is sufficiently small, √USSE’ is equal
to the LSR test statistic √WSSE. Setting fault detection thresholds for a
required false alarm probability therefore requires precisely the same
process as for the LSR method.
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Furthermore, Figure 10-2 shows the Test Statistic Characteristic for
√USSE’, for the same case as was used to generate the equivalent
characteristic for the LSR RAIM case in Figure 9-2. These characteristics
can be seen to be identical, again demonstrating the direct relationship
between √USSE’ and √WSSE.
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Figure 10-2 : √USSE’ Test Statistic Characteristic
It should be noted that the value of the √USSE’ test statistic is dominated
by the σ5 term. When d5 is small, the term V55 tends toward unity, and so
it appears that σ5 is itself approximately proportional to √WSSE, with
1/d5 acting as the constant of proportionality. Indeed this was the
relationship which was originally observed to have the underlying χ2
distribution, although on closer analysis it became apparent that the V55
term had to be included to provide the very high correlation with √WSSE
described above.
10.4.3 H/e Test Statistic
When discussing the unweighted EIV case previously it was stated that if
||Htls||F (the Frobenius norm of Htls) and || etls || (the vector norm of etls)
are used as axes for a fault detection plane, both the distance of a point
to the origin and the angle that this line makes with the x-axis act as
independent test statistics. The √USSE’ term defined above represents
the distance to the origin and, being exactly equal to √WSSE is in fact a
measure of the overall consistency of the set of measurements.
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Rather than consider the angle of the line drawn from a point on the
plane to the origin, we can more conveniently consider the ratio of Htls
and etls. This comparison of the two mismatches provides an
assessment of the extent of ephemeris error and pseudo-range error
The ratio of these scalar values (i.e. ||Htls||F / || etls || ) thus provides a test
statistic that represents the extent to which the Total Least Squares
position solution has allocated errors to the model (H) or to the
measurements (e). For brevity we shall refer to the ratio of these norms
as H/e, i.e. by definition,
H/e = ||Htls||F / || etls ||
Equation 10-12
Note from Equation 10-4 that both Htls and etls are directly related to σ5,
V55 and d5. However, because they are both directly related to all of
these terms, the ratio ||Htls||F / || etls || is entirely uncorrelated with
√USSE’. This is a very important point; being uncorrelated, √USSE’ and
H/e may be used as two independent test statistics.
The independence of the two statistics may be further understood, by
considering what they are measuring. These two statistics represent two
different properties of the mismatches between the total least-squares
solution and the measurement data. The √USSE’ term represents the
summed magnitude of mismatches between the observation data and
the least-squares solution. The H/e statistic, on the other hand, tell us
something about where those mismatches occurred. In particular, it tells
us the ratio of error attributed to pseudorange measurement (i.e. parallel
to the observation vectors)  versus error attributed to the Geometry
matrix(i.e. error in the observation unit vector itself). This explanation
gives some insight into the response of the H/e statistic. The example in
Appendix D of a singular value decomposition of a 2-dimensional matrix
provides additional insight into the relationship between these two test
statistics.
If the errors are mostly found to be ‘along’ the observation vectors, H will
be small and e will be large – so, H/e will be a small number.
Conversely, if significant errors are attributed to the Geometry matrix and
the pseudoranges are judged to be good, H/e will be large.
The implications of this are worth some consideration. The H/e statistic
will be quite insensitive to errors which do not induce large changes in
the Geometry matrix. Fortunately, the √USSE’ statistic is sensitive to
these errors. The use of a ‘backstop’ √USSE’ threshold will be discussed
later. Furthermore, consider that the majority of spacecraft visible at any
given time are most likely to be found at mid to low elevations. This will
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generally be so, since the area of the sky below 45° represents almost
2½ times the area of sky above 45° elevation. Thus, the ‘up’ direction for
a receiver is generally oblique to the majority of observation vectors, i.e.
a vertical error will induce changes in the geometry of a larger number of
spacecraft than a horizontal error. The H/e statistic is therefore
particularly well suited to detection of vertical error.
Figure 10-3 illustrates the point:
 S/C 2 
Receiver 
S/C 1 
S/C 3 
S/C 4 
Figure 10-3 Geometry change with vertical displacement
As described, a vertical change in receiver position produces large
changes in the vectors to spacecraft 1, 3 and 4. By contrast, spacecraft 2
experiences little change in direction, since the motion has a large
component along the observation vector. In contrast, a horizontal change
only induces significant change in the direction of the vector to
Spacecraft 2, which is high in the sky.
Given the very different nature of errors to which the two test statistics,
H/e and √USSE’, respond, it is intuitively clear that the two are linearly
independent. They measure fundamentally different properties.
For completeness, the correlation between (H/e) and √USSE’ was
calculated using the first 10,000 samples from the NavEng simulator run
which was used to produce Figure 10-1. In this case it was found to be
-0.02, which is an extremely weak correlation, of the order of what is
found when comparing two lists of 10,000 random numbers.
Figure 10-4 presents the distribution of lateral error vs H/e test statistic,
and Figure 10-5 presents the distribution of vertical error vs H/e test
statistic for the same set of data. This shows that the H/e test statistic is
reasonably strongly correlated with vertical error. In fact the value of this
correlation was found to be 0.83. In contrast, the statistic does not
respond strongly to lateral error..
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Figure 10-4 : H/e Test Statistic Distribution vs Horizontal Error
H/e Test Statistic vs Error - Vertical
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Figure 10-5: H/e Test Statistic Distribution vs Vertical Error
Figure 10-6 presents the probability density for the H/e test statistic. Note
how closely this distribution matches the theoretical curve for a “Half-
Normal Distribution”. A Half-Normal Distribution is effectively a zero-
mean normal distribution folded around the mean, so that all values are
positive. The correlation in this case is found to equal 0.99997.
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This is a very important result, because it greatly simplifies the task of
setting the detection threshold for this test statistic. If the standard
deviation of the distribution is determined, the appropriate threshold for a
given alarm rate is readily determined. The major investigation to be
undertaken on the EIV method is therefore to formulate a method for
setting the D matrix such that the distribution of the H/e Test Statistic is
bounded by a Half-Normal distribution, and that the standard deviation of
this distribution may be evaluated analytically.
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Figure 10-6 : Ideal H/e Test Statistic Probability Density
The technique used to estimate the standard deviation of this distribution
is described in Section 10.5.2.
10.5 Combining Two Test Statistics
10.5.1 Overall Concept
Either of the test statistics described in the previous sections could
potentially be used as the fault detection mechanism in a RAIM
algorithm. However using either √USSE’ or H/e on its own would not
provide any significant advantage over other RAIM algorithms. The
power of the EIV method becomes apparent when using both test
statistics together, i.e. so that a fault condition is declared only when
both test statistics exceed specified thresholds.
Consider the simplified case in which the continuity requirement leads to
a specified probability of false alarm of 1 x 10-6. The LSR RAIM threshold
would need to be set to yield no more than one alarm per one million
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independent samples. Using the EIV approach, the √USSE’ threshold
could be set to yield one detection per thousand samples, as long as the
H/e threshold is also set to the same alarm rate. Because they are
entirely uncorrelated the overall probability of false alarm would be 1 x
10-6, as required. Clearly, the PFA component of VPL derived from this
method would be significantly smaller than the PFA component of VPL
using the LSR method.
Figure 10-7 shows two sets of 10,000 samples generated by the NavEng
tool and displayed graphically using the “3d Grapher” tool [53]. The
horizontal axis (“x”) represents the √USSE’ threshold and the vertical
axis (“z”) represents the vertical error derived from a least squares
navigation solution.
The first set of data represents an unbiased sample, i.e. only zero-mean
Gaussian noise is applied to each measurement. The second set of data
represents the case where a bias is applied to the most critical satellite in
view. As described previously for the LSR algorithm, the test statistic
distribution increases in value in both the vertical error and test statistic
domains.
The vertical line on this figure represents the detection threshold for the
specified false alarm rate (in this case set to 1 x 10-4, so that around ten
samples would be expected to exceed this threshold). The horizontal line
represents the vertical protection limit calculated using the LSR method
for this PFA and a PMD also of 10-4.
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Figure 10-7 : Vertical Error (z-axis) vs √USSE’ Test Statistic (x-axis)
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Figure 10-8 : Vertical Error (z-axis) vs H/e Test Statistic (y-axis)
Figure 10-8 presents the same data, viewed along the x-axis so that this
figure represents the distributions of vertical error against H/e test
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statistic for the unbiased and biased cases. The horizontal line again
represents the VPL derived from the LSR method.
Figure 10-9 presents the data for the unbiased case alone, viewed along
the z-axis to show the relationship between the √USSE’ Test Statistic (x-
axis) and the H/e Test Statistic (y-axis). As with Figure 10-7 the vertical
line represents the detection threshold using the LSR method. This
figure also includes a region in the top right hand corner marked by the
H/e detection threshold and the √USSE’ detection threshold. These
values have been set to yield the same combined detection rate as the
LSR detection threshold.
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Figure 10-9: √USSE’ Statistic (x-axis) vs H/e Test Statistic (y-axis)
Figure 10-10 presents the same information as Figure 10-7, but now also
showing the vertical protection limit as calculated using the EIV
algorithm. This is approximately 15% lower than the VPL calculated
using the LSR method.
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Figure 10-10 : Vertical Error vs √USSE’ Statistic, showing EIV VPL
Finally, Figure 10-11 attempts to present these data in a three
dimensional perspective view. The higher horizontal plane is the LSR
VPL, whilst the lower plane represents the EIV VPL and its associated
detection thresholds.
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Figure 10-11 : EIV Test Statistic Distribution in 3 dimensions
10.5.2 H/e Test Statistic Standard Deviation
In order to set a detection threshold for the H/e test statistic, the
probability density function (i.e. the probability that the value of this
statistic exceeds a given value) for the unbiased case needs to be
evaluated. In Figure 10-6 it was shown that when correctly set up H/e
displays a Half-Normal distribution; given the standard deviation for this
distribution a detection threshold is readily evaluated.
The standard deviation can be evaluated for any case using Monte Carlo
simulation techniques, but this is likely to be too time-consuming to be
applicable to real-time safety-critical applications. An analytical approach
is therefore required. Based on the results from simulation and
experimentation, there appears to be a reasonably simple way of
producing a good estimate of the standard deviation.
The H/e statistic responds linearly to an induced bias – this is one of the
fundamental properties that we sought when tuning the D matrix. In a
non-biased case, each pseudo-range measurement will be subject to
Gaussian noise which is, in effect, a sequence of small biases. Thus,
holding all other measurements constant, if the pseudorange has a
Gaussian distribution, the H/e test statistic must also have a Gaussian
distribution.
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With noise present on all of the ‘n’ observations, the H/e test statistic can
then be approximated by a sum of ‘n’ Gaussian distributions. The sum of
two independent Gaussian distributions is, itself, a Gaussian distribution,
with variance equal to the vector sum of the variances of the component
distributions. Thus, taking the approximation that the contributions from
each spacecraft are independent, it follows that the distribution of H/e
can be found.
The approach taken here is to consider each observation (i.e. each
satellite in view) in isolation. If a bias is applied to this satellite of
magnitude equal to its UERE (i.e. the 1σ expectation of range error on a
signal), with no noise or bias on any other satellite, a value for H/e can
be determined. If the values arising in this way, by considering each
satellite in turn, are arranged as a vector, the Norm of this vector (i.e. the
square root of the sum of the squares of the elements of this vector)
represents the standard deviation of H/e for this case.
Figure 10-12 shows the H/e test statistic characteristic for the same case
for which the LSR and √USSE’ characteristics were presented earlier.
These plots show how vertical error and test statistic are related for a
known bias applied to each satellite in turn. Given the UERE for each
observation, it is a simple task to evaluate the expected (1σ) value of H/e
test statistic from each satellite. The vector summation of these values
provides the estimate of the overall standard deviation. This entire
process is expressed linearly in Section 10.6.
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Figure 10-12 : H/e Test Statistic Characteristic
For the case represented by this figure, the standard deviation is
calculated to be approximately 9.69 x 10-5. In comparison, the standard
146
deviation calculated by looking at ten thousand samples from the
navigation engine for this case is found to equal 9.55 x 10-5, i.e. the
estimation technique appears to agree with the observations to within
about 1.5%.
10.5.3 Backstop Threshold
The EIV method has an additional element of complexity which needs to
be taken into account when developing an operational RAIM algorithm.
Notice on Figure 10-12 that on this characteristic the satellite which has
the greatest vertical error for a given applied bias (satellite GSAS20 in
this example) does not have the steepest slope on the characteristic; in
this example there are three satellites for whom a large applied bias on
either one could lead to large vertical error without generating a large
value of H/e test statistic.
In the LSR method, the satellite with the steepest characteristic slope is
by definition the Critical Satellite, i.e. the satellite whose characteristic
effectively determines the VPL, because in setting the VPL it is assumed
that any feared event will occur on this satellite’s signal. This is also the
case for the √USSE’ test statistic of course, but is not generally true for
the H/e test statistic.
In the EIV method we identify the Critical Satellite from the √USSE’
characteristic (i.e. it is the same as the LSR critical satellite). Therefore,
in order to provide with certainty that a bias on any satellite will be
detected by the EIV RAIM algorithm without exceeding the evaluated
VPL, for specified values of PFA and PMD, it is necessary to add a
secondary test threshold, acting only on the √USSE’ test statistic, which
if exceeded will generate an alarm regardless of the value of the H/e test
statistic.
The process used to set this backstop threshold is as follows:
• Identify the Critical Satellite from the √USSE’ test statistic
characteristic (GSAS20 in the case above);
• From the H/e test statistic characteristic, identify every satellite whose
characteristic is steeper than that of the Critical Satellite (in this case,
GSAS 19, GSAS1 and GPSIIF13);
• Identify the satellite from this list which has the maximum slope on
the √USSE’ test statistic characteristic (GSAS19);
• Use the slope of this satellite’s characteristic in the subsequent
“Threshold Balancing” process.
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10.5.4 Threshold Balancing
Having established the probability density functions of the two test
statistics (√USSE’ and H/e) the next step is to evaluate values for the
detection thresholds on each test statistic such that the PFA requirement
is met and the VPL is minimised. This requires the characteristics of
each test statistic (i.e. the relationship between vertical error and test
statistic) to be taken into consideration.
For the √USSE’ test statistic the relationship is identical to the approach
used in the LSR method.
For the H/e characteristic the situation is more complex. As discussed
above, Figure 10-12 presents the test statistic characteristic for the H/e
test statistic, for the same case analysed using LSR RAIM in Figure 9-2
previously. The characteristics are still linear (at least over the relatively
low range of biases covered by this example), and pass through the
origin. Given these characteristics the relationship between vertical error
and H/e test statistic can be readily evaluated by finding the value of H/e
generated by applying a unit bias in turn to each observation.
Once the test statistic characteristic has been evaluated for both √USSE’
and H/e the final step is to “balance” the √USSE’, H/e and Backstop
thresholds.
When a value for a threshold is multiplied by a value for the
corresponding test statistic characteristic (i.e. the slope of vertical error
against test statistic) the product is some value of vertical error. This
value is effectively the component of VPL associated with the alarm rate
for this test statistic. “Balancing” is the process by which thresholds are
set such that:
• The combined probability of either
o exceeding the thresholds on both √USSE’ and H/e
simultaneously, or;
o exceeding the Backstop threshold
is no greater than the required PFA;
• The VPL component derived from √USSE’ and H/e test statistic
methods are equal;
• The VPL component derived from the Backstop is less than or equal
to the VPL component derived in the previous step.
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Note that in some cases it is impossible to satisfy all these conditions.
Figure 10-13 shows the √USSE’ characteristic and Figure 10-14 shows
the H/e characteristic for such a special case. In fact the geometry
leading to this case occurs at the same geographical location, 100
minutes earlier, than the characteristics previously discussed.
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Figure 10-13 : Root USSE’ Characteristic (Special Case)
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Figure 10-14 : H/e Characteristic (Special Case)
In this case the Critical Satellite is seen to be GSAS21. However, it can
be seen that satellite GSAS20 has a slightly less steep √USSE’
characteristic, but a marginally steeper H/e characteristic than the
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Critical Satellite. The Backstop threshold in this case will therefore be set
to cater for the case of a feared event occurring on GSAS20. Because
the √USSE’ slope for this satellite is so close to that of the Critical
Satellite, it is impossible to balance fully the thresholds in the manner
described above. In this case the VPL component calculated by
multiplying the slope of the GSAS20 √USSE’ characteristic by the
Backstop threshold is always larger than the VPL component derived by
balancing the other two thresholds. In this case the VPL solution is said
to be “Backstop Limited”.
10.6 Calculate the Vertical Protection Limit
In the LSR RAIM method, calculating the VPL is based on an
assumption that the worst case bias (i.e. the bias which when applied to
the critical satellite causes a missed detection probability exactly equal to
PMD) is that bias which, in the absence of noise on any satellites, would
just cause the LSR RAIM detection threshold to be exceeded. This
simplifies the task of setting the VPL8.
In the EIV method the situation is more complicated, because the worst
case bias is not found from some simple general relationship. Instead an
iterative method is required (or, at least has been assumed for this
implementation, since a closed-form solution to the problem is not
obviously apparent), which determines the worst case bias given the
√USSE’ Threshold and H/e Threshold values. The following steps
describe the logic used to find the worst case bias, and hence to set the
Vertical Protection Limit using the EIV method.
1. Consider a case where no bias is applied to any satellite, but each
measurement is subject to random noise with a variance as defined
by the assumed UERE value for that satellite. In this case the
√USSE’ Test Statistic has a central χ2 distribution, with N-4 degrees
of freedom.
2. Now consider the same case, but with a bias applied to the Critical
Satellite. The test statistic distribution is now a non-central χ2
distribution, with a non-centrality parameter which can be derived as
follows:
• Given that Equation 9-6 presents the relationship between
LSR Test Statistic and Vertical error, and the K3i term
represents the relationship between applied bias and vertical
                                           
8
 Although as we shall demonstrate this assumption is false.
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error, the value of Test Statistic for a given applied bias, in the
absence of any noise on any signals, is readily found.
• By assuming that this value would be the central value for the
new distribution, the value of the non-centrality parameter is
easily derived.
3. As an increasing bias is applied to the Critical Satellite, the “cloud”
representing its distribution moves along the line representing the
Critical Characteristic in Figure 10-15. For any particular applied bias,
there is some probability of measurements having a value of √USSE’
Test Statistic less than the derived √USSE’ Threshold. We refer to
this probability as “P(subUSSE’)”.
VPL
PMD
PFA component
ki
Vertical error
Test statistic
                                   √USSE’ Threshold         √USSE’ Statistic                                Backstop
Figure 10-15 : Calculation of EIV Worst case Bias
4. Given all the terms required to define a non-central χ2 distribution for
a given applied bias, the value of P(subUSSE’) is readily derived as a
function of applied bias.
5. In the absence of noise, the assumed applied bias will induce a
vertical error which we refer to us as the “PFA Component” since this
is the component of VPL which is a function of the detection
threshold, which is in turn a function of PFA. This is shown in Figure
10-15.
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6. When noise is applied to each measurement, the distribution of
vertical navigation system error will have a normal distribution, with a
mean equal to “PFA Component” and a standard deviation equal to σv,
the 1σ vertical error derived previously. The term “ki” in Figure 10-15
represents the number of standard deviations associated with a given
probability, which when multiplied by σv yield a term we refer to as
the “PMD Component”, since this is related to the required Missed
Detection probability.
7. For any assumed applied bias, it is possible to calculate a value for ki
such that the region marked as “PMD” in  Figure 10-15 represents
the probability of the random noise exceeding the threshold
represented by ki, whilst simultaneously being below the √USSE’
Threshold. This area should be, by definition, equal to PMD, since this
represents a Missed Detection.
In the implementations of the algorithm used in this thesis an iterative
process is to used to find the maximum value of Vertical Protection Limit
that meets these constraints.
10.7 EIV Method - Processing Logic Pseudocode
This section presents the EIV method in a format that can be used to
implement the algorithm into computer code. Rather than use formal
mathematical language, the names of functions commonly find in C++
mathematical libraries or Matlab are used. For example “normcdf”
represents the cumulative density function of the Normal Distribution and
“chi2inv” represents the inverse of the χ2 cumulative distribution function.
10.7.1 Initialise the algorithm
This algorithm has the following inputs:
• G matrix;
• W matrix;
• y vector;
• PFA :
• PMD;
• Number of satellites in view (N).
The first stage of the process is identical to the standard LSR RAIM
process. We need the following outputs from the LSR algorithm:
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• Vslope(max);
• Critical Satellite;
• σV;
• k (the number of standard deviations associated with PMD, found from
the lookup table or statistics function used by the LSR algorithm);
• Calculate the square root of (1 – Pii) (where Pii is the diagonal
element of the P matrix associated with the satellite under
consideration. See Equation 9-5). These values (the square root of (1
– Pii)) are arranged as a new vector BiasRatesVect.
10.7.2 Calculate the Test Statistics
• Form the C matrix, as a diagonal matrix with each element equal to
the square root of the elements on the diagonal of the W matrix;
• Get the D matrix from an external “Dmat” file.
• Put the fifth diagonal element of this matrix until a variable called “d5”;
• Form the augmented matrix C[G y]D;
• Perform the Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) of the matrix
C[Gy]D;
• Partition the U, Σ and V matrices as per Section 10.2.
• Produce the Test Statistic √USSE’ = (σ52 / d52 V552)1/2
• Produce the new matrix [ Htls  etls ] =     - σ5 C-1U5 [VT15 VT55] D-1
• Produce the H/e Test Statistic, H/e = ||Htls||F / || etls ||
10.7.3 Calculate the Detection Thresholds
• Assume a value which represents the largest bias which needs to
be detected using this algorithm (i.e. for which this algorithm has
to have linear characteristics). In this case it has been assumed to
equal 20m;
• For Satellite = 1 to N;
o Get the value from the diagonal of the W matrix
corresponding to this satellite. Call this “b”;
153
o Make a vector q, in which every element is set to zero
except the element corresponding to this satellite, which is
set to 20;
o Produce the new n x 5 augmented matrix C[G q]D;
o Perform the Singular Value Decomposition of the matrix
C[G q]D;
o Run through the same steps as previously for the EIV
algorithm, to decompose the matrices, etc.
o Store the value of ( || Htls ||F / || etls || ) x (b / 20) (i.e. the
ratio of these two values) in an array EIV_TS_Vector.
o This represents the H/e test statistic associated with a bias
equal to this satellite’s UERE; the 20m term is used to
minimise non-linearity effects of the characteristic close to
the origin.
o Store, in a new array EIV_Slope_Vector the value from :
 ( K3i x b ) / EIV_TS_Vector(i)
 This represents the slope of the ((|| Htls ||F / || etls ||)
test statistic with respect to satellite bias.
• Next Satellite.
• Evaluate the Norm (i.e. square root of the sum of the squares of
the elements) of EIV_TS_Vector. Call this value EIV_TS_Sigma.
This is the estimate of the Standard Deviation of the H/e test
statistic.
• Get the value from the EIV_Slope_Vector that corresponds to the
Critical Satellite from the LSR calculation. Call this value
EIV_Critical_Characteristic;
• Derive Vslope(2) – this is the highest value of “Slope”, i.e. the
LSR test statistic characteristic, for a satellite which has a
steeper EIV test statistic characteristic than the critical
satellite. If no satellite has a steeper EIV TS characteristic than
the Critical Satellite, Vslope(2) equals the second highest slope
on the LSR characteristic.
------------------------------
The next few steps are quite complicated, and require detailed
explanation through the following statements:
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• The total allowable false alarm rate is driven by the specification PFA;
• An alarm can be generated in one of two ways:
o By the √USSE’ Threshold and H/e Threshold both being
exceeded simultaneously; or
o By the Backstop Threshold being exceeded.
• The √USSE’ Test Statistic has a χ2 distribution, with N-4 degrees of
freedom;
• The H/e Test Statistic has a Half-Normal distribution;
• In order to set the √USSE’ and H/e thresholds correctly, we must find
values that meet the following constraints:
• [√USSE’ Threshold x Vslope(max)] = [H/e Threshold x
EIV_Critical_Characteristic];
• The combined probability of false alarm (taking into account the
probability of exceeding the Backstop Threshold) is equal to PFA.
Thus, PFA has two components:
• The probability of the √USSE’ Threshold being exceed
(PsubUSSE’)and H/e Threshold being exceeded (PH/e) occurring
simultaneously
= [PsubUSSE’ x PH/e];
• The probability of the Backstop being exceeded without the
PH/e threshold being exceeded (otherwise an alarm would
already have occurred)
= [(1 - PH/e) x PBackstop],
• The value of PsubUSSE’ can therefore be found by solving9 the following
convoluted expression for F(x) = 0:
F(x) = PFA - (x* PH/e) - ((1- PH/e)* PBackstop)
                                           
9 NB This function requires a robust numerical method. The nature of the function changes
significantly as the observation geometry changes, and is itself worthy of further investigation. For
this thesis a modified version of a Brent solver was used in the C++ and Matlab implementations
of this algorithm, with bespoke subroutines added to cater for conditions when the Backstop
factor was either insignificant or dominant.
155
Equation 10-13
Given that:
PH/e = 2 x normcdf(  Vslope(max) x (chi2inv(1-x,N-4))1/2 )
                              (EIV_TS_sigma x EIV_critical_characteristic)
Equation 10-14
Where “normcdf” represents the cumulative density function of the
Normal Distribution and “chi2inv” represents the inverse of the χ2
cumulative distribution function.
------------------------------
Having found the required probabilities for the two EIV RAIM detection
thresholds to be exceeded in order to meet the required PFA
specification, the detection thresholds are readily found:
• √USSE’ _Threshold = (chi2inv(1- PsubUSSE’, N-4))1/2
• EIV_H_over_e_Threshold = EIV_TS_sigma*abs(norminv(PH/e / 2))
• Backstop            = (chi2inv(1- PB, N-4))1/2
10.7.4 Calculate the VPL
This function requires an iterative process to determine the EIV worst
case bias, i.e. the bias which, if applied to the Critical Satellite, would
generate a missed detection probability equal to the specified PMD. The
process is described algorithmically in Section 10.6.
The VPL calculated by evaluating the worst case bias on the √USSE’
threshold is then compared with the VPL arising from the Backstop
threshold. The larger of the two values is returned as the Vertical
protection Limit.
10.7.5 Calculate Fault Detection State
The fault detection logic for the algorithm now becomes:
• If [(√USSE’ > √USSE’ _Threshold) AND ((|| Htls ||F / || etls ||) >
EIV_H_over_e_Threshold)] OR (√USSE’ > Backstop) then declare an
alarm.
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11. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES FOR LSR AND EIV METHODS
This section presents a numerical example of the calculation of  Vertical
Protection Limit, detection thresholds and test statistics for the Least
Squares Residuals and Errors in Variables RAIM methods previously
described. The condition analysed is that of a Galileo-only
constellation10, with a UERE characteristic as defined in Section 7.1.2.
The input conditions are:
• Latitude 52°, Longitude 0°;
• Time = 100 mins;
• 10° Masking Angle;
• PFA = 8 x 10-6;
• PMD = 0.0004.
This leads to the user-satellite visibility geometry shown in Table 11-1.
Sat ID North East Up Elev (Deg) UERE (m)
GS20 0.0147 0.1871 0.9822 79.2 0.79
GS19 0.2021 -0.6081 0.7677 50.2 0.8
GS1 -0.1998 0.6385 0.7432 48.0 0.805
GS21 -0.1713 0.8362 0.5210 31.4 0.83
GS2 0.5640 0.6527 0.5058 30.4 0.83
GS9 -0.8459 0.2739 0.4575 27.2 0.85
GS12 0.2311 -0.8812 0.4124 24.4 0.88
GS13 -0.5035 -0.8239 0.2601 15.1 0.96
GS11 0.8429 -0.4804 0.2426 14.0 0.99
Table 11-1:  Satellite Visibility and UERE
11.1 Calculate LSR VPL
The Observation Matrix (G) is easily formed by augmenting the columns
containing the North, East and Up components of the unit direction
vectors with a column of ones to represent the existence of an unknown
user clock offset.
                                           
10
 For clarity a case with only 9 satellites in view has been chosen. A combined Galileo/GPS
constellation would have around twice as many satellites in view, making the example more
complicated to demonstrate.
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0.0147 0.1871 0.9822 1
0.2021 -0.6081 0.7677 1
-0.1998 0.6385 0.7432 1
G = -0.1713 0.8362 0.5210 1
0.5640 0.6527 0.5058 1
-0.8459 0.2739 0.4575 1
0.2311 -0.8812 0.4124 1
-0.5035 -0.8239 0.2601 1
0.8429 -0.4804 0.2426 1
 Given the UERE’s presented in the last column of Table 11-1 the
weighting matrix W can be readily formed as shown (each element on
the diagonal = 1/UERE2):
1.602
1.563
1.543
W = 1.452
1.452
0
1.384
1.291
1.085
0
1.020
The next step is to produce the weighted pseudoinverse (also known as
the Moore-Penrose inverse) of the observation matrix:
0.3824 0.0480 -0.0122 0.0043
(GTWG)-1 = 0.0480 0.2290 -0.1927 0.1038
-0.0122 -0.1927 1.6976 -0.9680
0.0043 0.1038 -0.9680 0.6328
As presented in Equation 9-1, the highlighted cell represents σv2, i.e.
σv = √(1.6976) = 1.303 m
The K matrix, as defined in Equation 8-13 is readily produced:
 K = (GTWG)-1GTW
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0.0111 0.0672 -0.0779 -0.0397 0.3559 -0.4313 0.0586 -0.2506 0.3067
K = -0.0671 -0.2713 0.1500 0.2709 0.2655 0.0522 -0.2148 -0.1727 -0.0127
1.0627 0.7031 0.2671 -0.3521 -0.3512 -0.3234 -0.1303 -0.3924 -0.4836
-0.4783 -0.2696 -0.0327 0.3115 0.3097 0.2972 0.1849 0.3184 0.3590
The absolute values of the highlighted terms on the third row are the
elements |K3i| that appear in Equation 8-13. Similarly, as from Equation
9-4,
P = G.K =
0.5532 0.3712 0.2566 0.0157 0.0197 -0.0171 0.0175 -0.1030 -0.1139
0.3807 0.4487 0.0654 -0.1316 -0.0494 -0.0701 0.2273 0.0715 0.0574
0.2665 0.0663 0.2772 0.2307 0.1471 0.1763 -0.0608 -0.0335 -0.0698
0.0174 -0.1417 0.2453 0.3614 0.2878 0.2462 -0.0727 0.0124 0.0439
0.0217 -0.0531 0.1564 0.2878 0.5061 -0.0756 0.0118 -0.1342 0.2791
-0.0198 -0.0791 0.1965 0.2582 -0.0793 0.5283 0.0169 0.3035 -0.1253
0.0218 0.2750 -0.0727 -0.0817 0.0132 0.0181 0.3339 0.2508 0.2416
-0.1521 0.1030 -0.0476 0.0166 -0.1795 0.3872 0.2985 0.4848 0.0892
-0.1789 0.0879 -0.1056 0.0624 0.3970 -0.1699 0.3058 0.0949 0.5063
The terms on the leading diagonal are elements Pii which also appear in
Equation 9-6. Thus, for each satellite in view, the value of Vslope can be
evaluated as follows:
SV K3i Pii Slope
GS20 1.063 0.553 1.256
GS19 0.703 0.449 0.758
GS1 0.267 0.277 0.253
GS21 -0.352 0.361 0.366
GS2 -0.351 0.506 0.415
GS9 -0.323 0.528 0.400
GS12 -0.130 0.334 0.140
GS13 -0.392 0.485 0.525
GS11 -0.484 0.506 0.681
The satellite most sensitive to a bias is clearly GS20, which sets the
value of maximum slope, Vslope(max), to 1.256.
We now have all the information required to calculate the LSR VPL
which is available from the satellite geometry. However, in order to
calculate VPL we also need the factors T(N, PFA) and k(PMD) which
appear in Equation 9-6. As previously discussed, these are functions of
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the number of satellites in view, the required false alarm rate, and the
acceptable missed detection probability.
Taking the false alarm probability specified for both Cat I and APV II
specifications of 8 x 10-6, with 9 satellites in view, T(N, PFA) = 5.60. This
is the detection threshold for the LSR RAIM algorithm.
Assuming a missed detection probability of 4 x 10-4 (see Section 7.5 for
a discussion on the setting of this parameter), k(PMD) is found from an
inverse of the normal distribution for this probability level, k(PMD) = 3.353.
LSR RAIM VPL = (1.256 x 5.598)+(3.353 x 1.303) = 11.40 m
Figure 12-15 in Section 12.2.1.1 shows the Navigation Engine
configured for a simulation of this case, which confirms the VPL
calculated above.
11.2 Calculate LSR Test Statistic
Consider a case in which a 6m bias exists on the measurement on
satellite GS20, with all other observations being normal. A typical set of
measurement residuals might be:
Satellite Residual (m)
GS20 6.82
GS19 0.50
GS1 0.59
GS21 0.14
GS2 -0.68
GS9 0.28
GS12 -0.79
GS13 1.34
GS11 -0.80
Table 11-2: Example set of pseudorange residual errors
These residuals are arranged into the vector y.
As shown in Equation 9-5, the LSR Weighed Sum of Squared Errors is
equal to yT.W.(I-P).y
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Subtracting the P matrix from an Identity matrix:
0.4468 -0.3712 -0.2566 -0.0157 -0.0197 0.0171 -0.0175 0.1030 0.1139
-0.3807 0.5513 -0.0654 0.1316 0.0494 0.0701 -0.2273 -0.0715 -0.0574
-0.2665 -0.0663 0.7228 -0.2307 -0.1471 -0.1763 0.0608 0.0335 0.0698
-0.0174 0.1417 -0.2453 0.6386 -0.2878 -0.2462 0.0727 -0.0124 -0.0439
(I-P) = -0.0217 0.0531 -0.1564 -0.2878 0.4939 0.0756 -0.0118 0.1342 -0.2791
0.0198 0.0791 -0.1965 -0.2582 0.0793 0.4717 -0.0169 -0.3035 0.1253
-0.0218 -0.2750 0.0727 0.0817 -0.0132 -0.0181 0.6661 -0.2508 -0.2416
0.1521 -0.1030 0.0476 -0.0166 0.1795 -0.3872 -0.2985 0.5152 -0.0892
0.1789 -0.0879 0.1056 -0.0624 -0.3970 0.1699 -0.3058 -0.0949 0.4937
2.787
-2.224
-1.466
(I-P)y = -0.013
-0.158
-0.393
-0.898
1.778
1.268
4.466
-3.475
-2.262
W(I-P)y = -0.019
-0.230
-0.543
-1.159
1.929
1.294
Therefore yT.W.(I-P).y = WSSE = 29.85
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Hence the LSR RAIM Test Statistic, √WSSE = √29.85 = 5.46
Since this is less than the detection threshold calculated for this case
(5.60), this would not generate an alarm.
11.3 EIV Method
Setting the detection thresholds, and hence evaluating the protection
limits, using the EIV method requires repetition of the same process that
is used to calculate the test statistic for a set of measurements.
Therefore in this worked example we shall first calculate the test
statistics, and then calculate the thresholds and VPL.
11.3.1 Define Weighting Matrices
Set the C matrix to be equal to the square root of the W matrix:
1.266
1.250
1.242
C = 1.205
1.205
0
1.176
1.136
1.042
0
1.010
Next, define a D matrix. In this example, the matrix below has been
used:
1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
D = 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0.07 0
0 0 0 0 0.00085
11.3.2 Calculate the EIV Test Statistics
Using the same y matrix as was defined above, the augmented matrix
becomes:
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0.0186 0.2368 1.2433 0.0886 7.33E-03
0.2526 -0.7601 0.9597 0.0875 5.29E-04
-0.2482 0.7932 0.9232 0.0870 6.21E-04
C[Gy]D = -0.2063 1.0075 0.6277 0.0843 1.48E-04
0.6795 0.7864 0.6094 0.0843 -6.96E-04
-0.9952 0.3222 0.5383 0.0824 2.82E-04
0.2627 -1.0013 0.4687 0.0795 -7.64E-04
-0.5244 -0.8583 0.2709 0.0729 1.19E-03
0.8514 -0.4852 0.2450 0.0707 -6.83E-04
Undertake Singular Value Decomposition, and produce U, Σ and V
matrices:
0.3996 0.4069 -0.0106 -0.4788 -0.6446
-0.0087 0.6111 -0.0193 -0.2723 0.5095
0.5121 0.0975 -0.0650 -0.0338 0.3334
U = 0.5012 -0.0709 0.0100 0.3242 0.0021
0.3672 0.0819 0.5106 0.3225 0.0342
0.3106 0.0060 -0.5759 0.3167 0.0838
-0.2143 0.4959 -0.0291 0.2034 0.1862
-0.1680 0.2945 -0.4723 0.3823 -0.3398
-0.1462 0.3272 0.4230 0.4455 -0.2354
2.3915 0 0 0 0
0 2.0491 0 0 0
Σ = 0 0 1.5896 0 0
0 0 0 0.0876 0
0 0 0 0 0.00464
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-0.1579 0.2227 0.9620 0.0005 -0.0008
0.7656 -0.5876 0.2617 0.0114 -0.0006
V = 0.6210 0.7727 -0.0769 -0.1064 0.0066
0.0579 0.0895 -0.0117 0.9933 -0.0426
0.0013 0.0015 -0.0009 -0.0430 -0.9991
Therefore the √USSE’ Test Statistic, |(σ5 / d5 V55)| =
|0.00464/(0.00085*-0.9991)| = 5.46
which, as expected, is the same as the LSR √WSSE test statistic.
From Equation 10-4, [ Htls  etls ] =     - σ5 C-1U5 [VT15 VT55] D-1
1.87E-06 1.37E-06 -1.57E-05 1.44E-03 2.777
-1.50E-06 -1.10E-06 1.26E-05 -1.15E-03 -2.223
-9.86E-07 -7.23E-07 8.27E-06 -7.57E-04 -1.464
[ Htls  etls ]  = -6.48E-09 -4.75E-09 5.43E-08 -4.97E-06 -0.010
-1.04E-07 -7.65E-08 8.74E-07 -8.00E-05 -0.155
-2.62E-07 -1.92E-07 2.20E-06 -2.01E-04 -0.389
-6.02E-07 -4.42E-07 5.05E-06 -4.62E-04 -0.894
1.20E-06 8.79E-07 -1.01E-05 9.20E-04 1.779
8.56E-07 6.28E-07 -7.18E-06 6.58E-04 1.271
• ||Htls||F,, Frobenius Norm of Htls = 0.00235
• ||etls||, Vector Norm of etls = 4.533
Therefore, the H/e Test Statistic = 0.00235/4.533 = 5.18 x 10-4
11.3.3 Calculate the H/e Standard Deviation
The first step needs to be performed separately for each satellite in view.
Only a single example (for satellite GS20) is presented here.
164
• Produce a vector q, which is a null vector, except for the term relating
to the satellite in question, which is set to 20;
• Produce the Augmented Matrix C[Gq]D
0.0186 0.2368 1.2433 0.0886 2.15E-02
0.2526 -0.7601 0.9597 0.0875 0.00E+00
-0.2482 0.7932 0.9232 0.0870 0.00E+00
C[Gq]D = -0.2063 1.0075 0.6277 0.0843 0.00E+00
0.6795 0.7864 0.6094 0.0843 0.00E+00
-0.9952 0.3222 0.5383 0.0824 0.00E+00
0.2627 -1.0013 0.4687 0.0795 0.00E+00
-0.5244 -0.8583 0.2709 0.0729 0.00E+00
0.8514 -0.4852 0.2450 0.0707 0.00E+00
• Decompose using SVD and calculate H/e, as above. In this case
H/e = 0.00145
• This is the value of the test statistic for a 20m bias. The UERE for this
signal is 0.79m. Therefore, the 1σ expectation of H/e test statistic for
measurements on this signal = (0.00145 x 0.79) / 20 = 5.726 x 10-5.
• Repeat for all satellites in view, and arrange results as a vector:
Satellite 1σ H/e
GS20 5.726E-05
GS19 3.289E-05
GS1 4.087E-06
GS21 3.948E-05
GS2 3.895E-05
GS9 3.817E-05
GS12 2.477E-05
GS13 4.602E-05
GS11 5.340E-05
• Calculate the norm of this vector, = 1.204 x 10-4. This is the estimate
of the standard deviation of the H/e Test Statistic.
165
11.3.4 Calculate the Detection Thresholds
• Produce the H/e Test Statistic Characteristic, and calculate the slope
of the characteristic of the Critical Satellite (GS20). NB This can be
performed in parallel with the previous step by utilising the fact that
the vertical error induced by a 20m bias on observation i is equal to
K3i. Therefore the slope for GS20 = (20 x 1.0627)/0.00145 = 14,660.
This is the EIV Critical Characteristic.
• Identify the satellite on which the Backstop Threshold should be
applied. GSAS19 and GSAS1 both have H/e characteristics steeper
than that of GS20. Of these, GSAS19 has the steepest √USSE’
characteristic slope (equal to 0.758, as found above in the LSR
method)
H/e test stat Characteristic
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Figure 11-1: H/e Test Statistic for Worked Example
• The next step requires an iterative solution of Equation 10-13 and
Equation 10-14, using an appropriate numerical method. This is best
explained by stepping through the derived solution:
• Assume that the required probability of exceeding the √USSE’
Detection Threshold = 3.05 x 10-3;
• With 9 satellites in view, therefore 5 degrees of freedom, the square
root of the χ2 distribution at this probability is:
 √USSE’  Detection Threshold =4.233
• From the LSR method, Vslope(max),= 1.256. Therefore the component
of VPL that would derived from a threshold of 4.233 is:
√USSE’ VPL Component = 4.233 x 1.256 =  5.31 m
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• Because the √USSE’ characteristic slope of the Backstop satellite is
not very close to that of the Critical Satellite, assume that the
Backstop Threshold can be set to correspond to 1% of the desired
PFA, i.e. PBackstop  = 8 x 10-8. With 5 degrees of freedom, the Backstop
Threshold is calculated to be 6.43. Multiplying this by the √USSE’
characteristic slope of the Backstop satellite, 0.758, yields:
Backstop VPL Component = 4.88 m
• The probability of exceeding the H/e threshold is therefore required to
be (8 x 10-6 - 8 x 10-8) / 3.05 x 10-3 = 2.60 x 10-3.This equates to 3.01
standard deviations on a Half-Normal distribution;
• Given the H/e Test Statistic Standard Deviation = 1.204 x 10-4, the
Threshold associated with this probability is
H/e Detection Threshold = 1.204 x 10-4 x 3.01 = 3.624 x 10-4
• The component of VPL that would derived from this threshold of
4.233 is:
H/e VPL Component = 3.624 x 10-4x 14660 =  5.31 m.
Therefore, the system is balanced with a H/e Detection Threshold of
3.624 x 10-4, a √USSE’ Detection Threshold of 4.233 and a Backstop
Threshold of 6.43.
11.3.5 Calculate the EIV VPL
As with calculating the detection thresholds, setting the VPL is an
iterative process that is easiest demonstrated by starting with the
solution and working backwards.
• Assume that the Worst Case Bias on the Critical Satellite = 7.0m;
• Multiplying this by the k3i term for the critical satellite gives the vertical
error, in the absence of any noise on this or any other satellite, which
would be induced: 7.0 x 1.0627 = 7.439m;
• Given the √USSE’ Slope for this satellite = 1.256, the test statistic
that would be induced is 7.439 / 1.256 = 5.923;
• When noise is added to the signals, the residuals will have a non-
central χ2 distribution with non-centrality parameter λ equal to
5.9232 =  35.08
• With a √USSE’ Detection Threshold of 4.233, the χ2 test threshold is
4.2332 = 17.918;
• With 5 degrees of freedom, λ = 35.08 and x = 17.92, the probability of
a random sample have a test statistic less than the √USSE’ Detection
Threshold is 0.0183;
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• Given the required PMD of 0.0004, the VPL should be set such the
probability of exceeding the VPL limit with this applied bias
 = 0.0004 / 0.0183 = 0.0219;
• ki, the number of standard distributions associated with this
probability = 2.02;
• Given σv = 1.303 m, the component of VPL due to the missed
detection probability = 2.02 x 1.303 = 2.63;
• VPL for this bias is therefore 7.44 + 2.63 = 10.07m
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Figure 11-2 : Curve of VPL against Bias for a Fixed PMD
Figure 11-2 shows how results from repeating this process for a range of
values of bias, which confirms that the worst case bias in this example is
7.0m.
The VPL returned from this algorithm is therefore 10.07m.
Note that this is approximately 12% lower than the VPL calculated using
the LSR method.
Note also that with a 6m bias applied, the test statistics are 5.46 and
5.18 x 10-4 for √USSE’ and H/e respectively. These are both greater than
the calculated detection thresholds of 4.233 and 3.624 x 10-4
respectively, therefore in this example an alarm would be generated by
the EIV algorithm but not by the LSR algorithm, demonstrating the
improved detection capability of the EIV method.
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12. RAIM EXPERIMENTATION RESULTS
This section provides the results from the RAIM simulation
experimentation, under the following headings:
1. Service Volume Simulation Results,
• LSR and EIV RAIM algorithms
• Galileo only, with 10° mask angle;
• Galileo+GPS, with 10° mask angle;
• Galileo only, with 5° mask angle;
• Galileo+GPS, with 5° mask angle;
• Galileo SISA/IF integrity algorithm (WAAS equation, with three
critical satellites constraint).
2. Navigation Engine Simulation Results
3. Flight Trials Simulation Results
• LSR and EIV RAIM algorithms
• Response to Step Bias Feared Events;
• Response to Ramp Bias Feared Events;
• Response with Fault Detection and Exclusion incorporated.
12.1 Service Volume Simulation Results
Initial results from the SVS are presented in the following subsections.
The following parameters are common to all SVS runs reported in this
section:
• PFA = 8 x 10-6;
• PMD = 0.0004;
• Time Step = 2 mins;
• Time steps = 2160 (gives total of 72 hours repeat period);
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• Spatial Resolution = 2° in Latitude and 2° in Longitude.
UERE curves as below, shown graphically in Figure 12-1:
Elevation Angle (degrees) 5 10 15 20 30 40 50 60 90
GPS IIF (EUROCAE
Baseline) (m)
2.27 1.86 1.71 1.64 1.59 1.57 1.56 1.56 1.56
Galileo Test Case
Baseline (m)
1.66 1.14 0.96 0.88 0.83 0.81 0.8 0.79 0.79
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Figure 12-1 : Baseline GPS and Galileo UERE curves for RAIM
analysis
For combined Galileo+GPS constellation analysis, the constellations
have been configured such that the Galileo planes are co-planar with the
GPS planes. This configuration has been demonstrated to be the “worst
case” condition taken as a global average and when considering worst-
case locations.
For all charts in this section the key representing availability of Integrity
to the specified VAL is as presented below:
100% 99.9% - 100%
99.55% 99.5% - 99.9%
98% 97% - 99.5%
95% <97%
Figure 12-2 : Key (RAIM Availability Percentage) for SVS Output
Graphs
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The availability of RAIM Integrity, at the specified Vertical Alert Limit
(VAL) given the conditions specified above are presented in the following
sections. In each case, the availability has been calculated three times,
covering the cases of all satellites available, one satellite disabled, and
two satellites disabled. The state probabilities for these three cases differ
depending upon whether it is a Galileo-only case or a Galileo + GPS
case, as specified below:
All
satellites
available
One
disabled
Two
disabled
Galileo only 0.98 0.019 0.001
Galileo + GPS 0.96 0.038 0.002
Table 12-1 : Constellation State Probabilities
The availability results from each case are multiplied by the
corresponding state probability and then added together to give an
overall estimate of the availability of integrity.
For each Vertical Alert Limit used to evaluate availability, results are
presented under headings which have the following meanings:
• “Global Average, all OK” – This is the average availability of integrity
for the case with no satellites disabled. Note that this is a
geographically weighted average, i.e. it takes into account the
variation in the actual surface area associated with each spatial
measurement (because a 2° x 2° cell close to the equator covers a
much greater surface area than a 2° x 2° cell close to the poles);
• “Global Average, One Disabled” – Again, a weighted average, for the
case with one satellite removed from the simulation;
• “Global Average, Two Disabled” – Again, a weighted average, with
two satellites removed. For the combined constellation cases, this is
one GPS satellite and one Galileo satellite;
• “Consolidated Average” – This is the weighted average when the
three cases above are combined taking into account the appropriate
state probabilities;
• “Minimum Availability” – This is the lowest availability found in any
single cell, following consolidation of the three states. The Latitude
and Longitude of the central point of this cell is also specified;
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• “Minimum in ECAC” – This is the lowest availability found in any
single cell, above 30°N Latitude and below 75°N Latitude, following
consolidation of the three states. Note that Longitude limits have not
been taken into account, since the actual longitude of these results is
arbitrary (the constellation parameters have not been fixed relative to
any specified ground track).
12.1.1 Galileo Only, LSR RAIM, 10° Masking
Vertical Alert Limit 20m
Global Average, all OK 97.05%
Global Average, One
Disabled
90.73%
Global Average, Two
Disabled
83.29%
Consolidated Average 96.92%
Minimum Availability 86.47% 71S 141E
Minimum in ECAC 86.56%
Table 12-2 : Galileo only LSR RAIM Availability, 10° Mask
Figure 12-3 : Galileo only, LSR RAIM Availabilility, 10° Mask, 20m
VAL
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12.1.2 Galileo Only, EIV RAIM, 10° Masking
Vertical Alert Limit 20m
Global Average, all OK 99.75%
Global Average, One
Disabled
95.75%
Global Average, Two
Disabled
89.65%
Consolidated Average 99.67%
Minimum Availability 96.78% 28S 161W
Minimum in ECAC 97.99%
Table 12-3 : Galileo only EIV RAIM Availability, 10° Mask
Table 12-3 presents a particularly interesting result, in that the
Consolidated Average Availability for the EIV RAIM algorithm at 20m
VAL exceeds the availability requirement for the Galileo Safety of Life
Service, if the availability requirement is taken to be a global average. If
the specification is for the availability requirement to be met at the worst
user location (in this case at around 29°N) then the Galileo Safety of Life
Service specification cannot be met by EIV RAIM alone.
xxxxx
Figure 12-4: Galileo only, EIV RAIM Availability, 10° Mask, 20m VAL
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12.1.3 Galileo + GPS, LSR RAIM, 10° Masking
Vertical Alert Limit 20m 15m
Global Average, all OK 99.96% 97.89%
Global Average, One
Disabled
99.74% 95.95%
Global Average, Two
Disabled
99.59% 95.01%
Consolidated Average 99.95% 97.81%
Minimum Availability 97.48% 69N 135E 95.82% 71N 117E
Minimum in ECAC 97.48% 85.82%
Table 12-4 : Galileo+GPS LSR RAIM Availability, 10° Mask
Figure 12-5 : Galileo+GPS LSR RAIM Availability, 10° Mask, 20m
VAL
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Figure 12-6: Galileo+GPS LSR RAIM Availability, 10° Mask, 15m
VAL
12.1.4 Galileo + GPS, EIV RAIM, 10° Masking
Vertical Alert Limit 20m 15m 12m
Global Average, all OK 100% 99.89% 96.23%
Global Average, One
Disabled
99.98% 99.40% 92.89%
Global Average, Two
Disabled
99.93% 98.70% 90.38%
Consolidated Average 99.999% 99.87% 96.09%
Minimum Availability 99.78%
67S 65E
96.37% 71N
133E
80.97% 85S 13E
Minimum in ECAC 99.80% 96.37% 81.52%
Table 12-5 : Galileo+GPS EIV RAIM Availability, 10° Mask
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Figure 12-7: Galileo+GPS EIV RAIM Availability, 10° Mask, 15m VAL
Figure 12-8 : Galileo+GPS EIV RAIM Availability, 10° Mask, 12m VAL
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12.1.5 Galileo Only, LSR RAIM, 5° Masking
Vertical Alert Limit 20m 15m
Global Average, all OK 99.96% 91.30%
Global Average, One Disabled 98.07% 85.15%
Global Average, Two Disabled 94.16% 78.64%
Consolidated Average 99.92% 91.17%
Minimum Availability 98.55% 17S 31E 80.50% 71S 63W
Minimum in ECAC 99.36% 80.53%
Table 12-6 : Galileo only LSR RAIM Availability, 5° Mask
Figure 12-9 : Galileo only, LSR RAIM Availabilility, 5° Mask, 20m
VAL
12.1.6 Galileo Only, EIV RAIM, 5° Masking
Vertical Alert Limit 20m 15m
Global Average, all OK 100% 98.26%
Global Average, One Disabled 99.31% 94.73%
Global Average, Two Disabled 96.53% 89.0%
Consolidated Average 99.98% 98.19%
Minimum Availability 99.94% 23N 67E 91.82% 23N 23W
Minimum in ECAC 99.95% 95.21%
Table 12-7 : Galileo only EIV RAIM Availability, 5° Mask
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Figure 12-10 : Galileo only, EIV RAIM Availabilility, 5° Mask, 15m
VAL
12.1.7 Galileo + GPS, LSR RAIM, 5° Masking
Vertical Alert Limit 20m 15m 12m
Global Average, all
OK
100% 99.97% 95.77%
Global Average,
One Disabled
99.98% 99.69% 93.67%
Global Average,
Two Disabled
99.97% 99.45% 92.69%
Consolidated
Average
99.999% 99.95% 95.68%
Minimum
Availability
99.7% 67N
161E
97.88% 69N
139E
78.94% 73N
149W
Minimum in ECAC 99.7% 97.88% 78.94%
Table 12-8 : Galileo + GPS LSR RAIM Availability, 5° Mask
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Figure 12-11 : Galileo+GPS LSR RAIM Availability, 5° Mask, 15m
VAL
12.1.8 Galileo + GPS, EIV RAIM, 5° Masking
Vertical Alert Limit 20m 15m 12m
Global Average, all
OK
100% 100% 99.84%
Global Average,
One Disabled
100% 99.97% 99.46%
Global Average,
Two Disabled
100% 99.95% 99.21%
Consolidated
Average
100% 100% 99.83%
Minimum
Availability
100% 99.61% 71S
61E
96.56% 21N
109E
Minimum in ECAC 100% 99.7% 97.05%
Table 12-9 : Galileo + GPS EIV RAIM Availability, 5° Mask
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Figure 12-12 : Galileo+GPS EIV RAIM Availability, 5° Mask, 12m VAL
12.1.9 Galileo SISA/IF (WAAS Equation, 3 Critical Satellites), 10° Masking
This section provides results for a Service Volume Simulation performed
on an algorithm modelling a simplified form of the Galileo SISA/IF
availability function. In this case, availability is defined as:
VPL (calculated as 5.33 * σv, as per [15], referred to as the “WAAS
Equation”),
And
No more than 3 “Critical Satellites”, where such a satellite is defined as:
“If a satellite in view above the specified masking angle would, if
removed from navigation solution, cause the VPL to exceed the VAL it is
classified as a Critical Satellite”.
NB This is not the definitive Galileo SISA/IF availability algorithm;
however, it is the working assumption taken at the time of this
experimentation.
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Vertical Alert
Limit
20m 15m 12m
Global Average, all
OK
100% 99.93% 89.81%
Global Average,
One Disabled
99.84% 98.11% 85.95%
Global Average,
Two Disabled
97.95% 95.02% 80.88%
Consolidated
Average
99.99% 99.89% 89.72%
Minimum
Availability
99.97% 19N
115 E
97.89% 11N 7E 76.3% 23N 71E
Minimum in ECAC 99.98% 99.92% 78.07%
Table 12-10 : Galileo only SISA/IF Availability, 10° Mask
Figure 12-13 : Galileo only SISA/IF Availability, 10° Mask at 15m
VAL
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Figure 12-14 : Galileo only SISA/IF Availability, 10° Mask at 12m
VAL
12.2 Navigation Engine Simulation Results
This section presents two examples of the use of the Navigation Engine
Simulator (NavEng) to verify that the Errors in Variables RAIM algorithm
can meet the specified False Alarm and Missed Detection probabilities
whilst also yielding a lower VPL than that evaluated using standard LSR
RAIM.
The NavEng is a Monte Carlo simulation11. For each sample, a true
range and a pseudorange is generated for each satellite in view, with the
pseudorange error having a distribution defined by the relevant UERE
curve and calculated elevation angle. The RAIM algorithm calculates a
navigation solution and RAIM test statistics, and the navigation state is
updated accordingly.
NB This simulation models a fixed receiver, with a large number of
samples taking place with a fixed satellite geometry. It does not simulate
a trajectory or a fixed user with a moving constellation; instead it is used
to produce statistical data regarding the RAIM algorithm’s performance
for many samples of a fixed use case.
Two cases are described below:
                                           
11
 NB The “random” numbers used to generate noise in these simulations are taken from a list of
pseudorandom numbers which is reinitialised when the tool is loaded, therefore runs of different
cases can be performed using an identical set of “random noise” data.
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• Galileo only, 10° masking angle – corresponding to the standard
Galileo use case defined for GSTBv1 experimentation [45];
• Galileo + GPS, 5° masking angle – corresponding to the use case for
combined constellations specified in [43].
In both cases the geometry has been defined as that occurring at
Latitude 52° Longitude 0° Time 100 minutes, as defined within the
NavEng tool. This has been selected arbitrarily as the default values for
this tool, and has no particular significance (other than the location being
close to the location of the precision approach trials data used in the
Flight Trials simulation runs described in Section 12.3). For the Galileo-
only case, it also corresponds to the numerical example presented in
Section 11.
PFA has been set to 8 x 10-6 and PMD has been set to 0.0004, as
specified earlier in the discussion of SVS parameters. Runs are
performed with no applied bias (in order to demonstrate the false alarm
performance of the algorithms), and with an applied bias (in order to
demonstrate the missed detection performance of the algorithms).
The “No Bias” runs are performed with ten million samples. With this
specified PFA one would expect around 80 samples to generate false
alarms. If the assumptions regarding the underlying distributions of the
test statistics are correct, and if the thresholds are correctly set to
generate a false alarm probability of 8 x 10-6, using a binomial
distribution12 one would expect the number of alarms N generated in
such a simulation to be 62<N<97, with 95% probability.
Since the specified Missed Detection probability is far less stringent than
the false alarm constraint, fewer samples are required to provide a
statistically significant validation of this parameter. With PMD set to
0.0004, one million samples would be expected to generate around 400
missed detections, if a critical bias is applied. Again using a binomial
distribution analysis, one would expect 360<N<439 missed detections,
with 95% probability.
The UERE curves in both cases are as shown in Figure 12-1.
                                           
12
 Because the BINOMDIST function in MS Excel cannot handle probability values and sample
sizes of 8 x 10-6 and 1 x 107 respectively, an on-line resource was used to set these limits [55].
Using this tool it was found that for a cumulative binomial distribution probability of 2.5%, 62
alarms would be expected. Similarly, to set the 97.5% cumulative probability threshold, 97 alarms
would be expected. Therefore these values define the boundary of experimental values expected
with 95% probability.
183
12.2.1 Galileo Only, RAIM Results
12.2.1.1 Unbiased Case
 
Figure 12-15 : NavEng Run for Galileo Only, LSR RAIM, no Bias
This screenshot (Figure 12-15) from the NavEng tool shows the results
from a run with no bias, processed using the LSR RAIM algorithm. The
VPL is evaluated as 11.4m, and the number of false alarms is 76, which
matches well with the expectation of 80 alarms for the specified PFA and
sample size. This suggests that the tool provides a reasonable
simulation of the expected distribution of errors on each measurement,
by giving the expected central 2 distribution for the LSR test statistic.
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Figure 12-16 : NavEng Run for Galileo Only, EIV RAIM, no Bias
Figure 12-16 presents the same data processed using the EIV RAIM
algorithm. In this case the VPL is 10.1m (about 12% less than the LSR
VPL), and the number of false alarms is 69 (i.e. slightly fewer than the
LSR case, but still within the expected experimental limits).
Note that a false alarm is only generated when both detection thresholds
are exceeded. In this case there are 29,996 instances of the √USSE’
threshold being exceeded but the H/e statistic remaining below its
threshold, and 20,159 instances where H/e exceeds its threshold but no
alarm is generated because √USSE’ remains below limits. These values
are shown in the figure above.
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12.2.1.2 Biased Case
Figure 12-17 : NavEng Run for Galileo Only, LSR RAIM, with Bias
Figure 12-17 presents the Galileo-only case with a worst case bias
applied, processed using LSR RAIM. This figure shows that 4,726
samples had a navigation error that exceeded the VPL but which
generated a correct alarm (Good Detections) whilst 656 samples
exceeded the protection limit without an associated alarm (Missed
Detections). This value is higher than the expectation, and considerably
beyond experimental limits. This suggests that the standard LSR
algorithm under-estimates the vertical protection limit under certain
circumstances.
This is a very significant result that is worthy of further investigation, but
is beyond the scope of the current analysis. It is emphasised that the
result shown in Figure 12-17 is not an anomaly, but is a repeatable result
for this particular geometry case.
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Note that the bias applied in this case (7.6m on satellite GSAS 20) is
greater than the Critical Bias displayed in the NavEng tool control
window (6.616m), which is the Critical Bias for the LSR algorithm (i.e. the
bias which, if applied in the absence of any noise, would be just enough
to trigger the LSR RAIM alarm). The worst case bias is calculated
numerically, by evaluating the bias which, if applied to the critical
satellite, would have the largest probability of a sample having VNSE
exceeding the VPL and an LSR test statistic lower than the LSR
threshold. The Critical Bias is less than the worst case bias, and does
not, in general generate as many missed detections as the worst case
bias.
Figure 12-18 : NavEng Run for Galileo Only, EIV RAIM, with LSR
worst case Bias
Figure 12-18 shows the same data processed using the EIV algorithm.
As discussed above, the applied bias is the Worst Case Bias for the LSR
algorithm. In this case, the observed number of missed detections is
300, which is much lower than the number of missed detections using
LSR. This is as expected, since this applied bias is higher than the worst
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case bias for the EIV algorithm, causing more samples to fall into the
region of Good Detections for the EIV algorithm.
Figure 12-19: NavEng Run for Galileo Only, EIV RAIM, with EIV
worst case Bias
Figure 12-19 shows the performance of the EIV algorithm under the
worst case base for this algorithm. As discussed previously, this bias is
evaluated numerically, by finding the bias which when applied to the
critical satellite has a probability equal to PMD of any sample having a
VNSE larger than the VPL13, and simultaneously having either or both of
its test statistics below their specified threshold. This requires a
numerical convolution of a non-central 2 distribution (for the √USSE’ test
statistic) a half-normal distribution (for the H/e statistic) and a normal
distribution (for the vertical error distribution). Note that this bias is
smaller than the worst case bias for the LSR algorithm. This is not
surprising, since the detection threshold for the √USSE’ statistic is lower
                                           
13
 NB This is how VPL is set in the EIV algorithm, so the worst case bias is an artefact of the EIV
method, as demonstrated in Section 11.3.5 in  the numerical example.
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than the equivalent threshold for the LSR test statistic, therefore one
would expect the worst case bias for EIV to occur at a slightly lower
value than for LSR.
In this case, 406 missed detections were observed, which closely
matches the expectation of 400 given the specified PMD and sample size.
This suggests that the VPL calculated by the EIV algorithm correctly
represents the protection limit, given the specified missed detection
specification and the calculated detection thresholds.
12.2.2 Galileo + GPS, RAIM Results
12.2.2.1 Unbiased case
Figure 12-20 : NavEng Run for Galileo + GPS, LSR RAIM, no Bias
This screenshot (Figure 12-20) from the NavEng tool shows the results
from a run for Galileo + GPS with no bias, processed using the LSR
RAIM algorithm. The VPL is evaluated as 8.3m, and the number of false
alarms is 85, which matches well with the expectation of 80 alarms for
the specified PFA and sample size.
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Figure 12-21 : NavEng Run for Galileo + GPS, EIV RAIM, no Bias
Figure 12-21 presents the same data processed using the EIV RAIM
algorithm. In this case the VPL is 7.0m (about 18% less than the LSR
VPL), and the number of false alarms is 62 which is within the expected
experimental limits. Note that a false alarm is only generated when both
detection thresholds are exceeded. In this case there are 10,777
instances of the √USSE’ threshold being exceeded but the H/e statistic
remaining below its threshold, and 64,557 instances where H/e exceeds
its threshold but no alarm is generated because √USSE’ remains below
limits. These values are shown in the figure above.
This suggests that the EIV algorithm can provide a significantly lower
VPL than LSR RAIM, whilst maintaining the specified false alarm
specifications. It also suggests that the underlying assumptions
regarding the distribution of EIV test statistics (that the √USSE’ statistics
has a 2 distribution whilst the H/e distribution is half-normal) are
reasonable, since the detection rates closely match the expectations for
thresholds based upon these assumptions.
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12.2.2.2 Biased Case
Figure 12-22 : NavEng Run for Galileo + GPS, LSR RAIM, with Bias
Figure 12-22 presents the Galileo+GPS case with a worst case bias
applied, processed using LSR RAIM. This figure shows that 80 samples
exceeded the protection limit without an associated alarm (Missed
Detections). This value is considerably lower than the expectation, and
well outside experimental limits.
This suggests that in cases with a large number of satellites in view (as
is the case with combined constellations), the LSR algorithm may
significantly overestimate the VPL.
Figure 12-23 demonstrates an interesting shortcoming with the LSR
method when used with a combined constellation. It appears that with a
large number of satellites in view some satellites contribute more to
increasing the required detection threshold (because each additional
satellite in view adds a degree of freedom that increases the threshold
for a 2 test statistic), than it does to improving the accuracy of the
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position solution. These satellites are seen to be those which have the
lowest slopes on the LSR RAIM test statistic characteristic (identified
under the heading “slope” in the NavEng tool lower window). Although
the VPL calculated in the case above is found to be 8.30m, it can be
seen in Figure 12-23 that by disabling the four satellites with the lowest
values of “slope” (GSAS 12, and GPS2, GPS13 and GPS17), and hence
reducing the degree to which the system is overdetermined, the VPL
calculated by the LSR algorithm actually decreases by about 2.5%, to
8.1m. In this case, for the same applied bias as was used to generate
Figure 12-22, the number of missed detections has increased to 154.
This is still well within the PMD specifications.
This demonstrates that the LSR algorithm is not optimal when used with
large numbers of satellites in view, and that it can be improved simply by
including a routine to select some subset of the satellites in view for
calculation of RAIM integrity.
Figure 12-23 : NavEng Run, LSR RAIM, with Bias and satellites
disabled
Note that this effect of apparently improving VPL as satellites are
removed from the RAIM processing does not appear to occur with the
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EIV algorithm, which suggests that EIV is closer to an optimal RAIM
solution than the LSR method. In fact for the case shown in Figure 12-23
the EIV RAIM VPL is increased from 7.04m to 7.14m, with an
incremental increase as each satellite is disabled.
Finally in this section, Figure 12-24 shows the output from the navigation
engine simulator for the combined GPS + Galileo constellation using EIV
RAIM, with the EIV worst case bias applied. This demonstrates a Missed
Detection rate of 373 samples out of one million, which is within the
expected 95% experimental bounds.
Figure 12-24 : NavEng Run for Galileo + GPS, EIV RAIM, with Bias
These results appear to demonstrate that the EIV RAIM algorithm
provides a significantly lower VPL than the LSR RAIM algorithm, whilst
also meeting the missed detection and false alarm specifications. They
also demonstrate that the EIV algorithm appears to be closer to an
optimal algorithm for VPL than the commonly implemented LSR method.
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12.3 Flight Trials Simulation Results
This section presents the results from Matlab-based Flight Trials
simulations. The following plots are based on a simulation of a combined
Galileo/GPS constellation, being used to provide RAIM-based integrity to
an airborne receiver whilst the aircraft is undertaking a final approach to
land.
Each plot presents a series of traces which are explained in the
accompanying text. The bottom trace in all cases represents the “Alarm
State” for the RAIM algorithm, represented numerically. The values
plotted have the following meanings:
• Alarm State = 0 means Nominal Operations – Vertical Error is
below VPL, and the RAIM algorithm has not declared an alarm;
• Alarm State = 1 means False Alarm – Vertical Error is below VPL,
but the RAIM algorithm has declared an alarm;
• Alarm State = 2 means Good Detection – Vertical Error is above
VPL, and the RAIM algorithm has correctly declared an alarm;
• Alarm State = 3 means Missed Detection – Vertical Error is above
VPL, but the RAIM algorithm has not declared an alarm. This is
clearly undesirable.
The following parameters are used to configure the simulation:
• PFA = 8 x 10-6;
• PMD = 0.0004;
• Masking Angle = 5°;
• Undeclared offset between Galileo and GPS system time14 = 5
nanoseconds;
• 1-sigma OD&TS Error for Galileo = 0.715 m (65cm, plus 10%
margin);
• 1-sigma OD&TS Error for GPS = 1.5 m.
                                           
14
 It is expected that some mechanism would be available to disseminate the time offset between
Galileo and GPS system times, either broadcast through either of the systems or provided from
some other source. However, for the purpose of these simulations it is assumed that there will
always be some residual time offset error not completely accounted for in this broadcast offset,
and that this error has a maximum value of 5 ns [48].
194
• UERE curves as below, shown graphically in Figure 12-1.
NB Each simulated satellite has been given a “true” almanac and a
“broadcast” almanac. This allows for Orbit Determination & Time
Synchronisation (OD&TS) errors to be modelled for each satellite, as
components of its clock offset, semi-major axis, inclination, right
ascension of ascending node (RAAN) and mean anomaly. The values of
each of these components were randomly selected from a distribution
which would yield an overall OD&TS ranging error component of about
0.72 m (0.6m clock error and 0.4 m due to errors in semi-major axis,
inclination, RAAN and mean anomaly) for Galileo and 1.5 m (0.8m
random clock and 1.25m in position) for GPS IIF [54]. Once set, these
OD&TS errors remain fixed for all simulation runs.
The simulation is performed with 1 second epochs. The precise receiver-
to-satellite geometry is determined by the data file which is used to
provide the simulated aircraft trajectory in the simulation. Note that the
true position of the receiver has been extracted from actual instrumented
flight trials data provided by NATS; this trajectory represents a genuine
precision approach into Boscombe Down airfield by a BAC 1-11 aircraft.
In the cases presented, the start time is exactly 50,000 seconds after
midnight (i.e. 13:53:20). At this instant the receiver has a location (on
WGS-84 coordinates) of 51.198161N -1.665454E 527.6572m Altitude.
The satellite positions are readily determined by propagating the orbits
defined in Section 7.2 (i.e. take the epoch at which the orbits are defined
as being midnight on the day of the flight trial, and propagate them
forward by 50,000 seconds to find their positions at the start of the
analysis).
At each epoch an “environmental” component of UERE (tropospheric,
ionospheric, multipath, receiver additive white gaussian noise),
consistent with the UERE curve, taking into account the OD&TS
component already modelled, is added to each ranging measurement.
This “environmental” component is produced by setting a randomly
selected Zenith Tropospheric Delay (ZTD, which is fixed for all epochs),
from which individual tropospheric delays are calculated as a function of
elevation angle. To the tropospheric component is added (vector sum)
ionospheric delay, multipath jitter, and AWGN receiver noise. These
components, other than the tropospheric component, are therefore
treated as being uncorrelated between epochs.
A Pseudorange Vector is then produced at each epoch by adding the
satellite clock error, receiver clock error and environmental noise error to
the true distance from the user to each satellite. As and when required, a
bias representing a Feared Event is also added to this vector. This
Pseudorange Vector is used by simulated receiver algorithms which use
unfiltered Least Squares algorithms to estimate the user position, and
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various test RAIM algorithms to detect the occurrence of these Feared
Events.
12.3.1 LSR RAIM, Step Bias
Figure 12-25 demonstrates the ability of the LSR RAIM algorithm to
detect a step bias. A step bias is initiated 60 seconds into the simulation
(approximately 60 seconds before touchdown of the simulated aircraft).
The bias has a ranging error magnitude of 12 m, is held for 21 seconds
and then released completely. It is applied to the Critical Satellite, i.e. the
satellite which has the steepest LSR RAIM characteristic at that epoch.
No FDE is used, i.e. satellites are NOT excluded on detection of an
alarm condition.
Figure 12-25 : LSR RAIM Response to Step Bias
The top trace show how the Vertical Navigation System Error (VNSE)
responds to this step bias, with VNSE fluctuating  around the VPL
calculated by the LSR RAIM algorithm.
The second trace shows how the user receiver clock error responds to
this step bias. The 12m ranging error effectively increases the user clock
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error by around 4m. Note that in this case the user clock is updated on
an epoch-by-epoch “snapshot”, i.e. there is no filtering of the user clock.
Note also that the clock update comes from the least squares position
and timing solution derived from the combined Galileo/GPS
measurements. As a result, this trace shows the user clock error
demonstrates a step function similar to the VNSE (and the input bias
function).
The third plot shows the simulated true altitude of the receiver during the
two-minute simulation period. Note that the true position of the receiver
has been extracted from actual instrumented flight trials data provided by
NATS; this trajectory represents a genuine precision approach into
Boscombe Down airfield by a BAC 1-11 aircraft.
The fourth plot shows how the LSR Test Statistic responds to this step
bias. The statistic rises above the detection threshold at the same as the
VNSE rises.
The bottom plot shows the alarm state derived from the LSR RAIM
algorithm. The numerical state values have the meanings defined in
Section 12.3. For the majority of the run the state has a value of 0,
meaning nominal operations. However, when the bias is applied the
alarm state varies between one and two, which shows that the RAIM is
triggered for the entire duration of the applied bias, and the state
fluctuates between False Alarm and Good Detection as the VNSE
fluctuates relative to the VPL.
12.3.2 EIV RAIM, Step Bias, Snapshot User Clock
Figure 12-26 demonstrates the ability of the EIV RAIM algorithm to
detect a step bias. Conditions are as defined in the previous section.
197
Figure 12-26 : EIV RAIM Response to Step Bias
The top trace show how the VNSE responds to this step bias, with VNSE
fluctuating around the VPL calculated by the LSR RAIM algorithm, and
above the VPL calculated by the EIV algorithm. Note that the VPL
calculated by EIV RAIM is approximately 2m lower than the LSR RAIM
VPL.
The second trace shows the clock error for the user clock used by this
implementation of the EIV algorithm. In this case it is identical to that
shown previously for the LSR method.
The third trace shows the EIV √USSE’ Test Statistic15 (labelled “EIV1”)
and its relation to the primary detection threshold for this statistic, and
the Backstop threshold. As expected, this trace has the same
characteristic as the LSR RAIM test statistic. As a reminder at this point,
in the EIV algorithm an alarm is generated if the Backstop threshold is
exceeded by √USSE’, regardless of the status of the H/e test statistic,
                                           
15
 Note that in order to avoid confusion with the √WSSE statistic used for weighted Least Squares
RAIM, the √USSE’ test statistic is labelled “EIV1” in all of these plots.
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although the standard process is for √USSE’ and H/e both to exceed
their corresponding thresholds for an alarm to be generated.
The fourth trace shows the EIV “H/e” Test Statistic and its relation to the
detection threshold for this statistic, and demonstrates a very important
feature of the EIV algorithm. Unlike the √USSE’ statistic that remains
above its threshold for the duration that the Feared Event is active, this
statistic exceeds its detection threshold in this period on three short
periods only:
• At the start of the FE, when the bias is applied and the VNSE and
clock error both rise rapidly;
• At the end of the FE, when the bias is removed and the VNSE and
clock error both drop rapidly;
• At one other point between these events, due to random noise
fluctuations, which can be seen to be correlated with a small peak in
VNSE.
The bottom trace shows that the alarm status is nominal outside of the
FE start and stop times, and set to a value of two (“Good Detection”) for
the duration of the FE. Note that this detection is due to √USSE’
exceeding the Backstop threshold. If the Backstop were not employed
the EIV algorithm would detect the FE only at the points at which H/e
exceeds its threshold. The observations in between these spikes would
be Missed Detections.
In this case, as a result of the satellite geometry, the Backstop is quite
close to the √USSE’ threshold, so it is unlikely that an FE would occur
that exceeds the √USSE’ threshold only. However, in general there may
be cases in which the Backstop is significantly higher than the √USSE’
threshold. In this case, the behaviour of the H/e Test Statistic shown
above would be unacceptable, as this could easily lead to Hazardous
Misleading Information.
The following section presents an approach to mitigating this problem.
12.3.3 EIV RAIM, Step Bias, Filtered User Clock
Figure 12-27 repeats the case discussed above, but this time with a filter
applied to the use clock such that user time is taken to be an unweighted
average of the last fifty one-second epochs.
The traces are identical to those shown in Figure 12-26 except the
second trace demonstrates how the user clock has been smoothed by
this filter (the decay in the first 50 seconds is settling time for this filter
from its initial state) and the fourth trace shows that in this case H/e more
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closely follows the VNSE and input Feared Event functions. In this case
the EIV RAIM algorithm would correctly detect the step bias Feared
Event even if the Backstop threshold were not exceeded.
Figure 12-27 : EIV RAIM response to Step Bias, with Filtered Clock
12.3.4 LSR RAIM, Ramp Bias
Figure 12-28 demonstrates the ability of the LSR RAIM algorithm to
detect a ramping bias. A ramp bias is initiated 60 seconds into the
simulation (approximately 60 seconds before touchdown of the simulated
aircraft), on the critical satellite. The bias increases at a rate of 1 m/s,
and lasts for 12 seconds. It is held for 10 seconds and then released
completely. No FDE is used, i.e. satellites are NOT excluded on
detection of an alarm condition.
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Figure 12-28 : LSR RAIM Response to Ramp Bias
These traces show how VNSE, clock error and LSR Test Statistic ramp
up as the bias is applied and held. As expected, the RAIM algorithm
detects the FE before the VPL is exceeded, and maintains that detection
throughout the duration of the FE.
12.3.5 EIV RAIM, Ramp Bias, Snapshot User Clock
Figure 12-29 shows the same Ramp Bias case as for Figure 12-28, as
processed by the EIV algorithm with a snapshot user clock approach.
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Figure 12-29 : EIV RAIM Response to Ramp Bias
The point to note here is demonstrated by the fourth trace, in which the
H/e Test Statistic is fluctuating around its detection threshold. In
particular note that this statistic does not appear to react to the applied
bias in any prominent way, except for the point where the bias is
removed (as a step function), where the H/e trace displays a sharp
spike.
Although there are no missed detection in this case, this is entirely due
to the backstop threshold providing the required integrity.
These plots suggest that for Feared Events with an increasing bias
(which provide the characteristics against which current RAIM receivers
for aeronautical applications are defined [56]) the EIV algorithm in itself
would not be acceptable, if a snapshot approach is used to update the
user receiver clock.
12.3.6 EIV RAIM, Ramp Bias, Filtered User Clock
Figure 12-30 shows the same Ramp Bias case as for Figure 12-28, as
processed by the EIV algorithm with a filtered user clock approach. As
with the Step Bias case, these plots suggest that applying a simple filter
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to the user clock allows the H/e Test Statistic to more closely trace the
characteristic of the input FE and applied noise.
Figure 12-30 : EIV RAIM Response to Ramp Bias (Filtered Clock)
12.3.7 EIV RAIM, Ramp Bias, System-Switchable User Clock
Figure 12-31 represents a similar analysis to that shown in Figure 12-30,
but using an alternative approach to mitigate the effect of the Feared
Event contaminating the user clock estimate, and hence causing the H/e
test statistic not to track the VNSE. This technique is referred to as the
“System-Switchable User Clock” technique, and it takes advantage of
the fact that when using combined Galileo and GPS constellations for
RAIM, each system can provide an independent estimate of the user
clock error. It is therefore possible to provide user clock error estimates
based on Galileo-only, GPS-only and combined system measurements
simultaneously. In the event of a Feared Event occurring, these three
measurements will diverge in some way. By providing some thresholds
for this divergence it is relatively simple to set up some switching logic
such that the user clock is slaved to one of these three update sources
at any time.
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Figure 12-31 : EIV RAIM Response to Ramp Bias (Switchable Clock)
In Figure 12-31 a system has been modelled in which the user clock is
nominally updated by the clock error estimate coming from the combined
GPS/Galileo navigation solution. However, the clock error estimate from
GPS-only and Galileo-only solutions are compared at every epoch, and if
these disagree by more than twice σT then16 the Executive Clock
becomes either the GPS or Galileo-slaved clock, depending upon which
is closer to the previous clock error estimate.
Figure 12-32 demonstrates the activity of this Executive Clock selection
function. Before the start of the Feared Event the clock update estimate
derived from Galileo alone is very close to the estimate from the
combined constellation (i.e. the clock estimate is dominated by the
Galileo satellites in view). As the bias ramp begins to take effect (which
in this case occurs on a particular Galileo satellite which is the dominant
satellite for both vertical accuracy and user clock estimate), the Galileo
and combined system clock estimates begin to diverge from the GPS-
only estimate.
                                           
16
 where σT is the standard deviation of the time accuracy from the combined system, derived
from the 4th element of the diagonal of the Dilution of Precision matrix, analogous to σV discussed
previously.
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At some critical point, relatively early in the rise of the VNSE, the two
single-system clock estimates diverge beyond the set threshold, and
GPS time is selected as the Executive Clock to update the user clock.
This is shown by the trace labelled “Executive” being superimposed on
the GPS trace from approximately 65 seconds into this graph, as shown
by the arrow.
 
Figure 12-32 : Selection of Executive Clock
This technique appears to provide an alternative to filtering as a method
for overcoming the shortcoming in the EIV method regarding user clock
contamination due to a biased measurement. However it is only
applicable for use with a combined constellation – the System-
Switchable User Clock technique cannot be used for Galileo-only
applications.
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12.3.8 EIV RAIM, Ramp Bias, Ideal Clock
Figure 12-33 : EIV RAIM Response to Ramp Bias (Ideal Clock)
Figure 12-33 represents a similar analysis to that shown in Figure 12-30,
but using an alternative approach to mitigate the effect of the Feared
Event contaminating the user clock estimate, and hence causing the H/e
test statistic not to track the VNSE. Instead of relying on clock filtering or
the use of two independent systems whose time references can be
compared, this technique assumes that a user has a clock which is
sufficiently stable that it can be held fixed for the duration of the final
approach, without any clock updates from the navigation solutions. With
recent advances in atomic clock technology, rubidium atomic frequency
standard (RAFS) clocks of size, weight and cost applicable to avionics
applications are now becoming available. By using such a clock as part
of the Galileo/GPS receiver and holding the clock during the approach, it
appears to be possible to use the EIV algorithm in a way which allows
H/e to track the VNSE even more closely than with either the filtered
clock or system-switchable clock methods.
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12.3.9 EIV RAIM, Step Bias, with FDE
The cases analysed previously have all assumed that no Fault Detection
and Exclusion (FDE) algorithms are employed. Figure 12-34 presents
the results for the EIV RAIM with unfiltered clock response to a step
function (the same Step FE used in previous cases), but in this case a
simple FDE algorithm has been used. When the RAIM algorithm
generates an alarm, an FDE subroutine is called which calculates the
LSR RAIM test statistic for every case with one of the satellites in view
excluded (i.e. with 17 satellites in view 17 values of test statistic are
evaluated). It is assumed that the satellite which has been excluded in
the case which produced the lowest value of LSR RAIM test statistic is
the satellite on which the bias causing the alarm to be generated is
applied. The broadcast almanac for this satellite is then set to “Not Use”,
and it is excluded from the rest of the run.
Figure 12-34 : EIV RAIM response to Step Bias, with FDE Active
The point at which the satellite is excluded is clearly indicated by the
increase in VPL for both LSR and EIV RAIM methods in the uppermost
plot. As soon as the satellite is excluded the √USSE’ and H/e test
statistics both return to normal levels from their spikes at the time of
alarm.
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12.3.10 EIV RAIM, Ramp Bias, with FDE
Figure 12-35 presents the results for the EIV RAIM with unfiltered clock
response to a ramp function (the same Ramp FE used in previous
cases), with the FDE subroutine described in the previous section
applied. This shows similar characteristics to the Step function response
discussed previously, but in this case the FDE subroutine and RAIM
have clearly been triggered by the √USSE’ statistics exceeding the
Backstop threshold. With no filtering of the clock the H/e statistic does
not appear to register the occurrence of the ramp Feared Event.
Figure 12-35 : EIV RAIM response to Ramp Bias, with FDE Active
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13. DISCUSSION
This section discusses the results from the RAIM study presented in the
previous section, and attempts to integrate these results with the
conclusions from the Integrity Justification study.
13.1 Service Volume Performance
The results in Section 12.1 demonstrate the following main points:
1. If Galileo is used alone, with a 10° masking angle and standard Least
Squares Residuals RAIM, the minimum availability of RAIM integrity
to a Vertical Alert Limit of 20m is about 86%. This is far short of the
availability requirement of 99.5% specified for the Galileo Safety of
Life Service (SoL).
2. If instead the EIV algorithm is used, worst case availability is about
97%. However, the global weighted average availability is about
99.8%. Since the loss of RAIM availability (“RAIM Holes”) is entirely
deterministic (i.e. the presence of a RAIM hole over a destination
airfield may be predicted at the time of filing a flight plan) it may be
possible to make a case that weighted average availability greater
than 99.5% is sufficient to meet the SoL specifications.
3. There is often a significant difference between weighted average
availability and worst case availability, and for the Galileo-only cases
this worst case availability often occurs in tropical regions, well away
from the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) region.
Constraining the Galileo design such that the performance availability
specifications must be met at the worst location globally, rather than
as a global average, may significantly increase the difficulty of the
task, possibly with little benefit. It is recommended that the impact
that the current definition of availability will have on the Galileo
element performance specifications should be identified as a matter
of urgency.
4. Using the EIV algorithm with Galileo only, the availability of RAIM at
the worst user location is estimated to be around 99.95% for a 20m
VAL, if a masking angle of 5° is used. This would meet the SoL
specifications if the masking angle is taken to correspond to the
recommendations of the EUROCAE Galileo Working Group, rather
than the 10° constraint used in the standard Galileo use case.
5. The minimum masking angle therefore has a very significant impact
on the overall availability of integrity. It is recommended that the
impact that the current definition of masking angle will have on the
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Galileo element performance specifications should be identified as a
matter of urgency. In particular, for the Galileo SoL service whose
specification is closely aligned with the requirements for aviation
precision approach, the justification for using a more demanding
masking angle than that usually specified by the aviation community
should be very well justified, given the impact that this constraint may
have on Galileo system design.
6. When considering Galileo + GPS combined constellation
performance, the additional level of over-determination of the
navigation solution provides a very significant improvement in RAIM
availability.
7. With a 10° masking angle, a combined constellation system using
EIV RAIM should easily exceed the specifications for the SoL service
(99.8% availability at the worst user location, for a 20m VAL);
8. With a 5° masking angle, Cat I performance may be considered, with
worst case availability to 15m VAL of 99.6%, and global average
availability to 12m VAL of 99.8%.
9. The SISA/IF system, assuming the constraint of no more than 3
critical satellites is applied for integrity to be available, should easily
meet the specifications for the SoL service at the worst user location.
However, the worst case availability to 15m VAL of around 97%
suggests that it might be quite difficult to improve the system to the
point where it might be considered for Cat I globally. However, within
ECAC Cat I levels may be achievable, since the drop-off in
availability at 15m VAL occurs in a very narrow equatorial band.
10. For all the Galileo-only analyses, the availability of integrity drops off
significantly when considering the states with one and two disabled
satellites. This is especially true for the SISA/IF case, where the
reduction in the number of satellites in view is made worse by the
constraint of having no more than three critical satellites in the
navigation solution. This makes the results presented for the Galileo-
only cases quite sensitive to the assumptions made regarding the
state probabilities for one and two satellite disabled cases. The
current assumption of 0.98 state probability for all satellites operating
translates into an average downtime per operational satellite of about
6 hours per year. Although the SISA/IF performance to 20m VAL has
sufficient margin that the SoL specification should be met even if the
average Galileo downtime is significantly higher than this, the validity
of the other Galileo-only performances discussed above should be
treated with care. However, the Galileo + GPS case results are
relatively insensitive to the state probabilities applied for single and
double satellite outage cases.
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13.2 Navigation Engine Performance
The Navigation Engine tool has provided a useful method for
demonstrating that the EIV algorithm gives an improved VPL compared
with LSR RAIM, whilst simultaneously confirming that the assumptions
made in developing the EIV algorithm are valid. Specifically, the EIV
algorithm assumes:
• The Total Least Squares position solution can be manipulated to
yield two test statistics, √USSE’ and H/e, that are independent of
each other, and that each have a linear relationship with vertical
navigation system error;
• When the C matrix in the EIV method is correctly configured, the
√USSE’ test statistic has a χ2 distribution and hence detection
thresholds can be set using a similar approach to that for LSR RAIM;
• When the D matrix in the EIV method is correctly configured, the H/e
statistic has a half-normal distribution;
• The standard deviation of this half-normal distribution can be readily
evaluated based on the characteristics of the H/e statistic.
The results for the EIV algorithm from the NavEng tool have all been
entirely consistent with these assumptions.
In all cases examined the false alarm rate has been consistent with the
specification, which suggests that the thresholds on the two test statistics
have been set correctly, which in turn implies that the underlying
distributions of these statistics have been correctly modelled. This has
been demonstrated to be true even at the very low probability levels
required to demonstrate RAIM algorithms, by using simulation runs with
107 samples, against a PFA of 8 x 10-6.  
The detection capability for a step bias has been clearly demonstrated,
with a missed detection performance consistent with the specification.
Since the EIV VPL is evaluated by using a numerical method to find the
worst case bias, given the assumed distributions of the test statistics and
the vertical navigation system error, any flaws in the assumptions
regarding these distributions would be readily apparent. As it stands, the
results match expectations very closely.
The performance of the LSR RAIM algorithms show two interesting
features:
1. Under certain conditions, the LSR algorithm appears to
underestimate, the VPL, in that a worst case bias can be found that
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can be applied to significantly exceed the specified missed detection
requirement;
2. Under certain conditions (in particular with a large number of
satellites in view, some of which are relatively close together from the
perspective of the user) the VPL evaluated by the RAIM algorithm
can be improved by removing some of these satellites from the
navigation solution. This is because they add little to the accuracy of
the navigation solution, but increase the required detection threshold,
and hence the VPL.
Thus it is quite easy to demonstrate that the LSR algorithm is less than
optimal and that, therefore, there is merit in investigating more
sophisticated RAIM algorithms, such as EIV.
13.3 Flight Trials Simulation Performance
The results from the Matlab Flight Trials simulations provide a useful
addition to the NavEng experimentation. In particular, these runs
enabled the following points to be validated:
• The performance of the LSR and EIV algorithms when dealing with
signals in which the components of OD&TS error, tropospheric error
and other environmental error are modelled separately, rather than
just as a combined noise source with a normal distribution;
• The performance of these algorithms with a combined GPS/Galileo
constellation on which there is some undeclared system clock offset;
• The performance of these algorithms with step and ramp feared
events.
The main result arising from this phase of experimentation is that the EIV
algorithm cannot be treated as a “snapshot” RAIM algorithm in the same
way as LSR.
With the LSR algorithm, the magnitude of the RAIM test statistic is not
affected by a bias in the user clock. Since such a bias applies a common
error to each received measurement, the magnitude of the bias does not
affect the magnitude of the range residuals. Therefore, the magnitude of
an LSR test statistic depends entirely on the consistency of the received
measurements, and is independent of the user model (i.e. the accuracy
of the user linearisation point and clock bias).
EIV RAIM, on the other hand, is very much dependent upon the user
model, since the H/e test statistic is a measure of the ratio of changes
that are made to the user model compared with the range residuals. An
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initial clock bias at the time of initiation of a Feared Event will therefore
affect the ability of the RAIM algorithm to detect errors.
This manifests itself differently with a ramp bias compared with a step
bias feared event.
With a step bias feared event, assuming that before its application the
system was operating nominally and so the user clock has no
outstanding bias, the H/e test statistic initially detects the bias in the
same was as the LSR test statistic. However, if the system does not use
Fault Detection and Exclusion, so the biased measurement is not
immediately rejected, the effect of this step error will be to add some bias
to the user clock estimate. This will effect the user model used at the
next epoch by the EIV algorithm, so that whilst the bias is sustained the
H/e component of the EIV algorithm no longer detects a problem. The
test statistic then drops away back to normal levels, and so the normal
H/e component response to a step bias is a short spike at the time of
application, and again on removal of the bias. This is shown very clearly
in Figure 12-26.
With a ramping error feared event, the effect is more insidious. Because
the clock error increases gradually, epoch by epoch, the H/e test statistic
of the EIV algorithm may not detect the change in the user model at all.
This is shown clearly in Figure 12-29, where the ability of the EIV
algorithm to detect the feared event is due entirely to the Backstop
threshold on the√USSE’ test statistic, whilst the H/e statistic shows no
indication of the presence of a bias until the bias is removed as a step
function.
In fact, although we have only discussed the effect of errors in the clock
estimate on the response of the H/e statistic, in theory the EIV algorithm
is sensitive to any errors in the user model, the amount depending upon
the terms in the D matrix and hence the extent to which the “H” term is
allowed to admit errors in the user model in each dimension.
This puts a significant restriction on the use of EIV for RAIM: in effect,
the EIV RAIM algorithm is only useful for detecting faults occurring in a
given epoch, if the linearization point derived from the previous epoch is
known to be “good”.
Because of this feature of the EIV algorithm, great care must be used in
its implementation. However, as was seen in Figure 10-4 and Figure
10-5, simulations using the Navigation Engine suggest that there is little
or no correlation between lateral errors and H/e test statistic, whereas
there is a very strong correlation between vertical error and H/e.
In theory, the techniques demonstrated for controlling the contamination
of clock error should be adequate to protect against vertical errors in the
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linearization point as well. The reason for this is similar to the argument
illustrated by Figure 10-3, which shows how changes in the vertical
component of the linearization point manifests itself differently in the
pseudorange errors to different satellites, depending upon their
elevation.  If one considers for example a receiver with a 10m bias in its
estimate of clock error, this would have a fairly small impact on the
estimate of lateral position, because the error would appear in
measurements from a variety of directions in azimuth, yet it would have a
significant impact on vertical error, since all measurements come from
above the user. As a result, clock error and vertical error are closely
linked. Therefore, in theory, as long as the clock error component of the
user model is managed to prevent it being contaminated by ramping
biases, the EIV algorithm should be useable as a valid RAIM technique
to protect vertical position solutions derived from a standard least
squares fit algorithm.
Three different techniques have been demonstrated to show that the EIV
algorithm can be used as a powerful RAIM system, as long as measures
are taken to prevent the clock error component of the user model being
contaminated by the feared event which the RAIM algorithm is intended
to protect against. These methods are:
• Use some form of clock filtering technique, such that the user clock
estimate used by the EIV algorithm is not updated on an epoch-by-
epoch basis, but is instead updated with some filtered estimate of the
clock error, with a time constant sufficiently long that it would enable
the detection of any proscribed ramping bias;
• Use some form of selective switching technique, such that the
consistency of clock state estimates are compared using different
sources, and some logic is applied as to which source becomes the
“Executive Clock” in the event that the sources diverge beyond some
set limits. The most obvious example of this is where Galileo and
GPS are used together, so that a user has two independent clock
error estimates, along with one combined navigation solution
estimate, which can be compared against the user clock. This
technique appears to provide quite strong defence against
contamination of the user clock estimate, and hence would be a good
solution for combined GPS/Galileo RAIM implementations;
• Use a very stable clock such as an avionics-grade RAFS as part of
the receiver equipment, and use a clock-coasting mode when
entering phases of flight requiring high integrity, such as precision
approach. Such a technique would require some significant
safeguards to ensure that the clock state is not corrupted in the
moments before entering clock-coasting mode, but offers the solution
with the best overall performance.
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One additional benefit of using the latter approach is that when clock
coasting, the navigation equations could be modified to solve for just the
three unknowns of spatial position. This would yield a solution with a
smaller σv and one more degree of freedom, and hence one would
expect an improvement in the VPL that would be evaluated in these
circumstances. This is an interesting point, but is beyond the scope of
the current research activity.
13.4 Comments on the Physical Implementation of the EIV Method
At this point it was worth returning to the analytical treatment of the EIV
method presented earlier to gain more understanding of what the H/e
statistic represents. These terms were introduced in Equation 10-1 as:
y = (G + H) . x + e
From which we can make the expansion
Hix  = Hi1x1 + Hi2x2 + Hi3x3 + Hi4x4
Thus the perturbation matrix H operates on the difference between the
actual position/time state and the linearization point. If the pseudorange
on observation on the ith observation has a significant bias then the
above components of H can be used to cancel out this bias in the TLS
position solution. The greater the size of the components of x the smaller
the components of H need to be to achieve the same effect, since the
corrected bias is the product of H and x.
In Section 10.2 it was stated that the objective function to be minimised
is ||C[He]D||. From the descriptions of the C and D matrices discussed
earlier it is seen that this objective function F can be expanded as
follows:
F = ||C[He]D||F
= 
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Thus, the σi terms normalise the contributions corresponding to each
satellite’s pseudorange measurement, and the dj terms weight each
component of the vector containing offset (three position components
and clock) and pseudorange residual. Therefore, if dj is small the
corresponding components of the vector contribute little to the cos
function F, and the solution will permit relatively large values of Hij or ei
as appropriate. Conversely, if dj is large then that component of the
vectors will probably dominate the cost function, and so will be tightly
minimised.
When discussing setting the D matrix in Section 10.3.2 it was shown that
for our purposes we choose to use a matrix in which the first three terms
have a unity value, the fourth term has a value some two orders of
magnitude reduced, and the fifth term is reduced by 5 or 6 orders of
magnitude on unity. These values minimise the components of H
corresponding to position offsets, allow moderate values for clock offset,
and admit a large amount of latitude for the residuals.
By setting the terms of the D matrix in this way we are implicitly
recognising the following points:
1. Clock errors and height errors are very closely linked. As mentioned
above and by referring back to Figure 10-3 it can be seen that a clock
bias is very similar moving the antenna along the vertical axis, in
terms of the impact on the pseudorange measurements. A clock bias
adds or subtracts the same amount to each pseudorange, while
moving the antenna vertically changes the pseudorange in the same
direction, but not equally. Hence there is a very strong correlation
between the “clock” and “up” error states;
2. Because of the relatively high drift rate in the type of crystal oscillator
typically used in GNSS receivers, errors in the linearization point are
likely to be dominated by the clock component;
3.  For aviation precision approach, vertical protection is more
demanding than lateral protection, therefore we wish to optimise the
algorithm for vertical protection.
Based on the argument developed above for the effects of the weighting
matrices on the EIV solution, ||H|| will be dominated by the Hi4 values
(corresponding to the receiver clock offset), whilst ||e|| will be almost
equal to the norm of the least squares residuals vector. Because of the
minimisation used the values of Hi4 obtained will depend on the values of
d4 and x4.
Thus the sensitivity of the EIV method to errors in the clock component
of the linearization point is related to the value chosen for the d4 term.
This suggest that a larger (i.e. closer to unity) value for this term would
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make the algorithm less sensitive to clock errors, but would also make
the H/e statistic less useful as a RAIM statistic. Conversely, making the
d4 term even smaller would admit larger values of clock offset into the
value of ||H||, potentially making the H/e statistic more sensitive, but also
making the task of managing the errors in the linearization point more
difficult. In practice the values to be used in tuning the D matrix would
need to be set based upon parameters such as the drift rate of the
receiver’s clock and the method being used to manage the receive clock
estimate for the linearization point.
The approach taken to setting the D matrix in this thesis has effectively
“tuned” the process to make a RAIM algorithm sensitive to clock errors,
and has then taken advantage of the correlation between clock error and
vertical error to use the algorithm for vertical protection during precision
approach. It should be noted that this was not a deliberate process when
undertaking the simulation trials described earlier; This understanding of
the relationship between the terms of the D matrix and the sensitivity to
errors in the linearization point has arisen from analysis of the results of
the simulations.
Therefore, although the EIV method has been shown to offer significant
improvements compared with LSR RAIM when evaluated in a strictly
defined simulation environment, a great deal of practical experimentation
would be required to show that the shortcomings previously discussed
can be suitable managed. In the previous section it was stated that the
EIV RAIM algorithm is only useful for detecting faults occurring in a given
epoch, if the linearization point derived from the previous epoch is known
to be “good”. How “good” this has to be depends upon issues such as
the drift rate of the receiver clock, the dynamics of the receiver (such as
the rate of change of vertical position) and effects of filtering in the
receiver on both clock and position. These effects will place constraints
on the errors in the linearization point that the EIV algorithm would have
to deal with from epoch to epoch.
13.5 RAIM in the Context a of Global Integrity Service
The results from the Integrity Justification Study and the RAIM Study can
be summarised in the following two statements:
1. The Galileo Integrity Determination System will cost much more to
develop, deploy and operate than it is ever likely to recoup in
commercial revenues, therefore its inclusion in the Galileo system
architecture cannot be justified on commercial grounds;
2. Given the predicted future performance of Galileo and GPS free to air
signals, RAIM algorithms will offer users an integrity monitoring
capability at least as good as that from the Galileo IDS.
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Although the demonstration of these points is adequate to meet the
objectives of this thesis as presented in the problem statement at
Section 1.3, a number of other questions have arisen in the course of
this work that deserve some brief discussion, to provide a context for
these conclusions.
13.5.1 Context of Galileo Integrity Service
Over the duration of the research activities leading to this thesis the case
against the inclusion of an Integrity service in the Galileo system has
grown significantly; indeed, in February 2004 the Chief Engineer of the
UK’s National Air Traffic Services (NATS) stated publicly [57] that the
operators of the US WAAS system and the Japanese MSAS system
intend to provide integrity for Galileo through their own systems, at a
stroke taking away a large fraction of the previously assumed market for
Galileo integrity services. Furthermore, progress continues to be made
on other regional augmentation systems, in Australia and India for
example, further weakening the potential market for a global integrity
service. Yet, at the time of writing, the Galileo Joint Undertaking, the
quasi-Governmental body responsible for taking the Galileo programme
from public to private operational management, remains committed to
specifying a Safety of Life service and an encrypted integrity-based
Commercial Service in the Galileo high-level system requirements.
The Galileo Working Group of the European Organization for Civil
Aviation Equipment Manufacturers (EUROCAE) has also undertaken a
number of studies [58] into possible concepts for operations for the use
of Galileo to assist aviation precision approach. It is interesting to note
that these studies consistently note the potential for a combined
GPS/Galileo RAIM system as a backup integrity barrier, yet equally
consistently reject the notion of using RAIM as an alternative to the
Galileo IDS. One could postulate a number of reasons for this
resistance, from an unwillingness to knock down one of the pillars on
which Galileo was “sold” to politicians, to the commercial self interest of
certain companies involved in these discussions, to a more human,
instinctive unwillingness to conclude that airborne avionics can be
entrusted with determining the integrity of a navigation position solution
during final approach.
The author believes that a perfectly sound concept of operations is
possible using RAIM, in conjunction with GPS and space-based
augmentation systems other than the Galileo IDS. If we consider an
environment in which EGNOS, WAAS and MSAS are all providing an
integrity service for both GPS and Galileo, a suitably equipped user
could have integrity adequate for precision approach, given any two from
three from GPS, Galileo and SBAS. If either GNSS (GPS or Galileo)
were for any reason unavailable integrity would still be provided by the
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other system through SBAS. If SBAS were unavailable, the two GNSS
would provide adequate integrity through RAIM, as demonstrated in this
thesis. This should provide sufficient redundancy for even the most
demanding safety of life user groups, without the need for a Galileo IDS.
The sticking point in such discussions is the possibility that some feared
events may exist which RAIM cannot protect against. There may
potentially be some failure mode for Galileo which can cause hazardous
misleading information to an airborne receiver, whilst not generating a
RAIM alarm. Examples of such failure modes are difficult to come by, but
they cannot be dismissed out of hand. The author’s response to this
argument is that it doesn’t make sense to build an expensive IDS at this
stage of the programme, to protect against unknown failure modes. It
would be wiser to develop and deploy the Galileo system without in-built
integrity, and add an integrity system at some later point, when the
behaviour of the system is better characterised. This would have the
additional benefit of shifting the capital expenditure for this aspect to the
programme much closer to the point at which revenues might be
expected, hence improving the internal rate of return on the programme,
as discussed in the Integrity Justification Study.
13.5.2 Time To Alarm – A Problem for Galileo
In Section 5.6.2 a brief discussion of the constraint that the Time to
Alarm (TTA) requirement puts on the Galileo IDS was presented. Over
the duration of the development of this thesis it has become apparent
that the TTA specification is arguably the single biggest cost driver on
Galileo, as currently defined. Indeed, the entire system architecture has
effectively been driven by this single requirement.
As currently defined, the Galileo satellites have no inter-satellite links. In
order for the ground segment to communicate with any satellite, direct
contact has to be established between the satellite and an uplink station.
Had inter-satellite links been employed then it would be possible to use
any satellite in contact with the ground as a relay, so that telemetry,
telecommand and, in particular, navigation data messages could be
passed up and down using the satellites themselves as a
communications network. The use of links was discussed early in the
system engineering phase of Galileo, and rejected on the grounds that it
would be too difficult to ensure that the 6 second TTA requirement could
always be met with such an architecture.
As a result, the Galileo architecture now includes a network of around 30
Uplink Stations used exclusively for uplinking navigation and integrity
data messages to the satellites in the constellation (which is entirely
distinct from the network of telemetry, tracking and commanding stations
used for spacecraft monitoring and control), along with a high integrity,
high speed mission data network linking all of these stations to two hot
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redundant control centres. This complex and costly “Mission Segment” is
driven entirely by the 6 second TTA requirement. Without this
requirement there is little doubt that the early trade-offs on Galileo would
have included inter-satellite links (as is the case for the GPS satellites
currently being launched to replenish the constellation) in the baseline
architecture, and greatly simplified the Mission Segment.
Yet although TTA has such a profound impact on the design of Galileo’s
IDS, for RAIM it is almost irrelevant. It is inconceivable that a receiver
using RAIM would struggle to meet a 6 second TTA. This point hasn’t
been analysed in this thesis – it is very difficult to demonstrate, and adds
little value to testing the problem statement – but it should be considered
in any discussions regarding the future evolution of the Galileo system.
13.5.3 RAIM as a Solution to the Integrity Problem
The introduction to this thesis referred to the often observed
phenomenon that if there is a way to get a useful service for free,
somebody will find a way to get it. In this context, the “useful service” is
the high-integrity navigation solution, and the way to get it “for free” is by
using RAIM.
This provides two kinds of problem: Firstly, for the Galileo system
designers, the Galileo and GPS free-to-air signals will “cannibalise” their
market, which affects the business case for development of the IDS, as
previously discussed. Secondly, it provides a problem for developers of
RAIM algorithms – specifically, how to have their algorithm accepted by
the user community and, ideally, how to make money from the process.
This thesis has concentrated on aviation precision approach as the
target audience for the integrity systems under comparison. One
important feature of the aviation market that is worthy of note is that all
air navigation systems must be based on accepted standards, and all
such standards must be in the public domain. This means that it is
impossible for any individual or organisation to patent a new RAIM
algorithm, get it accepted as a new international standard for airborne
GNSS receivers, and hold a monopoly on the rights for its use.
At present the LSR RAIM algorithm is enshrined within ICAO standards
as the standard RAIM algorithm to be used, where RAIM is applicable
(i.e. as a backup to SBAS, for detecting local errors). For EIV, or any
other better-performing RAIM method to usurp LSR as the designated
standard would take an enormous amount of work, be it analytical,
experimental and even political in terms of the lobbying that is required
to make such a fundamental change to ICAO standards. Without some
underlying business case, nobody is likely to take up this battle.
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13.5.4 Further Development of EIV
This then leaves us in a position in which we have demonstrated a new
RAIM algorithm which appears to provide significantly better
performance than the LSR method, and which provides a strong
argument against the further development and deployment of the Galileo
IDS. However, EIV has some significant weaknesses, in that it needs to
be used as part of an integrated system to protect against gradually
ramping biases, perhaps using stable on board clocks, barometric aiding
or inertial sensors. This takes it away from being a true RAIM algorithm
and is more properly an “Assisted Autonomous Integrity Monitoring”
(AAIM) method.
The author expects the integration of navigation systems with other
sensors to be a major area for growth in the coming years, both in
academic circles and for commercial applications. Given the barriers
mentioned above to the commercial exploitation of a new RAIM
algorithm through international standards, perhaps the most promising
route to developing a business case for EIV is through the development
of some integrated sensor suite, incorporating the principles of EIV RAIM
in some way.
13.5.5 The Future for the Galileo IDS
At the time of writing, as Europe prepares to enter the Full Development,
Initial Deployment and Initial Operations (Phase C/D/E1) Phase of
Galileo, the Safety of Life Service remains within the service
requirements for the system, and hence the IDS (more accurately, the
Integrity components of the Galileo Mission Segment) remain enshrined
in the system architecture. Unsurprisingly, the estimated costs to
complete the programme continue to climb, mainly in the area of the
Mission Segment, and the integrity requirements continue to provide the
greatest technical challenges.
Yet there is still no evidence that the market drivers for high-integrity
navigation solutions, such as the airlines, actually want the solution
being offered by Galileo.
The consortia putting together their bids to operate Galileo under a
public/private partnership will no doubt undertake their own detailed cost
benefit analyses and, it is hoped, will propose system architectures
which best meet the requirements of the market for Galileo services. A
comparison of the conclusions of these analyses with those presented
within this thesis offers an opportunity to assess how well the problem
statement has been addressed. This will be the “acid test” for the
arguments presented in this thesis.
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14. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
14.1 Conclusions
The first part of this thesis, the Integrity Justification Study, demonstrates
that the inclusion of a ground-based integrity system in Galileo is
incompatible with the desire to fund the deployment and operation of
Galileo through private investment. For safety-of-life and other users that
require a certified, high-availability integrity signal, the existence of
EGNOS, WAAS and other overlay systems will restrict the market for
Galileo integrity-based services such that there is no viable business
case for significant private investment. Based on the results and
conclusions from this study, the Integrity Determination System as
currently specified adds considerable cost to the Galileo programme, but
offers no obvious benefit. Regardless of any other conclusions from this
study concerning likely RAIM performance, one should question the
arguments to commit well over one billion Euros on a system which
would not meet Cat I precision approach requirements, and offers little
over WAAS and EGNOS.
The second part of this thesis, the RAIM Study, demonstrates that the
performance that can be expected from Galileo receivers using
autonomous integrity monitoring techniques is broadly equivalent to that
currently defined for the Galileo safety-of-life service. Furthermore, when
GPS and Galileo signals are combined, the performance may approach
that required for aviation Category 1 precision approach, i.e. significantly
better than that intended for the Galileo Safety of Life service.
A novel RAIM algorithm, based on a Total Least Squares (TLS) solution
of the navigation problem linear equations, under certain, well-controlled
conditions, offers potentially better performance that the standard Least
Squares approach. This improvement is possible because the TLS
approach provides two apparently uncorrelated RAIM test statistics.
Because each test statistic has the necessary characteristic of
increasing in proportion to the applied bias (and hence to the induced
vertical positioning error) it is possible to set a fault detection logic based
on detection thresholds for both statistics being simultaneously
exceeded. This allows lower detection thresholds for a given false alarm
probability than for the standard Least Squares RAIM approach, which in
turn leads to significantly improved RAIM availability. However, this novel
approach also has significant issues regarding the its physical
implementation, making it more likely to be used as part of an Assisted
Autonomous Integrity Monitoring system, rather than pure RAIM,
therefore the comparison with Least Squares RAIM is not entirely fair.
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If Galileo and GPS provide dual frequency free-to-air signals with
ranging error performances as currently predicted, professional and
safety-of-life users may be able to exceed IDS integrity specifications
using RAIM. This has a significant impact on the case for private
investment in Galileo; given the expected performance from a combined
free signal constellation, the scope for the Galileo operator to raise
revenues by selling access to encrypted parts of the navigation message
is doubtful.
14.2 Recommendations for Further Research
This thesis attempts to consider a commercial question, regarding the
value for money offered to investors in Galileo by developing an integrity
determination system, and a more detailed technical evaluation of a
novel RAIM algorithm. As a result, there is a danger of it falling between
two stools, being neither a complete cost/benefit analysis for the Integrity
system nor a rigorous evaluation of the EIV RAIM technique. At each
stage of the analysis a number of questions have arisen which, although
both relevant and interesting, have been deemed to be out of scope for
this research, in order to keep the thesis within reasonable bounds. This
section attempts to highlight those questions for which additional
research would provide useful complementary results to this thesis.
Perhaps the most obvious direction for additional research is in the
formal definition of the Errors in Variables RAIM algorithm. This thesis
has shown that both of the test statistics derived for the EIV method
appear to be directly proportional to applied biases, and hence have a
linear relationship with vertical position error. Furthermore, the
underlying statistical distributions for these test statistics resemble very
well known functions, thus making the task of setting detection
thresholds and calculating protection limits relatively simple.
These statements are made based on the results from simulations.
Although a logical process is presented in this thesis which builds on the
paper which first introduced the EIV method [30], to cover the case
where observations are weighted according to their assumed variances,
the conclusion that the H/e test statistic follows a half-normal distribution
is driven by the results of Monte Carlo simulations, rather than by a
rigorous mathematical analysis. It is recommended that further research
is undertaken into the mathematical principles underlying the EIV
method, ideally by someone with a stronger grounding in linear algebra
and statistics than the author of this thesis. In particular, the methods
used for setting the terms in the D matrix described in this thesis would
benefit from more rigorous analysis.
An additional area of research, perhaps for someone seeking to make an
operational implementation of the EIV algorithm, is to consider how best
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to manage the user clock in an EIV-enabled receiver, to mitigate the
problems discussed previously regarding detection of ramping errors if
the user clock is unfiltered. Recent advances in rubidium atomic
frequency standards (RAFS) mean that atomic clocks with exceptional
short-term stability are, or soon may be, sufficiently small, cheap and
robust to be considered for avionics applications. It is conceivable that
an EIV RAIM receiver using such a clock would be able to “clock coast”
for the duration of the terminal approach phase of flight, and in this time
the navigation receiver would have to solve for three unknowns, instead
of the four unknowns solved for presently. This would simultaneously
improve the accuracy of the navigation solution, and provide an
additional degree of freedom for the RAIM algorithm to be used in
assessing integrity.
Alternatively, there is scope for significant research into the opportunities
offered through Galileo and GPS having independent timing references.
This was shown to provide an elegant solution to the problem of avoiding
contamination of the user clock estimate as required by the EIV
algorithm; a user of a combined Galileo/GPS constellation can at any
time compare the receiver clock estimate against a Galileo-only solution,
a GPS-only solution and a combined constellation solution. By providing
rules for the actions to be taken if the consistency between these
measurements exceeds specified limits, it is conceivable that this may
lead to alternative approaches to combined system RAIM. Inevitably
there will be other applications which can be exploited by taking
advantage of this property, and this is likely to be a fruitful area of
research.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, there remains a major
requirement for the business case for the Integrity functions within
Galileo to be analysed dispassionately and for the system architecture
and deployment schedules to be revised accordingly.
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APPENDIX A SAMPLE RESULTS FROM GALSAS STUDY
The following sections present abridged reports from three interviews
(out of seventeen conducted by the author) undertaken as part of
the “Structural Analysis of the European Satellite Navigation Applications
Segment” study, discussed in Section 3.2.
A.1 UK Civil Aviation Authority - Safety Requirements Group
Interviewed in June 2000.
Profile of the organisation
The role of the Safety Requirements Group (SRG) within the UK Civil
Aviation Authority is to set the safety standards for all aspects of civil
aviation, and ensure that they are maintained. The Group's operating
costs are met entirely from charges on the industry. Unlike many
countries, there is no direct Government funding for the Group’s work.
Current GNSS activities
 “All navigation aids fail: it’s a question of whether or not they fail with
integrity.” – Initial results from joint studies with the University of Leeds
suggest that GPS provides a relatively consistent service, but it has
occasionally suffered insidious failures which limit the scope for its
widespread approval as a navigation aid.
To date, UKCAA has approved GPS for use as a component of
navigation systems in civil aircraft for the following applications:
• Basic Area Navigation (B-RNAV17);
• North Atlantic crossings (to replace Omega);
• North Sea helicopters (to replace Decca Navigator).
Safety Regulatory view of GNSS
In order to approve an Air Traffic Service, the CAA SRG is required to
certify the entire structure that supports this service, such as the safety
management system, equipment specification, etc. This UK legal safety
regulatory function cannot be discharged for GPS, because of its nature
as a system owned and operated by the US DoD.
                                           
17
 B(asic)-RNAV defines European Area Navigation (RNAV) operations which satisfy a required
track keeping accuracy of ± 5 NM for at least 95% of the flight time. This level of navigation
accuracy is comparable with that which can be achieved by conventional navigation techniques.
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However, the CAA are keen to emphasise that GPS is not treated as an
Air Traffic Service (and neither will be EGNOS or Galileo); as it only
forms part of an approved integrated navigation system (e.g. airfield,
lighting, airspace, procedures, etc.). For example, GNSS alone as a
signal in space cannot in itself be treated as a replacement or alternative
to fully approved Air Traffic Services such as Instrument Landing System
(ILS).
It is proposed that EGNOS will be represented by a single authority
which possesses legal personality (i.e. a focal point which accepts
liability, accepts safety management and channels issues such as cost
recovery). This facilitates the approval of EGNOS as a common
European component for use in the air traffic services of States.
EGNOS augments the performance of GPS to achieve suitability for
some aviation navigation purposes.  However, as GPS is an un-
approved component, it cannot be assured that all potentially
catastrophic GPS anomalies can be mitigated.
However, subject to performance demands GPS can be approved,
unaugmented by SBAS (e.g. EGNOS), for use in non-terminal phases of
flight, and that EGNOS opens opportunities in the precision and non-
precision landing phase of flight (e.g. Cat I landings) which have the
potential for approval as part of a total Air Traffic Service.
It is also conceivable that a safety regulatory approach could be
accepted for GPS (without breaching US sovereign and military
sensitivities) which could result in the CAA accepting a higher degree of
reliance on GPS in aviation despite the inability to discharge legal
powers of approval (NB This is a personal opinion of the interviewee, not
necessarily the official view of the UK CAA).
The UK CAA’s position on the removal of GPS Selective Availability is
that it makes no difference to the use of GPS as a navigation aid. Even
with SA on, GPS meets the positioning requirements for non-terminal
phases (e.g. B-RNAV). Furthermore, the removal of selective availability
has no impact on GPS availability and integrity, the main safety related
characteristics of GPS which effectively drive UK CAA policy.
Future use of GNSS
The CAA expect GPS to be increasingly included as part of integrated
navigation systems in civil aviation, and over time the number of areas in
which it will be approved for use will increase beyond the three currently
listed by the UK CAA (see above).
The introduction of EGNOS will add terminal and approach phases to the
areas which may be approved for use. From the point of view of the UK
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CAA, EGNOS will meet their user community’s requirements; Galileo, as
presently promoted, does not add anything of value from a safety
regulatory perspective. Although Galileo has the potential to permit full
safety regulatory visibility (e.g. failure modes), it does not represent an
Air Traffic Service, and can only be used as part of an integrated system
(and hence offers negligible advantage over EGNOS).
The alleged benefits of independent GNSS constellations are potentially
flawed as this presupposes that both are approved or at least accepted
by safety regulatory authorities. For example GPS, unaugmented,
cannot currently be regarded as an independent component providing
full redundancy to Galileo for purposes for which it cannot be approved.
This not the case where GPS is augmented by EGNOS, where the
benefits of independence are only maintained by maintaining concurrent
use EGNOS and Galileo.  It is only in these circumstances where there
is great potential to reduce (or even eliminate) the requirement for
traditional ground based navigation aids (over a relatively long period of
time, to enable an orderly transition process to a wholly satellite-based
navigation system).
The current plan to make the Safety Access Service on Galileo an
encrypted, “pay-to-use” signal, is unlikely to be supported by the aviation
community because it introduces a set of unnecessary risks and failure
modes into a safety critical service. Given that GPS augmented by
EGNOS will offer a high integrity signal fulfilling a number of civil aviation
navigation purposes with a free-to-air signal, acceptance of a restricted
access signal on Galileo could be a major stumbling block.
Apart from airborne applications, there is a clear market for GNSS
receivers on airfield support vehicles – a market which will increase both
in size and importance as the number of aircraft movements increases.
GNSS Policy issues
GPS currently has a significant advantage over Galileo in that the
regulations defined by the US Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) are
almost always ahead of the regulations from the CAA and JAA, to the
extent that many JAA regulations are effectively FAA regulations with
new covers and cosmetic changes.
GPS is now regarded as a mature system, with ICAO Standards and
Recommended Practices (SARPS) in place for its internationally
interoperable use as a navigation aid, including the use of space and
ground based augmentation systems. In order for Galileo to be readily
accepted into the civil aviation community there needs to be agreement
on the international compatibility and interoperability of Galileo and GPS.
This effort must be co-ordinated at ICAO level and at equipment level
through standards making bodies such as the Radio Technical
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Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) and the European Organisation For
Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE).
Reference was made to a paper by Joe Fee of the FAA outlining
personal views on the value of Galileo and GPS together to the aviation
community, which includes the following statement:
“First of all there should be agreement on the compatibility and
interoperability of the two systems. Once this is agreed, joint
action could be taken immediately to extend the existing ICAO
standards for Galileo. This effort must be co-ordinated with
development of equipment standards from RTCA/EUROCAE and
certification from the JAA/FAA in the same time frame.
These parallel efforts must be initiated in the near future if the
practical use of GNSS-2 is to occur within the next two decades.
If the GNSS-2 providers agree to common standards at an early
stage of development and work together towards their
implementation, the standards process can be dramatically
shortened.”
It is felt that at the moment EUROCAE, as a voluntary organisation with
no power to set mandatory equipment standards, is powerless to prevent
GPS from being accepted as the de facto standard for GNSS in aviation
applications. The concern is that as advanced standards are introduced
in the US that refer explicitly to GPS rather than to a generic GNSS,
these will be taken up as European and international standards, which
will present hurdles for Galileo when it is ready for introduction as a
navigation system.
Conclusions
The UK CAA regard the Galileo programme as “not sufficiently user
driven”. Based on their current understanding of the system, Galileo in
itself does not offer any significant safety regulatory advantages over
GPS with EGNOS and other augmentation systems;
• However, Galileo in conjunction with GPS/EGNOS would provide a
redundant, independent GNSS, which does offer the opportunity for
greater reliance on GNSS (and, potentially, a scaling down in
terrestrial navigation aids);
• There is a significant concern about the use of “controlled access
signals” on Galileo. Encryption of navigation signals, possibly with a
“pay-to-use” mechanism for the decryption key, adds a number of
failure modes and other complications to a safety-critical service
which the aviation community is unlikely to support – especially given
that the GPS/EGNOS signal will be free-to-air;
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• There is a danger that GPS and augmented-GPS based navigation
systems will become de facto international standards, through the
way JAA and EUROCAE standards and regulations tend to follow
behind equivalent American bodies. This could present a significant
delay to the acceptance of Galileo by the aviation community, and in
order to mitigate this risk European delegates to ICAO should ensure
that as regulations are developed for the use of GPS, these should
be extended to include Galileo at the same time.
A.2 BT Cellnet
Interviewed in May 2000.
Profile of the Company
“BT Cellnet, the Mobile Internet market leader, is the UK's fastest
growing Mobile Internet company. Today it has over 7 million customers
using its voice services and 600,000 ISP subscribers to its Genie
Internet Mobile Internet service. Wholly owned by BT plc, the company is
driving beyond the boundaries of voice communication to lead the Mobile
Internet revolution. BT Cellnet launched the UK's first Mobile Internet
Service Provider, Genie Internet in 1999, and will be the first to introduce
the new generation of very high-speed mobile data services using
GPRS, or General Packet Radio Services, in Summer 2000.”
Since 1998 Cellnet have offered “Traffic Line”, their first Location Service
which offers users traffic information relevant to their location, which is
evaluated from the users cell identification.
As from June 2000 Cellnet will offer their “Locator” service. Based on
GSM cell and sector identification to estimate the user’s location, this
offers position accuracy of about 200m in major conurbation, degrading
to up to 25 km in rural areas. Using the “Locator” service, users will be
able to access information regarding the nearest facility chosen from a
menu, e.g. restaurants, automatic bank teller machines, fuel stations,
etc. “Traffic Line” will continue to be supported, as a subset of “Locator”.
Competitive Environment
Within the UK BT Cellnet are one of four mobile telephone operators (the
others being Vodafone, Orange and One2One) who, along with NTL,
have also been awarded licenses to operated the new 3G
telecommunications systems. All operators have plans to offer Location
Services in the near future.
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Market Data
BT Cellnet’s interest in the satnav market is limited to its potential for use
in providing Wireless Location Services. The recent report from Strategis
Group Europe was discussed, and the market projections showing
around 100 Million users of cellular systems for location-based
information by 2002/2003 in Europe, rising to over 200 Million by 2005,
matched their own assessments.
Technology
BT Labs, the technology arm of BT plc, are currently undertaking studies
regarding the various positioning technologies that may be used to
support Wireless Location Services. Until the recent decision by the US
to turn off GPS Selective Availability the focus of efforts had been on
terrestrial base station triangulation techniques, although various forms
of DGPS were also being evaluated. With SA off, the 10m accuracy
offered by unaugmented GPS is regarded as sufficiently accurate to
meet all foreseeable needs for Wireless Location Services, and GPS (or
some other GNSS) is being seriously considered as the positioning
technology for future services.
The technology on which their current location services are based (cell
and sector identification) offer very poor positioning accuracy away from
built-up areas, and in cities during peak times the cell switching
techniques used to smooth cell loadings often lead to sudden jumps in
the reported position of the user (as the cell identification changes).
However, they offer better in-building performance than GPS, do not
suffer “canyoning” in built up areas to the same extent as GPS, do not
require any additional hardware, and have little effect on the battery life
of the user terminal.
Some GSM handsets with built-in GPS receivers are now coming on to
the market, and BT Cellnet are evaluating the performance of these
items to determine the viability of GPS/GNSS as a technology to meet
their needs.
In addition, it is envisaged that by around 2004 broadband 3G mobile
telephones will have a significant market, and the current expectation is
that such systems will have an inherent position location capability with
an accuracy of at least 20m. The technology on which this will be based
is not yet decided.
Market trends and factors
The recent proliferation in Wireless Access Protocol (WAP) enabled
mobile phones has led to great interest in the ability of networks to
provide information to mobile users which is relevant to their location. To
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some extent the network operators such as BT Cellnet are being driven
by a customer expectation that cellular systems can determine user
location to much greater accuracy than is currently possible.
Cellnet believe that “E911”-type legislation for the localisation of callers
of emergency numbers may be introduced by around 2003, and the
accuracy required by this legislation will have a major impact on the
positioning technology to be used.
Cellnet also estimate that by 2003 the majority of mobile telephones sold
in the UK will have a location capability with an accuracy possibly driven
by the “E911” legislation. If GPS/GNSS becomes the de facto standard
for Wireless Location Services, required accuracy would be of the order
of about 10m. The system is expected to provide location information to
the user, and also to send this information on request to the network.
Ideally, the network should be able to poll a user terminal in idle mode, to
determine its location, and forward this data to other authorised users.
For example, it is envisaged that by dialling the number of a mobile
phone, preceded by some service code, it would be possible to see that
the target user is on the second floor of the HMV store in Oxford Street.
In order to become a standard feature in future mobile telephones a
position location technology needs to:
• add little cost and size to the terminal;
• have no recurring licensing cost;
• work well in built-up areas;
• have little impact on battery life;
• be capable of estimating position within 20/30 seconds of switch-on;
• be capable of being “pinged” by the network for its location, ideally
from within idle mode, and replying within 20/30 seconds;
• provide location information that can be readily translated into inputs
for various location service applications;
• be compatible with the requirements for any “E911”-type legislation.
Market reaction to the introduction of GALILEO
The current timescales for the introduction of Galileo is far too distant to
come into the strategic plans of BT Cellnet. At the moment it is not yet
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decided if satnav will be a major component of their plans for Wireless
Location Services. The decision to turn off GPS SA has certainly been
very influential, and there is a good chance that GPS receivers will be
standard features in high-end mobile telephones within the next
two/three years.
If GPS does become the de facto standard, Galileo will have to be
completely compatible with GPS in order for it to be used by mobile
telephone networks. The better availability offered by the Galileo
constellation would make it better suited to urban users of mobile
phones, but this is likely to be limited to the Open Access Service. The
positioning accuracy of GPS meets all foreseen requirements for cellular
users, and the other Galileo features of integrity and continuity of service
are not seen as offering any marketing advantage over GPS.
It is unlikely that networks such as BT Cellnet would be interested in
implementing a location service which requires decryption of the
Controlled Access signal and/or payment of recurring licensing costs.
Conclusions
• Operators of cellular telephone networks in the UK see a large
market for Wireless Location Services, which require some position
technology to be either built into the network, or into the handset
itself;
• Wireless Location Services now being introduced are based on
network infrastructure (i.e. do not use satnav). With SA off, GPS
offers a significant improvement in the accuracy available;
• Network operators see 10m accuracy as the limit for their
requirements;
• The major growth period for this market is expected to be from 2002
to 2005;
• Although the better urban performance of Galileo compared with
GPS is a marketable feature, it is unlikely that the Controlled Access
Service would be implemented as the Wireless Location Services
technology by cellular network operators.
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A.3  CMT TechServ
Interviewed in May 2000.
Profile of the Company
CMT TechServ is a division of Communications & Measurement
Technologies Ltd (CMT). Operating mainly in the UK, their activities as a
value-added reseller for Trimble GPS equipment has opened some
markets in the Middle East, in support of oil and gas exploration
activities.
CMT’s activities have a common theme of GPS and radio applications,
covering: radio modems for point-to-point telemetry; service and
hardware provision for GPS and Differential GPS (DGPS) (including the
Focus FM UK-wide DGPS service); integrated bespoke GPS solutions;
and Trimble equipment distribution. CMT originally identified a niche in
the market for precise position systems some 11 years ago.
In the near-future CMT intend to expand their activities to include
satellite delivered GPS corrections in collaboration with Omni-Star of
Holland, and are also developing some automatic vessel identification
applications for marine navigation around coastal waters.
Competitive Environment
For GPS equipment solutions, competition comes from suppliers of
equipment from Leica, Ashtech, etc. For the Focus FM DGPS service,
main competition comes from Racal Survey’s DGPS/Real Time
Kinematic (RTK) service. CMT currently have about 60% of the market in
the UK for fee-paying DGPS, although this is changing rapidly.
The switch-off of GPS Selective Availability has made a huge difference
to the market for DGPS services already, with the market for users
requiring 10<x<100m accuracy disappearing overnight, although there is
still a market for high end, <1m accuracy users.
CMT expects the market for satnav equipment to move rapidly toward
greater integration with communications systems, with the market for
location-based services being the driver for the global sat/nav industry in
the next few years.
Market Data
CMT are currently evaluating the market for satnav services, and have
no comment on the existing estimates.
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Technology
CMT believe that there will be a large market for applications requiring
1<x<10 m accuracy. Although some specialist/professional applications
will require decimetre and centimetre accuracy,  this will remain a niche
market for the foreseeable future.
Other drivers for market demand will be increased robustness (i.e. sky
availability), reduced cost and improved in-building performance. This
latter point is recognised as a weakness of GNSS compared with
terrestrial position systems based on cellular telephones, and is believed
to be a large potential market for trains, etc. (which currently have poor
GPS service when in stations or passing through tunnels).
Expected technological trends in GNSS systems influencing market
development include increased accuracy from GPS; increase in the
range of applications using GPS (possibly including integration with other
systems to provide better in-building performance); increased ease of
use in human/machine interfaces; and reduced power and size in GPS
receivers to allow personal tracking applications to be developed. In
particular, CMT expect to see a drive toward GPS receivers with 1-day
active battery packs; at present, battery life presents a significant
restriction to the ways in which GPS receivers are used, and hence to
the applications being developed.
CMT expect a shift to occur in the near to mid-term future regarding the
way in which GNSS applications are bundled. At present, new navigation
and positioning applications are developed and sold as an integrated
system including GPS receiver, application host electronics and user
interface unit. Taking as an example the case of in-car GPS, there is a
host of potential applications, including moving map/navigation systems,
lost vehicle tracker systems, hazard/traffic warning systems, potentially
even “black box”-type data recorders. All of these applications need only
one GPS receiver, therefore CMT expect cars in the future to be fitted
with a GPS/GNSS receiver as a standard feature, which has some kind
of “GPS Out” feeding a data bus on to which the various applications can
be connected.
This is a very significant shift in thinking – the market for GNSS
applications will greatly exceed the market for GNSS receivers, and the
interface standard to be used by commercial applications will soon be
set. In order to be successful, Galileo receivers will therefore need to
offer a compatible interface (because applications developers will not
wish to develop and market separate GPS and Galileo applications).
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Market trends and factors
With the removal of SA, CMT expect an increase in the interest in using
GPS for low-end surveying activities. For example, Local Authorities are
required to map the location of lamp posts, man-holes, fire hydrants,
trees, etc., to some given accuracy, and this is currently performed using
traditional surveying techniques. Although the necessary accuracy is
greater than unaugmented GPS currently offers, CMT expect non-real-
time positioning applications to be developed to meet similar markets
which do not require the expense and complexity of DGPS. This point is
expected to be amplified with the introduction of EGNOS, which will
almost certainly make <10m accuracy DGPS redundant, and may
become the standard tool for non-precision surveying.
Similarly, as more and more GPS receivers are used for recreational
navigation (such as hiking and rambling), it is conceivable that the legal
definition of boundaries and footpaths may change from a line drawn on
a map to a set of co-ordinates published on a web-site which may be
downloaded into a user’s terminal.
CMT perceive the quality and nature of current user interfaces in GNSS
applications as being a barrier to progress. For most mass-market
applications, an output presented as a latitude and longitude display on a
screen is of little value; users require the data to be presented in an
appropriate fashion (such as voice synthesis for traffic management
applications), and to be translated into some appropriate reference (e.g.
a car navigation application that says “Take the first left after the church,
into King Street” is more user friendly than an application that says “Take
the first turning on your left, distance 120 metres”).
CMT see the drivers for change in the GNSS market being integrated
GNSS/comms receivers, and the increase in uptake of in-car GPS (as
previously discussed).
Although CMT expect the mass market demand for accuracy to be
between 1m and 10 m accuracy, they also perceive a significant market
for decimetre and (potentially) centimetre accuracy, for surveying
applications (e.g. oil and gas exploration). There is also likely to be a
niche market for real-time, high precision positioning.
Regarding the development and launch of new products and services,
CMT regard themselves as being project led, i.e. they have no plans to
start developing anything either for EGNOS or Galileo as an internal
investment, but will react when a project identifies a specific requirement.
To this end, EGNOS full operational capability is still too far away to
affect CMT’s plans, and Galileo is not even on their horizon.
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As the launch of Galileo becomes closer, CMT will need to see a
demand for use of the CAS signals in order to begin development of
dedicated Galileo products and services.
CMT expect Galileo to be compatible with, and complementary to, GPS;
CMT expect to see combined GPS/Galileo receivers which process the
open access signals from both systems and produce a better service
than is available from either system on its own.
In order for Galileo to become a part of CMT’s strategic thinking, it would
have to offer a free-to-air signal with 1m<x<10m accuracy standalone
(i.e. without the need for differential receivers or post-processing).
CMT foresee a small market for applications that would benefit from
Galileo’s signal integrity and guarantee of service.
The vast majority of applications foreseen by CMT require some
communications system alongside the GNSS service, therefore an on-
board data communications payload would be of interest, if its bandwidth
is sufficient to enable it to be used for a large number of applications
simultaneously.
Market reaction to the introduction of GALILEO
CMT expect a fairly rapid expansion in the market for GPS receivers and
associated applications, with the recent removal of SA. This is expected
to consolidate the position of GPS as the system of choice for medium
precision positioning systems. For high-precision positioning, differential
GPS (in its various forms) will remain an important, but reduced, market.
In the mid-term future, the introduction of EGNOS and other space-
based augmentation systems will further reduce the market for DGPS
services world-wide.
By the time Galileo is operational GPS receivers (with or without some
form of augmentation) are expected to be extremely commonplace,
coming as standard equipment with most cars, mobile telephones, etc. In
order to make any impact on this market Galileo receivers would have to
either be significantly cheaper or offer better accuracy/availability from its
Open Access Service.
Conclusions
• The removal of SA is already having a profound effect on the market
for DGPS services. In the mid-term future this is likely to lead to an
increase in the market for GPS receivers, which can now be used for
medium precision positioning tasks that previously required DGPS
(e.g. in agriculture);
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• The introduction of EGNOS will take this a stage further, increasing
the accuracy available from standalone GPS receivers;
• CMT expect a fairly rapid surge in the number of installed GPS
receivers (mobile phones, vehicles, etc.), and that the next stage in
the market’s development will be based around applications sold
without a bundled receiver. This requires some kind of interface
standard to be developed;
• Galileo must be sufficiently compatible with GPS that any
applications developed and intended to use a standard “GPS
interface” could also be connected to the output from a Galileo
receiver;
• Galileo is too far away to have an impact on CMT’s strategic thinking.
From their current understanding of the system, the market for the
Controlled Access Services will be very limited;
• In order to succeed, Galileo receivers need to be cheaper than GPS,
or the OAS needs to offer better accuracy and availability than GPS;
• Receivers that can combine measurements from GPS and Galileo
free-to-air signals are likely to meet the needs of the vast majority of
users for whom either system on its own is not good enough;
• A key opportunity for improvement would be in-building performance.
CMT see the in-building performance of GPS as a weakness; if
Galileo can offer significantly better performance in buildings and in
built-up areas, this would be a significant advantage;
• CMT see the drivers for change in the GNSS market being integrated
GNSS/comms receivers, and the increase in uptake of in-car GPS.
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APPENDIX B RESULTS FROM UKISC WORKING GROUP SURVEY
The following sections present consolidated reports from responses
received for the UK Industrial Space Committee’s Galileo Working Group
survey discussed in Section 3.5.
Five responses were produced, which are broadly classified as three
representing the views of “Prime Contractors” and two “Non-primes”.
Consolidated responses to the list in questions presented in Section 3.5
are presented below
B.1 Galileo “Prime Contractors” view
The points listed below present a synopsis of the views expressed by
members of the UKISC Galileo Working Group representing large
systems integrators and potential prime contractors for elements of the
Galileo system infrastructure.
1 EGNOS could become the safety service for GPS and Galileo (i.e. The
EGNOS system could just delete GLONASS and replace it with Galileo).
With respect to other augmentations, you can probably do everything you
want with GPS provided you find an augmentation to suit the application.
What we hope Galileo can do is to make many of the diverse range of
augmentations redundant. In many ways Galileo is competing with the
augmentations rather than GPS. If you look at the number and cost of the
hundreds of GPS augmentations, a global Galileo could well be cheaper.
2 GPS III appears to be aiming at a performance similar to Galileo. 3G
mobile communications systems could do the job for the mass-market
users, but according to a German study, the infrastructure costs in
Germany alone would equal a global Galileo.
3 The 'free of direct user charge' service of Galileo is likely to be superior to
that offered by GPS IIF due to superior signal structure (possibly 3
frequencies).
4 There is little technical risk in implementing Galileo especially after the
successful deployment of GPS.  The most significant delay has been due
to a lack of an institutional/legal entity (joint undertaking) with the
authority and competence to move forward.
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5 European Governments plan to spend 1.1B Euro (tbc) on the
development phase.  After that, user departments will pay as they would
for GPS.  Beyond that, the PPP process will determine the size of public
sector subsidy, if any.
6 Mechanisms could be related to Intellectual property Rights (IPR) –
licences, royalties, etc. The only way to get commitment is to invite bids
from potential PPP operators and to enter into binding contracts.
7 If the US government decide to 'take out' the competition with a
constellation of (say) 100 GPS III satellites with a free open-access
signal, then they could obviously scupper Galileo. The questions are
would they, and why?  The main motivation behind GPS modernisation is
probably Galileo.  If Galileo stopped, would the US press ahead with
modernisation?
8 The better you make OAS, the less people will be willing to pay for CAS.
The professional market for Galileo never was big and never would come
close to covering much of the costs of Galileo. Tapping into the mass
market has always been the only possible way of getting a reasonable
commercial return on Galileo.  Our own views on the potential market
would have to remain confidential at the moment as this would form part
of our bid to be the PPP partner.
9 The only way to ensure this is to make it a PPP and to invite competitive
bids. The bidders would then have to put their money where their mouths
were and state what public funding would be required and what their own
business plans were. However, also remember that this is PPP (i.e. a
partnership) and the public side can expect to shoulder some of the
continuing burden through public sector service payments.
10 France seem to stand alone on this. No-one wants Galileo as a military
system except France, who threaten they will walk away from the
programme if they don't get PRS. We will just have to watch this space
and see how the politicians respond.
11 At the moment Galileo would not have any capability like SA and the
military will not have any control. Is this realistic? I think not, but who
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knows.
12 It is our belief that Galileo will only be used as an aid to navigation.  “Sole
means” status is difficult to achieve, and not necessarily desirable in view
of the possibility of interference or single point failure.  The liability
therefore may be limited to negligence.
13 (a) This must be through a formal competitive tender process leading to a
binding contractual relationship (see 8 above). The EC should invite
consortia to make proposals to deploy and operate a system to deliver a
given level of service for a given period of time ('the concession
contract'). The consortia would then make proposals stating what money
would be required from the public sector (if any and when required, short
or long term) and what their business plans were. The award would be
adjudicated on the level of service offered, the confidence that it would
be delivered, the robustness of the business case, the cost to the public
sector etc
14 (b) The strategic arguments in favour of Galileo are strong enough in
some countries where they already would like it to be a public
procurement (e.g. France, Italy) but not in others (e.g. UK, Germany,
Netherlands).
15 Up to the point of Galileo Initial Operational Capability, which should be
brought about by an entirely publicly funded programme, there will be
very limited grounds for private funds.  The subsequent development of
services and user equipment is where we would see genuine private
investment.  (A PPP provided infrastructure should ultimately be
regarded as a variant of public funding).
16 It is a major criticism of the Galileo Programme that little participation by
end users has resulted in a specification which, whilst sound, follows
traditional lines, perhaps lacking innovation. The reluctance of user
groups to participate should not be construed as lack of interest but as
reluctance to pay before they can be sure that a well managed
programme will emerge.
17 Airlines, including many American ones, have been positive towards the
introduction of Galileo provided it does not require re-certification of the
aircraft fit.  Galileo plus GPS will give a level of service that should be
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much more easily certifiable for aviation use than augmented GPS on its
own.
B.2 “Non-Primes” view
The points listed below present a synopsis of the views expressed by
members of the UKISC Galileo Working Group representing smaller
companies, and/or organisations closer to the applications-end of Galileo
services, rather than having major interests in Galileo system
infrastructure.
1 There are two strong reasons to support Galileo. Firstly, GPS has
become a key element of Europe’s transport, telecommunications and
industrial infrastructure, and it is rapidly becoming indispensable.  It is
wrong for Europe to become so reliant on a system under the control of
the US DoD. Secondly, a combined GPS/Galileo constellation is worth
much more than the sum of its parts.
The GPS constellation was designed for military users who typically can
see a lot of the sky at the same time. The GPS system performs poorly
in urban areas. Similarly, EGNOS was designed primarily for aviation
users and also offers little to urban users. Although Galileo on its own
offers little improvement over GPS + EGNOS, on its own it provides an
alternative system, and in combination with GPS it will open a huge
market for consumer uses of satellite navigation.
2 Services are still under definition but expected to include;
• Free GPS like service (“OAS”)
• A free ‘safety-of-life’ service with authentication of signal to prevent
spoofing (“SAS”)
• Higher accuracy charged commercial services (“CAS”)
• Very accurate and/or encrypted services for Government and/or
paying users (“PRS”)
These will be guaranteed services. They will be comparable in accuracy
with GPS upgrade; probably will have higher security available to
commercial users. Probably more accurate than 3G systems
3 This is the current specification for the OAS. However, this causes a
problem for any commercial operator of the system, because such a
service, when combined with the free dual-frequency signal from
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upgraded GPS, will provide such a high level of performance that this
will inevitably “cannibalise” the market for the CAS (and possibly SAS)
services.
4 On current plans, GPS will begin to deploy next generation satellites
before Galileo deploys its first operational satellites. However, since
Galileo is starting from scratch (rather than replacing old satellites), it
should have a full operational capability with dual-frequency signals
many years before GPS Block IIF.
Terrestrial networks will start to include positioning systems to support
location – based services well before Galileo, but these are unlikely to
offer the same degree of accuracy.
5 According to the official programme plan, Galileo will cost  3.25 Billion
to the end of 2008, and a further  220 Million per annum thereafter. Of
this, only  1.8 Billion of the development costs are currently identified
as a public funding contribution, the balance (and the recurring costs)
should come from private investment.
It is extremely unlikely that the system will be capable of generating
direct revenues sufficient to attract the required level of private
investment. Therefore, if the system is developed as some form of PPP,
it is almost inevitable that there will be a significant public funding
contribution. Given the cost model stated above, it is estimated that a
“public service” charge of around  600 Million pa will be required in
order to make Galileo a worthwhile private investment.
Assuming that the UK contributes at 15% of total costs, the cost to UK
would be about  270 M initially, with a recurring cost of  90 M pa.
6 There have been no convincing arguments that any revenue
mechanisms can be set up around selling access to the Commercial
Access signals . Potentially there may be scope to charge a levy on
each Galileo receiver chip, but this is fraught with difficulties.
Although a number of organisations have signed a commitment in
principle to invest in the Galileo system, following a number of studies
there has been no evidence that Galileo will attract sufficient private
investment to sustain any form of PPP, unless a very substantial annual
public service charge is levied.
7 The technical and commercial arguments supporting Galileo (i.e. the
benefits to users from a bigger constellation and dual-frequency free
signals) apply equally to the US and Europe. The US has a number of
current generation GPS satellites on the ground, ready to replace failed
satellites in orbit. The current plan is to upgrade the system gradually,
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be replacing failed Block II satellites with next generation satellites as
the become available. However, the GPS satellites in orbit have
demonstrated service lives considerably longer than their design
specifications. As a result, if the US sees a potential commercial
advantage, it could launch say six additional GPS satellites at short
notice, and accelerate the upgrade programme by two to three years.
This would inevitably reduce any potential market for Galileo commercial
access signals. Since GPS IIF will also include free signals in the
protected L5 band, such an acceleration of the programme would also
allow the US to consolidate the role of GPS in aviation and safety-of-life
applications.
8 There has been an assumption that there is a market for users requiring
authentication, accountability and a guarantee of service. This market is
small (by volume), and its financial value has not been determined. Such
users would have a simple commercial decision: Pay for Galileo’s
guaranteed service, or pay an insurance premium and use the free-to-air
signals. It is very unlikely that CAS can be competitive in this
environment.
9 This is a clear weakness in the current programme structure – there is
no single customer, and ESA are exploiting the lack of well-defined
requirements to undertake R&D activities that should be left entirely to
potentially suppliers of the system.
There is no reason why Galileo could not be run as a simple
procurement. The required service specifications are well-known and
can be simply stated – basically they are the same performance
specifications as GPS Block IIF. The EU should set up a single body
charged with procuring the system against these specifications, with
ESA providing technical assistance in tender evaluation.
The current confused structure cannot possibly produce a cost-effective
solution.
10 Galileo’s potential use as a military system is a great concern to the US.
The “High Dynamic User” specifications defined in the Galileo System
Requirements Document greatly exceed the performance of non-military
GPS receivers, and would enable Galileo to be used as a guidance
platform for some weapons systems.
There is an argument that if Europe is to invest in its own GNSS, it
makes sense to use it to provide strategic independence from GPS.
However, in this case the system must be an entirely public procurement
and operation, with similar export controls to those applied by the US.
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If it is not to be used for military purposes, there is no justification for the
PRS service or the High Dynamic User specifications. There is also an
argument that in this case the system does not need to follow the
GPS/GLONASS model with clocks on-board the satellites. A much
cheaper architecture would use bent-pipe satellites and closed-loop
controlled clocks on the ground.
At present Galileo is a civil system, with some potential military uses.
This is the worst possible option, and a decision must be made to go
one way or the other. The UK position is to make it a purely civil system.
11 It is inevitable that Galileo will include some mechanism for jamming or
deliberately degrading the signals in the event of an emergency. Galileo
will not be able to offer any levels of guaranteed availability beyond
those of GPS C/A code – under conditions in which GPS SA is turned
on, Galileo will undoubtedly also use a degraded signal.
12 We have seen no evidence that any user group will use Galileo only if it
offers liability cover. The costs associated with providing this cover are
likely to be very high, and difficult to recover – it would be much easier
and cheaper for individual users to take out their own insurance for
problems associated with using Galileo. The requirement for liability
cover from the system should be removed.
13 The strategic arguments and benefits to Europe (and the world) that
Galileo offers have been identified and presented many times over.
Clearly the system ought to be deployed even if private investment is not
forthcoming. However, this introduces a problem for the supporters of
PPP because the benefits that will accrue will come regardless of
whether or not it includes private investment. Unlike a PPP for a hospital
or a toll bridge, the Prime manufacturers will benefit from the
construction and operation of the system, regardless of whether or not
they invested in it directly. Private investment into the programme will
not give them any significant commercial advantage.
14 There are no such plans. At some point in the future, before a PPP can
go ahead, there must be some comparison of the costs using a PPP
compared with a traditional public procurement (the so-called “public
sector comparator” or PSC). Following on from the previous answer, the
Galileo programme is in the nonsensical situation in which the promoted
candidates for the PPP have a vested interest in their PPP proposals
failing the PSC – the system will still be built (almost certainly by these
same Prime Contractors).
15 The arguments against a fully publicly funded programme are dogmatic,
based on a simplistic argument that since many people will make a lot of
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money from the existence of Galileo, they ought to put up some of the
investment, which in turn will lead to a cost-effective design and
operations concept. These arguments don’t stand up to scrutiny, for
reasons previously discussed.
There are many arguments to support an entirely public-funded
programme, but the simplest is that a PPP cannot ever be cheaper than
the PSC, and there’s no reason why any investors should try to make it
so. Public procurement of the system is inevitable, but the price will go
up the longer it takes to recognise this fact.
Mitigation techniques to survive signal loss are required even for GPS.
For the UK there is extensive and growing reliance on GPS for strategic
issues. Telecommunications (timing), Survey (oil and Gas exploration
Ordnance Survey) and public service such as ambulance (where they
are totally reliant on GPS to improve their response times to incidents,
as mandated by Government). This growing reliance on GPS in the UK
for strategic and public interest issues means that should Galileo go
ahead it should be treated as a true public project and not PPP. Any
direct revenue generation opportunities from Galileo are very low. The
main revenue will come from production of receivers and value added
services from which Government will then take a tax (i.e. corporation
tax).
However much we ‘trust’ the US, it is inevitable that US national
interests will be the prime concern, and for either political or commercial
reasons the GPS service may be changed, degraded or removed with
serious consequences in some areas. However a subset of GPS out of
US control would suffice.
16 End-user groups have not been adequately represented. Specifically,
the signal structure should best meet the requirements of end-users (in
terms of performance and equipment cost), even if that means providing
less than the maximum theoretical performance.
The Galileo programme has taken an “if we build it, they will come”
attitude to end-users, which is true to an extent, but may lead to an
imperfect solution.
17 WAAS and EGNOS are likely to become enshrined in civil aviation
standards and practices over the next few years. Galileo’s integrity
determination system does not offer any performance advantages over
WAAS/EGNOS and there is no evidence that the civil aviation
community will reap any benefit from this system. However, the
additional availability provided by Galileo’s additional satellites would be
strongly welcomed by all aviation users.
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APPENDIX C PERFORMANCE OF MDE ALGORITHM
As has been previously discussed, the nearest comparison to the
analysis presented in this thesis in currently published literature comes
from work performed under [17]. This work, undertaken under the GALA
Study, uses the technique of Marginally Detectable Errors (MDE) to
assess RAIM availability. The MDE technique is itself based on an
algorithm formalised in [27].
The steps of the MDE method may be summarised as:
1. Compute Cx, the covariance matrix of the estimated parameters
(position and clock  error) and extract standard deviations:
Cx = (GTWG)-1
Equation C- 1
2. Compute Cv, the covariance matrix of the residuals:
Cv = W-1 - G(GTWG)-1GT
Equation C- 2
3. For each observation i, determine the standard deviation of the
residual, σvi, from the ith element of the leading diagonal of Cv.
4. For each observation i, determine the variance of the observation,
σi
2
, which is the square of the UERE for satellite i, from the ith
element of the leading diagonal of W-1.
5. Calculate the ratio Pi:
Pi = σi2 / σvi
Equation C- 3
6. For the specified False Alarm Probability (PFA), evaluate a, the
number of standard distributions (from a two-tailed test) associated
with this probability on a Gaussian distribution.
7. For the specified Missed Detection Probability (PMD), evaluate b, the
number of standard distributions (from a one-tailed test) associated
with this probability on a Gaussian distribution.
8. For each observation i, determine the Marginally Detectable Error
(MDEi), which is the minimum size of gross error on this observation
that will be detected at the specified PMD and PFA:
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MDEi = Pi (a + b)
Equation C- 4
9. For each observation i, produce a vector bi, which is a null vector,
except for the ith element which is MDEi, for example:
biT = [0,0,0, MDEi,0…0,0,0]
Equation C- 5
10. For each observation i, compute the position shift due to each MDEi
xi = (GTWG)-1 GTW bi
Equation C- 6
11. The Vertical Protection Limit is taken to be the largest value of xi(3,3),
i.e. the largest third diagonal element on the list of vectors xi,
The key point that distinguishes the MDE approach from the LSR
method is the way the False Alarm probability (PFA) is handled. In the
LSR method, k (PMD) is identical to b as shown in Step 7 above.
However, in the LSR method, the calculation of T (N, PFA), the decision
threshold for alarms, reflects the assumption that the test statistic has a
chi-square distribution, with N-4 degrees of freedom. This is the main
cause of divergence between results using the two different methods.
Although superficially the LSR method seems quite different from the
MDE method, in fact by following the steps through in detail it turns out
that the computed vertical position shift due to MDE(max) is exactly the
same as (a + b) x Vslope(max). This somewhat surprising result is because
σvi (in MDE terminology) is identical to ((1-Pii)) x σi) (LSR terminology).
VPL calculated from the MDE method is therefore identically equal to:
VPLMDE = Vslope(max) x  (a + b)
Equation C- 7
Therefore there are two differences in the calculation of VPL:
1) For the Missed Detection component, MDE multiplies b by Vslope(max),
whilst the LSR method multiplies b by σv;
2) For the False Alarm component, MDE multiplies Vslope(max) by the
normal distribution factor a, whilst LSR multiplies Vslope(max) by the 2
distribution factor T(N, P FA).
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Where the number of satellites in view is around 6 or 7, as might be
typical for applications using GPS alone with a masking angle of say 10°,
the two methods will give very similar results. However, as the number of
degrees of freedom increases, with up to 23 satellites in view for the dual
constellation case, the divergence in results becomes dramatic, with the
MDE method giving much lower VPL values.
Figure C- 1 presents the results for a simulation of the combined
GPS/Galileo constellation case, for a fixed geographical position, at 5
minute intervals for 24 hours. This shows that the results from the MDE
algorithm follow the same general pattern as those from the LSR
algorithm, but with a reasonably consistent offset, making the MDE
estimate of VPL less conservative than the LSR approach.
Figure C- 2 presents the results for the same case, re-run to use just the
nominal 24 satellite GPS constellation. In this case the results from the
two methods are very similar, with occasional excursions by the MDE
method to large VPL values when unfavourable viewing geometries
occur.
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Figure C- 1: Comparison of VPL calculated using LSR and MDE
approaches, for GPS+Galileo
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LSR vs MDE. Lat = 52 Long = 0 deg.
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Figure C- 2: Comparison of VPL calculated using LSR and MDE
approaches, for GPS-only
A Monte Carlo simulation for combined GPS/Galileo constellations was
performed using the “Bias Modelling” spreadsheet described in Section
6.3, for both LSR and MDE approaches simultaneously. For a fixed
geographical location and epoch (52°N latitude, 0° longitude, time = 0
minutes), one hundred thousand repetitions were made to calculate the
LSR VPL, MDE VPL and actual vertical error. For each repetition, new
random values for the UERE on each visible satellite were applied,
based on a Gaussian distribution and the UERE/elevation curves
presented previously for Galileo and GPS dual frequency services. In
order to produce meaningful results with one hundred thousand
repetitions, PMD and PFA were both set to 1 x 10-4, so that ten false
alarms would be expected in the fault-free case. For each case, each
algorithm could produce one of four outcomes:
• Normal operations – vertical error is below VPL and test statistic is
below test threshold;
• Alarm – vertical error is above VPL and test statistic is above test
threshold;
• False Alarm – vertical error is below VPL and test statistic is above
test threshold;
• Missed Detection – vertical error is above VPL and test statistic is
below test threshold.
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Normal Alarm FA MD
LSR 99,988 0 12 0
MDE 95,388 3 4609 0
Table C- 1: Comparison of MDE with LSR for Galileo+GPS Case
The MDE method clearly has a much higher false alarm rate than the
LSR method; in fact this rate is far above the specified PFA value,
equivalent to a false alarm probability of 4.6 x 10-2. It is believed that that
this is because by using the normal distribution factor a instead of the 2
factor, the MDE method effectively ignores any false alarms generated
by satellites other than that identified as generating the MDE, when
setting the test statistic. This is potentially in interesting area for further
investigation, but is beyond the scope of this thesis.
This Monte Carlo analysis was then repeated for the GPS-only case. and
The LSR results were as follows:
Normal Alarm FA MD
LSR 99,989 0 11 0
MDE 100,000 0 0 0
Table C- 2: Comparison of MDE with LSR for Galileo-only Case
These results appear to support the conclusion that the MDE approach
yields similar results to the LSR approach for small constellations, but
differs significantly with large constellations, to the extent that the MDE
algorithm used in the GALA analysis of combined GPS/Galileo RAIM
performance is invalid, since it does not provide the specified fault-free
false alarm probability when dealing with large constellations. Because
the results between the two methods are so similar when using the GPS
constellation alone, it is conceivable that the shortcomings with the MDE
method have not been previously identified, because few analyses have
been performed looking at constellations larger than GPS alone.
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APPENDIX D INTRODUCTION TO SINGULAR VALUE
DECOMPOSITION
This introduction to the Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) process is
derived from “Matrix Computations” by Golub and Van Loan [52].
SVD is a very useful way of dealing with sets of linear equations (or
matrices) which are either singular or numerically very close to singular.
In such situations, other decomposition techniques such as Gaussian
elimination may fail. SVD is also a very powerful method for solving
least-squares (LS) problems, both as an alternative to the “normal
equations” method of solving the LS problem or for solving the total least
squares (TLS) problem as will be demonstrated below.
For any real M x N matrix A, there exist;
• An orthogonal, M x M matrix, U,
• An orthogonal, N x N matrix, V,
• A diagonal, P x P matrix, Σ = diag(σ1,…,σP)
where P = min (M, N) and σ1 >= σ2 >=…>= σP >= 0.
Such that:
A = UΣVT
Equation D- 1
=A U
V
Σ
NNMN
N
MMM
Figure D - 1: Graphical Representation of the SVD Process
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The (column) vectors, ui and vi are termed the ith left singular and ith right
singular vectors respectively. σ1,…,σP are termed, the “singular values”
of A and all other elements in matrix Σ are zero.
Another commonly used, trimmed-down form of the SVD is the “Thin
SVD”. This is similar to the above method with the exception that the
matrix, U has dimensions M x N and the matrix, Σ is a square, N x N
matrix . This is the type of SVD method employed in the EIV RAIM
method. Matrix U in this case is “column-orthogonal” as its columns are
orthonormal but the matrix itself, being singular (non-square) can have
no inverse.
=A U
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Figure D - 2: Graphical Representation of the Thin SVD Process
A transformation performed by matrix, A upon the N-dimensional vector,
x, can be characterised in terms of the matrices U, Σ and V in the
following way. Every matrix transformation involves a stretch and/or a
rotation of the matrix or vector which is being acted upon. This can be
thought of as the action of three, independent matrix transformations,
namely, the action of a hanger matrix, a stretcher matrix and an aligner
matrix. A hanger matrix is created by loading the vectors from a
perpframe into the columns of the matrix. A perframe is a set of
orthonormal basis unit vectors (axes) for an N-dimensional vector space.
In analogy with the SVD, the hanger matrix is represented by the matrix,
U. The aligner matrix is created by loading the vectors from a perpframe
into the rows of the matrix. In analogy with the SVD, the aligner matrix is
the matrix, V. The stretcher matrix defines the amount of stretch in each
of the respective dimensions which will be performed by the matrix
transformation. In analogy with the SVD, the stretcher matrix is the
matrix, Σ. For example, a stretch of amount, σ1 will be performed in the
direction of the first, perpframe vector and so on. A value of zero for any
of the elements of Σ will indicate that this particular dimension has
collapsed and the matrix transformation is performed onto a vector
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space of lower dimensionality. It is important to note that Singular Value
Decomposition can be performed upon any M x N matrix.
In the transformation, y = A.x, where x and y are N-dimensional vectors
a linear mapping is performed from the vector space x to the vector
space y. If there are as many unknowns as there are simultaneous,
linear equations, i.e. M = N and they are not linearly dependent then
matrix A is non-singular and square. This means that the whole of the
vector space, y, can be “reached” by matrix, A, i.e. the “range” of A. If
however, matrix, A is singular (or numerically close to singular) then
there will be a subspace of x that is mapped to zero by the matrix
transformation, i.e. A.x = 0. This subspace is termed the “nullspace” and
its dimension is termed the “nullity” of A. The subspace of y which can
be reached by the matrix transformation performed by A is termed the
“range” of A. The dimension of the range of A is termed the “rank” and
observes the simple relationship; Rank + Nullity = N.
In the case of an under-determined set of linear equations, i.e. N > M, a
unique solution is not expected and the matrix transformation performed
by matrix A maps the vector space of x into one of lower dimensionality.
In this case σ1,…,σM produced by the SVD are non-zero (or non-
negligible numerically) and the corresponding columns of matrix U define
the orthonormal basis unit vectors (perpframes) of the range of A. Also in
this case, σM+1,…,σN are zero (or numerically negligible) and their
corresponding columns in the matrix, V (or rows of matrix V-1) define the
orthonormal basis unit vectors of the nullspace.
rank(A) = r
Equation D- 2
null(A) = span{vr+1,…,vn)
Equation D- 3
range(A) = span{u1,…,ur)
Equation D- 4
The SVD process is very useful for identifying problems of rank
deficiency or numerically near-rank deficiency with a design matrix. If
any of the components, σ1,…,σP are zero or small enough that their
value is swamped by round-off error then this is the first indication that
there is a problem of rank deficiency. The matrix, Σ is said to be ill-
conditioned if σN/σ1 is too large, i.e. its reciprocal is of the same order as
the machine precision.
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When considering the design matrix of the RAIM algorithms, the above
situation is not likely to occur as the solution is generally over-
determined by multiple (more than 4) satellites and linear dependency is
likely to be precluded by the geometry of the satellite orbits. Hence the
singular values σ1,…,σN will all be positive, non-zero. σN is a relevant
value as it is the 2-norm distance from A to the set of all singular
matrices.
D.1 The SVD Process
SVD is a commonly used process and examples of coding
implementations are easily found in the general literature. This section
gives a high level description of the general processes required to
implement a working SVD algorithm.
The process can be broken down in to six discrete steps. As described in
Equation D- 1, the matrix A can be described in terms of three matrices,
U,  Σ and V. To find these matrices, follow the procedure described
below:
1. Find the ‘n’ Eigenvalues, λ, of the matrix   AT.A
2. Find the  ‘n’ Eigenvectors,  that correspond to the ‘n’ Eigenvalues
found in step 1.
3. Form a diagonal matrix, Σ, from the Eigenvalues found in step 1,
Σ =  σ1 = √(λ1) 0 0
0 σ2 = √(λ2) 0
0 0 σp = √(λp)
where p is the smaller of m and n,
and  σ1 >  σ2 > σp
4. Arrange the Eigenvectors of AT.A, in the same order, to form the
columns of matrix V,
V = v1 v2 vn
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5. Find the first column vectors of the matrix U, using the relationship:
ui = σi
-1
 
Avi, for i = 1 : n
where vi are the column vectors of the matrix V
6. Find the remaining (m-n) columns of the matrix U, using the Gram-
Schmidt orthogonalisation process. This process is well documented
in mathematical literature and will not be described here.
D.2 SVD of a 2-Dimensional Matrix
In order to demonstrate the purpose of using the Singular Value
decomposition process, let us consider the SVD of a simple 2x2 matrix:
A =  0.5 1
1 0.5
Using the process described above, this can be decomposed into the
three matrices, U,  Σ and V as follows:
Original Matrix, A Hang (U) Stretch (Σ) Align (V)
0.5 1 -0.7071 0.7071 1.5 0 -0.7071 -0.7071
1 0.5 -0.7071 -0.7071 0 0.5 -0.7071 0.7071
To understand the physical significance of these three matrices, let us
consider the matrix action (i.e. the transformation) of the matrix A on the
points of a unit circle. This is shown in Figure D - 3, i.e. the unit circle is
transformed to an ellipse/ The transformation is, therefore, a  rptation
about the origin of the coordinate frame, with a stretch along each of the
axes of the frame.
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Figure D - 3: Action of Matrix A on Unit Circle
The next three figures demonstrate the effect of multiplying A by the
matrices, U,  Σ and VT in sequence, showing how this produces an
identical transformation.
Figure D - 4 shows the transformation of the U matrix, which is a rotation
of the axes of the coordinate frame (as demonstrated by the circle and
square, which mark the “before” and “after” of a single point).
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Figure D - 4: Action of U (“Hang”) Matrix on Unit Circle
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Figure D - 5 : Action of Σ (“Stretch”) Matrix on Unit Circle
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Figure D - 5 shows the “stretch” along the two axes, derived from the Σ
matrix. In this case the effect is to multiply the coordinates of the points
of the unit circle by 1.5 in one direction and by 0.5 in the orthogonal
direction.
The final step is to “align” the transformation back to the original
coordinate frame, by multiplying by VT. This yields the same ellipse as
shown in Figure D - 3. We can therefore see, by following the steps of
the SVD process, the basis for the transformation of the unit circle to an
ellipse, aligned and stretched by matrix A.
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Figure D - 6: Action of V (“Align”) Matrix on Stretched Circle
This physical representation of the SVD process is critical to
understanding the EIV RAIM method. If we extrapolate this example to
the 5-dimensional matrix on which SVD is performed in the EIV method,
we see that the √USSE’ test statistic is effectively a measure of the
“stretch” caused by inconsistencies in the observations, whilst the H/e
statistic is a measure of the rotation of the coordinate frame caused by
these inconsistencies. This is the basis for using the SVD method to
produce two independent test statistics for RAIM.
D.3 SVD Solution of the Least-Squares (LS) Problem
As mentioned earlier, the Singular Value Decomposition can be
employed as an alternative to the normal equations as a means to
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solving the least squares (LS) problem. Whilst this particular method is
not employed in the calculations of RAIM, this section is included to
provide background understanding of the SVD.
The least-squares solution for the (N=4)-dimensional position vector, x,
using the normal equations is given by:
x = (GT.G)-1.GT.y
Equation D- 5
in the un-weighted form (x = (GT.W.G)-1.GT.W.y in the weighted form),
where:
G is the M x N design matrix, y is the M-dimensional vector of residuals,
W is the M x M weighting matrix and M is the number of visible satellites.
Taking the un-weighted case as example, the singular value
decomposition of G as:
G = U.Σ.VT
Equation D- 6
produces the least-squares position solution:
x = V.Σ-1.UT.y
Equation D- 7
Extra robustness is given to this method by the added substitution of any
elements of the inverse matrix, Σ-1 with zero where the corresponding
elements of the matrix, Σ are zero (or very small in comparison with the
machine error). Whilst this may seem counter-intuitive, it actually means
that one of the simultaneous equations which is dominated by round-off
error is being disregarded and hence improving the position solution.
This method is very robust and theoretically can not fail to find a solution.
It is an interesting point to note that in the SVD solution of the least-
squares problem, non-zero elements of matrix, Σ, σ1,…,σP are inversely
proportional to the lengths of the principal axes of the error ellipsoid of
the least-squares position fit.
D.4 SVD Solution of the Total Least-Squares (EIV) Problem
The standard least-squares solution to the RAIM problem assumes that
all errors are confined to the vector of residuals, y. To perform a more
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accurate analysis one has to consider that the errors are instead
distributed between the y vector and the design matrix, G.
Let us consider a general problem, characterised by the set of
simultaneous, linear equations:
G.X = Y
Equation D- 8
where G is an M x N matrix, X is an M x d matrix (or an M-dimensional
vector, x in the “one-dimensional” case where d = 1, as in the EIV RAIM
method) and Y is an M x d matrix, y (or an M-dimensional vector in the
“one-dimensional” case). The total least-squares method aims not at
reducing the sum of the squares of the errors on Y; rather it aims to
reduce the sum of the squares of the errors on both Y and G at the same
time. If we term the matrix of the errors on G as the M x N matrix, H and
the matrix of the errors on Y as the M x d matrix, E then the aim of the
total least-squares solution is to minimise the Frobenius norm of the
weighted augmented matrix, C.[H E].D, i.e.:
minrange(Y+E) ⊆ range(G+H) ||C.[H E].D||F
Equation D- 9
where:
C and D are suitably defined weighting matrices such that C =
diag(c1,…,cM) and D = diag(d1,…,dN+d)
If we call the weighted, augmented matrix, C.[G Y].D, A and then
perform Singular Value Decomposition upon this matrix, we have:
C.[G Y].D = A  = U.Σ.VT
Equation D- 10
where the following partitions apply:
A = A1 A2
N d
U = U1 U2
N d
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V = V11 V12 N
V21 V22 d
N d
Σ = Σ1 0 N
0 Σ2 d
N d
If σn(A1) > σn+1(A), then the matrix, [Htls Etls] defined by:
C.[Htls Etls].D = -U2.Σ2.[V12T V22T]
Equation D- 11
Which solves Equation D- 9. If D1 = diag(d1,…,dN) and D2 =
diag(dN+1,…,dN+d) then the position solution matrix, XTLS:
XTLS = -D1.V12.V22-1.D2-1
Equation D- 12
exists and is a unique solution to (G + H).X = Y + E.
As stated earlier, the EIV RAIM total least-squares problem is termed
“one-dimensional” in that the value of d is 1 (we do not have multiple
right-hand sides). Thus in this case,
xTLS = -D1.V15.V55-1.D5-1
Equation D- 13
where the following partitioning scheme has been employed:
A = A1 A5
4 1
U = U1 U5
4 1
V = V11 V15 4
V51 V55 1
4 1
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Σ = Σ1 0 4
0 Σ5 1
4 1
Similarly, the M x 5 matrix, containing the errors,  [Htls etls] is defined by:
C.[Htls etls].D = -U5.Σ5.[V15T V55T]
Equation D- 14
Or, more usefully,
[Htls etls] = -σ5.C-1.U5.[V15T V55T].D-1
Equation D- 15
Back-substituting this value for [Htls etls] gives:
minrange(Y+E) ⊆ range(G+H) ||C.[H e].D||F = σ5
Equation D- 16
Thus providing the basic equations from which the EIV RAIM test
statistics are derived in Section 10.4.
